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 Abstract 
This thesis examines an important yet largely unexplored inner-workings of business 
group affiliation in emerging economies by exploring firm risk of group affiliates in 
comparison to their non-group firms. Using data for seven financial years the analysis 
focused on group affiliated firms and non-group firms in India, one of the largest 
emerging economies. The study is done in three phases. In the first study, the impact 
of business group affiliation on firm risk relative to non-group firms is examined. 
Followed by analysing if the difference between risk-taking by business-group 
affiliated firms and non-group firms depends on the relative size, sales revenue and 
cash flow of a firm within a business group, and finally on the relative bankruptcy risk 
of a firm. The second study extended the analysis by examining the impact of 
corporate governance on risk-taking, and the difference in the impact of these 
corporate governance variables between business group affiliated and non-group 
firms. The proxies for corporate governance include a wide range of board 
characteristics. Finally, the study extended the modelling of firm-level risk by 
considering the two-way relationship between risk and capital structure using a 
structural equation modelling (SEM) framework. The findings of the analyses suggest 
that 1)firm risk of both business group affiliates and non-group firms are defined by 
unsystematic risk (over 80%). 2)group affiliated firms’ risk-taking are a)lower relative 
to non-group firms, b)highly dependent on the contribution of the affiliates towards 
overall groups’ size, revenue and cash flow, c)financially safe firms assumes lower 
risk than financially distressed firms, 3)corporate governance is an effective 
mechanism to monitor firms in EMEs regardless of its organizational form, 4)firm risk 
and capital structure of both group affiliates and non-group firms are interlinked 
suggesting that both firms are likely pursuing strategy of reducing the likelihood of 
bankruptcy either by adjusting its capital structure or by adjusting the risk it bears. 
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 : 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
A few fast growing and liberalising Asian and Latin American countries were 
identified as ‘newly industrialising countries in the 1980s. However, this term was 
replaced by emerging market economies (EMEs) due to the widespread of 
liberalisation and adoption of market-based policies by the developing countries.  
EMEs are classified by International Monetary Funds (IMF) as middle-income 
countries that lack criteria such as market development, size and liquidity to be 
classified as developed economies. EMEs have been receiving growing attention since 
the early 80s because of their growing share in global trading and foreign direct 
investments. EMEs worldwide share certain characteristics, namely, weak institutions, 
market imperfections and market incompleteness. These characteristics often 
contribute to the high transaction costs for firms and it is argued that this results in 
concentrated ownership structures of firms, and formation of organisational structures 
such as business groups.  
Literature on business groups describe business groups as confederations of legally 
independent firms that share multiples economic, social, formal and informal ties 
(Granovetter, 1995; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001) that take coordinated action (Khanna & 
Rivkin, 2001). Even though the firms within the groups are legally independent, they 
typically are horizontally and vertically connected. Firms’ horizontal connections are 
such as cross-shareholding, interlocking directorship, while vertical connections are 
such as shared ownership and control (Elango, Pattnaik, & Wieland, 2016; Yiu, 
Bruton, & Lu, 2005). The divergence between control and ownership in business 
groups through pyramidal ownership structures and cross-holdings of shares are 
argued to be facilitating tunnelling activities by controlling shareholders.    
Generally business groups are highly diversified, however, individual firms in each 
groups are more focused (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a) which facilitates resources 
including human capital reallocations. Early literature of Left (1978) argued that 
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business groups serve three main functions. First, business groups are organisations 
structured in such way to appropriate quasi rents – which accrue access to imperfect 
markets of capital and information. Second, business groups are alternative to 
portfolio diversification in the absence of market for risk and uncertainty. Third, 
through use of vertical integration, business groups eliminate problems arising from 
bilateral monopoly and oligopoly. It has been argued business groups affiliation can 
reduce (certain kinds of) agency, bankruptcy and monitoring costs (Ferris, Kim, & 
Kitsabunnarat, 2003). 
The context of this study, India, has a large population of both business group affiliated 
firms and non-group firms which have similar level of ownership concentration but 
only business groups have additional attributes such as internal capital market and co-
insurance effect. Both types of firms are well represented by firms from sectors that 
are highest attractor of FDI such as services, computer software/hardware, 
telecommunications, construction, trading, automobile industry, chemicals, drugs & 
pharmaceuticals and power.  
Further, risk landscape is ever evolving but risk management in emerging economies 
is still under-developed and especially in India is still very new. Hence, firms in India 
are more reliant on the existing mechanisms such as internal capital fund and co-
insurance to address risk management issue. Risk Survey, 2018 conducted by Deloitte 
India’s Risk Advisory in reports that in the last 3 years risk management practices are 
being widely adopted after firms view risk as a value enabling function.  
In additional, business groups are ubiquitous in EMEs worldwide, especially in 
countries that are highest contributor towards world GDP. Three out of ten top EMEs 
in the world are Brazil, China and India (IMF, 2018). Figure 1.1 below reports the top 
ten global gross domestic products (GDP) illustrates that the top 3 countries contribute 
29% towards overall global GDP and are predicted to be contributing one third (33%) 
of the overall GDP by 2023. In particular, India is among the top 5 countries as of 
2016 and expected to overtake UK in 2019 and 2023 in terms of GDP. Meanwhile, 
according to IMF (2018) India is third largest country in terms of purchasing power 
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parity (PPP). According to statistics from Department for Promotion of Industry and 
Internal Trade, India, from April 2000 to March 2019, the cumulative foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in India was USD609.8 billion with service sector, computer, and 
telecom industry remains leading sectors for FDI inflows. This total FDI is enormous 
in comparison to some of the developed countries such as USA (USD25.6b), UK 
(USD26.8b) and Singapore (USD83b). Further, India’s high growth rate since 2003 
are reported to represent a structural increase rather than simply a cyclical upturn and 
are expected to continue to grow (Goldman Sachs, 2011).   
 
     International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook @ 02/04/2018 
Figure 1.1: The ten largest economies in the world by 2023, measured in GDP (billions of 2018 
USD) 
 
As discussed in the literature, the defining characteristic of business groups is their 
ability to move capital and other scarce resources such as managerial talent among 
member firms. Business groups pose an interesting intellectual challenge for 
researchers who are interested in both EMEs and the relationship between 
organisational forms and outcomes such as firm performance. On the one hand, 
features such as internal capital markets potentially add to the ability of business group 
affiliated firms to perform better, for example, by bypassing credit market frictions 
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(Khanna & Palepu, 2000a). By extension, business group affiliation makes bankruptcy 
less likely and, in principle, enables firms to be more entrepreneurial. On the other 
hand, reallocation of resources from successful firms within a business group to less 
successful ones (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009) can create incentive 
problems for the former and moral hazard for the latter (Bhaumik, Estrin, & 
Mickiewicz, 2017). At the same time, it has been argued that business groups 
structures facilitate activities such as tunnelling (Bertrand, Mehta, & Mullainathan, 
2002), and this adds to the considerable corporate governance challenge posed by 
ownership concentration that is common among both business group affiliated firms 
and their non-group counterparts (Bhaumik et al., 2017; Chacar & Vissa, 2005; Morck 
& Yeung, 2003).   
Not surprisingly perhaps, much of the literature on business groups in EMEs contexts 
focus on firm performance and corporate governance issues. In this dissertation, we 
extend that literature by focusing on how business group affiliation affects risk-taking 
by firms. Risk is an important component of a firm’s entrepreneurial orientation 
(Lumpkin, & Dess, 2001; Naldi, Nordqvist, Sjöberg, & Wiklund, 2007; Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2005). In the context of Anglo-Saxon countries, discussion about risk is 
based on the premise that risk-taking reflects a corporate governance problem and, 
consequently, there is a large literature that examines how mechanisms such as 
remuneration contracts offered to managers – for example, inclusion of shares and 
share options in the remuneration packages – can influence firm-level risk. In EMEs, 
ownership concentration ameliorates the principal-agent or Type I agency problem, 
such that excessive risk-taking is perhaps less of a concern. Indeed, to the extent that 
ownership concentration coincides with family ownership of firms, it can be argued 
that the owner-managers of these firms are risk-averse (Bhaumik & Dimova, 2014) 
and consequently take less risk than what might be optimal from a strategic 
perspective.   
In this dissertation, we take a fairly comprehensive look at risk-taking by business 
group firms. Our analysis is undertaken in the context of India, an EMEs which has a 
large population of both business group affiliated firms and non-group firms. First, we 
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examine how business group affiliation impacts the risk-taking, relative to non-group 
firms. We also examine whether the difference between risk-taking by business-group 
affiliated firms and non-group firms depends on the relative size of a firm within a 
business group, and on the relative bankruptcy risk of a firm. Second, we extend this 
analysis to examine the impact of corporate governance on risk-taking, and the 
difference in the impact of these corporate governance variables between business 
group affiliated and non-group firms. Our proxies for corporate governance include a 
wide range of board characteristics and takes advantage of a change to the corporate 
governance code in India which added clarity to the identity of independent directors. 
Finally, we extend the modelling of firm-level risk by considering the two-way 
relationship between risk and capital structure using a structural equation modelling 
(SEM) framework. 
The aims and objectives of this thesis are described in section 1.2 to provide more 
details on these three major parts. The overall contributions of this dissertation are 
reported in section 1.3. 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
The overall aim of this thesis is to investigate risk-taking behaviour of business group 
affiliated firms in emerging economies in comparison to non-group firms. The effects 
of ownership structure, corporate governance and capital structure of business group 
affiliated firms’ risk. The sub-aims and corresponding objectives are presented in 
Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1: Sub-aims and their corresponding objectives 
This table presents the sub-aims and their corresponding objectives of this thesis 
 
Sub-aims  Objectives 
1 Examine the impact of ownership    a   Identify the difference in firm risk of group  
 and organizational form on firm   affiliated firms in relative to non-group firms.  
 risk and improve the understanding b Examine the risk-taking behaviour of group 
 of how internal capital markets of   affiliated firms relative to their size within  
 business group affiliated firms   their respective group. 
 affects firm risk c Analyse the difference in firm risk of 
 
 
 group affiliated and non-affiliated firms 
 
 
 change when risk-taking is modelled in a  
 
 
 behavioural finance framework i.e. when 
      firms are financially distressed or safe 
2 Investigate the effectiveness of a   Examine the effect of corporate governance 
 corporate governance mechanisms  attributes to firm risk of group affiliated 
 in shaping the risk-taking behaviour   and non-group firms 
 of group affiliated and non-group b Check on the robustness of the findings by 
 firms that have similar high   examining the effect of corporate governance 
 ownership concentration but different attributes to the firm characteristics identified  
  organizational form   in 1(b) and 1(c) 
3 Employ Structural Equation  a   Develop a SEM model that captures the 
 Modelling (SEM) to examine the  interlinks between firm risk and capital  
 difference in two-way relationship   structure  
 between firm risk (unsystematic b Analyse the effect of 2(a) on both firm risk 
 risk) and capital structure of group  and capital structure of group affiliated and 
 affiliated and non-affiliated firms  non-group firms to confirm the robustness 
    of the model 
  
c 
Identify the role of relationship banking to 
firms' 
      capital structure decisions 
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1.3 Contribution  
This thesis on the relationship of business groups in emerging markets and firm risk 
contributes to the literature and knowledge of emerging market firms and business 
groups.  
First, the thesis broadens the literature of business group that previously largely 
concentrated on performance of firms as a results of business group affiliation 
(Bhaumik et al., 2017; Chacar & Vissa, 2005; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001) by focusing 
on the impact of business group affiliation on corporate strategy.  
Second, it contributes to the wider literature of corporate governance that had focused 
on the argument of principal-agent conflicts in the Anglo-Saxon context (Coles, 
Daniel, & Naveen, 2008; De Miguel et al., 2001; Ferreira & Laux, 2007), corporate 
governance as a mechanism improve performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Burkart 
& Panunzi, 2006) previously. This thesis contributes in a specific way to address the 
deficiency in literature on the influence of corporate governance on firm risk in 
business group affiliated firms and non-group firms in developing economy.  
Third, the thesis enhances the understanding on the two-way relationship between firm 
risk and capital structure of business group affiliation and non-group firms using 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) by incorporating the effect of corporate 
governance and relationship banking. Using SEM technique allow us to observe the 
two-way relationships and analyse determinants that are observable by multiple 
indicators. 
Finally, the thesis extends the literature on emerging market by focusing on risk which 
a key component-indicator of corporate strategy. This extends the previous studies 
which were mainly on agency theoretic issues such as agent problems between 
majority and minority shareholders (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000) and 
influence of ownership on firm performance (Kim, Kitsabunnarat, & Nofsinger, 
2004).  
  8 
1.4 Thesis Structure and Format  
This thesis is prepared in a format where the empirical chapters (Chapter 3-5) consists 
of studies that is prepared and partly prepared for publication. These papers are 
formatted to fit the format of the thesis to aid continuity. Written permission from 
Faculty of Social Science to submit this thesis in the alternative format is attached in 
Appendix A. 
Overall, this thesis consists of six (6) chapters including this introduction chapter. 
Chapter 2 is a literature review on the topic of sub-aims (1-3), followed by the three 
(3) empirical chapters (Chapter 3-5). The final chapter, Chapter 6, provides the overall 
conclusions and summary of the work described in the thesis. 
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 : 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Emerging Market Economies  
The term emerging market economies (EMEs) originated from the International 
Financial Corporation (IFC) classification of middle-income countries where foreign 
financial institute are allowed to buy securities. These countries lack a few criteria to 
be classified as developed. The criteria are economic development, size and liquidity 
as well as market accessibility1. According to International Monetary Funds (IMF), 23 
countries are currently categorized as EMEs. This group of countries has been 
receiving growing attention since the early 1980’s because of their increasing share in 
global trading and foreign direct investment. The contribution of EMEs to global 
economy is immense as the EMEs gross domestic products (GDP) constitute 32% of 
the global GDP2.  
EMEs traditionally lack in areas such as distribution systems, import restrictions, 
necessary capital and human resources (Hoskisson, Johnson, Tihanyi, & White, 2005). 
Besides the deficiencies in the aforementioned factors, missing or lack of market 
institutions also contributes to the high transaction costs for firms to operate in EMEs. 
EMEs have weaker property rights, weaker rule of law and weaker environment for 
contract enforcement compared to their developed country counterparts, not just at a 
point in time but persistently across time. Unsurprisingly, EMEs also have weaker 
environments of investor and credit protection.  
As EMEs develop better market institutions, firms in EMEs benefit by enjoying lower 
transaction cost, having access to capital and other resources. However, despite having 
                                                 
1MSCI Market Classification Framework 
(https://www.msci.com/documents/1296102/1330218/MSCI_Market_Classification_Framework.pdf/
d93e536f-cee1-4e12-9b69-ec3886ab8cc8) 
2 Data obtained from World Bank Database (http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf) 
as of 2017. 
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reduced transaction costs and improved dynamic environmental conditions, persistent 
weaknesses with investors’ protection discourages outside investors to actively invest 
on firm equity. The effect of weak investors’ protections in most EMEs results in 
outside investors suffering from information asymmetry and control disadvantages 
(Hill & Jones, 1992). This makes ownership concentration the optimal strategy for 
investors, resulting in high ownership concentration in hands of a group of people, 
usually promoters of companies and their friends and family. In the words of Bhaumik 
and Dimova (2014): “If the legal protection against expropriation of outside investors 
is good, the optimal outcome would be a widely held and professionally managed firm. 
If, on the other hand, protection of outside shareholders is inadequate, it would be 
optimal for the founder-entrepreneur (and hence the associated family) to remain 
involved, either as the target shareholder who would monitor the professional 
manager or as the owner-manager insider who may then be actively involved in 
expropriating the minority shareholders.” (pp. 12-13). In the Indian context, for 
example, promoter-individuals, their families and corporate bodies associated with the 
promoters are collectively the largest shareholder in 50.3 percent of firms, and they 
own more than 50 percent of the shares in more 37.98 percent of the firms (Bhaumik 
& Dimova, 2014; Table 1.3).3  
In addition, market imperfections in EMEs make it optimal for a significant percentage 
of firms to be associated with wider business networks – “business groups” in the 
parlance of the literature (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998; Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Peng 
& Delios, 2006). These networks, which are often diversified across different 
industries, provide the associated EMEs firms to overcome imperfections in market 
for resources such as credit and managerial talent. One of the consequences of the 
relationships among the firms associated with a network with diversified sources of 
revenue is that these firms benefit from internal markets for resources such as capital 
and managerial skills, which are either scarce or which are vulnerable to market 
                                                 
3 The percentages were computed on the basis of a sample of 5,337 firms for which detailed ownership 
information were available in the Prowess database. 
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failures. As we discuss in the next section, this has important implications for firm 
behaviour.  
Further, the ownership concentration in EMEs firms, for both business group-affiliated 
and unaffiliated firms, has implications for corporate governance in these contexts. As 
such, ownership concentration, and the consequent emergence of promoter-owner-
managers (POMs), by its very nature, aligns the interests of the majority/controlling 
shareholders and upper level managers who take strategic decisions. As a result, in 
contrast to Berle & Means (1932) firms with dispersed ownership, the key agency 
conflict in these firms is not between the managers and shareholders, but between 
majority and minority shareholders. In the literature, this is known as principal-
principal (as opposed to principal-agent) or Type II (as opposed to Type I) agency 
problem (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003; Young et al., 2008). It is unclear, therefore, 
as to what extent stylized corporate government mechanisms that were developed to 
mitigate principal-agent or Type I agency problems are effective in these contexts 
(Bhaumik & Selarka, 2008). This, too, has implications for firm behaviour in EMEs 
contexts. 
2.2 Business Groups 
Business groups are a widespread phenomenon in many countries under various 
names, such as keiretsu in Japan, chaebol in Korea, konzerne in Germany and 
Jituanqiye in Taiwan. The characteristics of business groups may differ from country 
to country, but it is commonly defined as a group of legally independent firms that can 
be horizontally or vertically connected to one another. Horizontal connections include 
equity cross-ownership or interlocking directors and vertical connections through 
single ownership and controlled by controlling shareholders (Chang & Choi, 1988) or 
linked together through equity cross-ownership (Khanna, 2000). It has also been 
argued that firms affiliated to business groups are held together by interpersonal trust 
that is generally observed within kinship networks (Granovetter, 1995). Even though 
business groups exist in many countries, it is dominant form of organization 
throughout most emerging economies.  
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The literature on business groups in emerging economies has put forward explanations 
as to why business groups are a highly visible form of organization in EMEs. The 
transaction cost theory proposed by Williamson (1998) suggests that the optimal 
structure of a firm depends on its institutional context. As discussed above, the range 
and depth of institutional mechanisms that make market-based transactions easy in 
advanced economies are either absence or weak in emerging economies and this has 
been cited as one of the main reasons for the effectiveness of business groups in 
emerging economies. Consider, for example, the market for capital. If investor and 
creditor protection are weak, and so are contract enforcement mechanisms that 
underpin the ways (e.g., attaching collateral and forcing liquidation of assets on 
defaulting firms) in which firms overcome market failures on account of adverse 
selection, firms may have limited access to external capital markets, such that the 
internal capital market that is associated with business groups can gain in importance. 
Similarly, emerging markets are characterized by missing markets for key resources 
such as managerial talent. It is now well understood that management practices are a 
key determinant of productivity and firm performance, and that firms based in 
developing countries (and, by extension, emerging markets) may be at a disadvantage 
because of poor management practices (Bloom, Mahajan, McKenzie, & Roberts, 
2010; Bloom & Reenen, 2010). Indeed, it has been argued that “differences in 
management practices account for about 30% of total factor productivity differences 
between countries and within countries across firms” (Bloom, Sadun, & Reenen, 
2017). It is also well understood that managerial talent may be scarce in emerging 
markets and that these markets are also characterized by labour market imperfections  
(Khanna & Yafeh., 2000). In these conditions, business group structures can create 
internal markets for scarce resources such as managerial talent that gives firms 
affiliated to these business groups a competitive edge over their competitors. This 
argument can be extended to include other resources such as technological resources 
that are scarce during early stages of development. 
Business group companies, which are generally spread across a number of different 
industries (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007), also generate some other benefits for associated 
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companies. The diversification itself enables them to mitigate industry-specific risks 
in an environment that is characterized by market incompleteness, i.e., inability to 
hedge risks through appropriate use of insurance contracts. It has been argued that 
business group affiliated firms are co-insured against financial distress or bankruptcy 
(Claessens, Fan, & Lang, 2006) by other affiliates within the group. However, the 
evidence regarding risk sharing is mixed (Khanna & Yafeh, 2005), such that this may 
not be the most important reason for existence of business groups. But there are other 
benefits from diversification. For example, where such diversification leads to 
presence of affiliated firms in both the upstream and downstream industries, resulting 
in de facto vertical integration within the business group that connects their main 
manufacturing firms with other affiliated firms which supply raw materials and 
intermediate goods and services (Chang & Hong, 2002), the relevant companies can 
also benefit from lower transactions cost associated with inter-firm contracts. Where 
institutions are weak and contracts are incomplete, there are also benefits associated 
with retaining the residual rights of control within the business group structure (see 
Hart, 1995).  
As such, in contexts that are characterized by weak institutions, market imperfections 
and market incompleteness, business group is more relevant organization form as they 
can internally generate capital, reallocate capital and resources including human 
resource among the affiliates. Firms in emerging economies may need to rely heavily 
on network and relationship-based strategies, hence, developing the ability to enforce 
contracts, which with business affiliations can now be done informally (Meyer et al., 
2009). In such volatile environment, group affiliation may enhance firms’ ability to 
secure resources through non arms-length transaction and still implement internal 
contracts without depending on law enforcements (Filatotchev & Mickiewicz, 2001). 
Kim (2003) has argued that the most important benefit possessed by group affiliates 
due to having internal capital markets is the capability to internalise transaction cost, 
and this argument can be generalised to include other resources that are key to a firm’s 
competitiveness. To reiterate, therefore, firms’ ownership structure in a given context 
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is an equilibrium response to the country’s development (or underdevelopment) of its 
institutions, legal environments and market frictions. 
The advantages of business groups in reallocating capital among its affiliates through 
internal capital market not only improves economic efficiency but also done more 
efficiently than the underdeveloped external capital market (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a, 
2000b). The importance and benefits of business groups in emerging economies have 
been much discussed in the literature (Chang & Hong, 2002; Claessens et al., 2006; 
Ferris et al., 2003; Khanna & Palepu, 2000a, 2000b; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). 
Affiliation with Japanese keiretsu was shown to reduce agency, bankruptcy and 
monitoring costs and liquidity constraints (Ferris et al., 2003). Khanna and Palepu 
(2000) too reports that group affiliation addresses agency problems. These advantages 
can result in outcomes such as better risk management (Bhaumik et al., 2017) and 
greater R&D activities (Chang, Chung, & Mahmood, 2006; Sasidharan, Jijolukose, & 
Komera, 2015) for business group affiliated firms.  
However, there are also weaknesses or costs associated with business group 
affiliations, in particular, because of moral hazard created by the internal capital 
market. For example, it has been demonstrated that business group affiliated firms 
have greater persistence of poor performance (Chacar & Vissa, 2005), and are less 
likely to experience technological progress (Bhaumik & Zhou, 2014). Business groups 
also indulge in unrelated (and hence inefficient) diversification (Kock & Guillen, 
2001), redistribute cash to financially weaker firms within the group which results in 
negative spill overs for other group-affiliated firms (Gopalan, Nanda, & Seru, 2007), 
and have lower returns on investment of their retained earnings (Bhaumik et al., 2017). 
In addition, it has been argued that where ownership structures lead to conflict between 
majority and minority shareholders, business groups may expropriate minority 
shareholders using mechanisms such as tunnelling (Bertrand, Mehta & Mullainathan, 
2002; Baek, Kang & Lee, 2005; Kali & Sarkar, 2011). 
This, in turn, has led people to question the efficacy of these organizational structures 
as institutional environment improves in emerging market economies, as robust 
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markets emerge for erstwhile scarce resources, and as it becomes increasingly possible 
to hedge against risk using insurance contracts. Khanna & Palepu (2000) argue that in 
emerging market contexts such as Chile the benefits that are not associated with 
diversification weakened over time; “the evolution of institutional context alters the 
value-creating potential of business groups, albeit slowly” (pp. 268). In the same vein, 
Bhaumik, Das, & Kumbhakar (2012) find that with financial sector development in 
contexts such as India the advantage associated with business groups – specifically, 
how business group affiliation ameliorated financial constraints of firms – weakened 
over time. More damningly, a recent meta-analysis Carney et al., (2011), suggests that 
even when institutions are weak, it may not be easy to make a case for the existence 
of business groups. Overall, group affiliation is shown to be outperforming 
unaffiliated firm in countries where institutional development is high (e.g. Singapore, 
Hong Kong, Sweden and Malaysia). By contrast, in countries with institutional void, 
there are mixed findings on the performance of group affiliated firms compared to 
unaffiliated firms. A business group’s ability to adapt to changing institutional 
contexts, in particular, may depend on the strength of the state and the extent to which 
state’s facilitate this adaptation process (Carney, Van Essen, Estrin, & Shapiro, 2018). 
In conclusion, while business groups may have a role to play in EMEs in the early 
stages of their development, when institutions are weak, and markets are imperfect 
and/or incomplete, it is unclear as to whether these organizational forms are optimal 
as institutions and markets in EMEs develop over time. Specifically, it is unclear as to 
whether the peculiarities of business groups are conducive to strategic decision-
making about key issues such as risk-taking. We shall revisit this issue later in the 
dissertation. 
2.3 Ownership Concentration  
As mentioned earlier, EMEs firms are also characterized by significant ownership 
concentration. Following the pioneering work of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), it has 
been argued that concentrated ownership of firms is driven by weak shareholder 
protection. Specifically, in the absence of strong shareholder protection, an investor’s 
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ability to extract a return on her investments depends on her control over a firm which, 
in turn, depends on share concentration in her hands. In other words, legal shareholder 
protection and legal shareholder concentration are substitutes. Burkart & Panunzi, 
(2006) have argued that this is not necessarily the case; “[i]n particular, when the law 
is a substitute for monitoring, legal protection and ownership concentration can be 
complements” (pp. 2). However, the La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) explanation for 
ownership is widely accepted, and the importance of legal institutions is further 
strengthened by studies that suggest, for example, that while ownership concentration 
is unaffected by disclosure standards, this concentration is lower in countries in which 
the burden of proof is lower for legal action against auditors (Guedhami & Pittman, 
2006). In EMEs, ownership concentration often coexists with family control  
(Bhaumik & Dimova, 2014), but this need not always be the case. 
Ownership concentration of firms in EMEs help resolve the stylized principal-agent 
problem in widely held firms (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), but 
they give rise to their own array of agency problems. Specifically, where concentration 
of ownership coincides with majority shareholding by an investor (or a group of 
investors acting in unison), firms are characterized by the so-called Type II agency 
problem (Villalonga & Amit, 2006) or the principal-principal problem (Young, Peng, 
Ahlstrom, & Bruton, 2002; Young et al., 2008). The controlling owners have the 
incentive to expropriate minority/outside shareholders to derive minority shareholders 
of their rights and gain private benefits of control in return, and since they may have 
the right to decide how the firm is run and how the profits are distributed (Claessens 
& Fan, 2002), minority shareholders are exposed to the possibility of expropriation. 
Evidence of expropriation of minority shareholders in firms that are controlled and 
managed by dominant/majority shareholders have been reported in the literature 
(Singla, Veliyath, & George, 2014). The problem of expropriation is expected to be 
particularly acute in firms in which there is significant divergence between the cash 
flow rights and control rights of these majority/controlling shareholders (Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2005).  
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In principle, while ownership concentration may result in expropriation of minority 
shareholders, where the majority shareholders are also the managers making strategic 
decisions – an example of which is family firms – one would expect amelioration of 
the principal-agent problem. More generally, since large shareholders have significant 
incentive to monitor the managers, they overcome the collective action problem 
experienced by outside investors in widely held companies, and hence the managers 
in these firms are better monitored (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Hence, in principle, 
one would expect that ownership concentration would result in better firm 
performance.  
At the same time, majority (or controlling) shareholders are entrenched and are, 
therefore, less accountable to minority shareholders and other stakeholders of the 
company. This, in turn, may result in poor decision-making, or decisions that augment 
the private benefits of the majority shareholders at the expense of others. Filatotchev 
and Mickiewicz (2001) find that concentrated ownership may lead to less efficient use 
of financial resources. Similarly, Bhaumik & Selarka (2012) find that M&A decisions 
by firms with Type II agency problems do not necessarily result in post-M&A value 
addition (but the literature suggests that the relationship between ownership 
concentration and M&A outcomes may be mixed (Craninckx & Huyghebaert, 2015). 
These firms can also be risk averse, given the exposure of the majority shareholders 
in a single enterprise (García-Marco & Robles-Fernández, 2008), which can result in 
outcomes such as reduction in product diversification (Hill & Snell, 1988) – more 
generally, less diversification (Amihud & Lev, 1999) – and less internationalization 
(Bhaumik, Driffield, & Pal, 2010). These problems can be even more acute where 
ownership concentration coincides with family control (Bhaumik & Dimova, 2014).  
In conclusion, therefore, while ownership concentration in EMEs firms may result 
from weak investor protection, and while ownership concentration may ameliorate the 
principal-agent problem that characterizes widely held firms, ownership concentration 
itself may result in distorted incentives that may adversely affect strategic decisions of 
firms and expropriation of minority shareholders. Where ownership concentration 
coexists with business group structures, the ability to expropriate, in particular, may 
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increase with business group affiliation that facilitates tunnelling. Business group 
affiliation also facilitate greater entrenchment of majority investors (who may also 
serve as managers,) by way of mechanisms such as pyramidal ownership (Almeida & 
Wolfenzon, 2003). At the same time, the incentive structures within the firms may be 
further distorted by access to the internal market for capital, in particular, and strategic 
resources, more generally; specifically, by the ability of business groups to insure 
affiliated firms against idiosyncratic negative shocks and the moral hazard associated 
with such insurance. 
2.4 Corporate Governance in Emerging Market Economies 
A narrow definitions of corporate governance focuses on the relationships between 
firm managers, the board of directors and firm’s shareholders as defined by Shleifer 
& Vishny (1997) in their seminal review as the element that “deals with the ways in 
which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on 
their investment” (p.737). Meanwhile, broader descriptions include the relationship of 
the firm to all its stakeholders and society that enable firms to attract capital, perform 
efficiently, generate profits and meet legal obligations and general society’s 
expectations. The boarder definitions corresponds to Sir Adrian Cadbury, head of 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom 
definition of corporate governance as “the system by which companies are directed 
and controlled” (Cadbury Committee, 1992). 
The Anglo-Saxon approach clearly refers to corporate governance as the set of 
mechanisms practiced by firms when ownership is separated from management and 
also concerned with the fiduciary responsibilities of managers and directors of the firm 
to act on the best interest of shareholders and maximise shareholder value. With the 
separation of ownership and management, the agency problems of shareholders in 
firms in diluted ownership are two-folds. First, shareholders are concern that 
management will be interested with its own rent-seeking behaviour and second, the 
board members may cater to the interests of particular groups including the 
management rather than protect the interests of the shareholders. The literature also 
  19 
suggests that designing optimal contracts that align interests of managers and 
shareholders may not be easy (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Holmstrom, 1999), and that 
use of executive compensation packages to manage managerial moral hazard may not 
be easy (Garen, 1994; Grinstein & Hribar, 2004) especially when CEOs and others in 
the upper management can influence their own compensation packages. 
Correspondingly, corporate governance system practiced worldwide is designed to 
mitigate these problems and align the behaviour of all parties with the best interests of 
shareholders. The mechanisms implicitly involve a threat that managers who do not 
work in the interests of the shareholders can be removed, even though powerful 
managers can protect themselves by ensuring that golden parachutes are triggered at 
the time of termination of employment (Wade, O’Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990). Use of 
golden parachutes are more likely in contexts where ownership concentration is high, 
such that the threat of removal of managers is more credible (Falaschetti, 2002). 
These set of corporate governance mechanism may be effective in protecting 
shareholder interests and reduce agency costs in countries where principal-agent 
problems are prevalence. However, they are unlikely to be a panacea for corporate 
governance in emerging market contexts. As we have noted above, a striking feature 
of firms in emerging market economies is the concentration of ownership in the hands 
of affluence family or business groups (Khanna & Palepu, 1999). The lack of 
participation of outside investors due to institutional void and weak investor and 
creditor protections (Bhaumik et al., 2017), most of the firms in emerging market 
economies are either part of business groups or privately owned and controlled by 
families with shareholding between forty to sixty percent. The dominance of these 
types of firms alter both the nature of conflict within firms, and the credibility of any 
threat to remove incumbent managers. 
Extensive family ownership and control, business group structures and weak legal 
protection of minority shareholders in emerging economies (Young et al., 2008) 
denote that the traditional agency problems between principal-agent in firms with 
dispersed ownership is now replaced with principal-principal conflicts. This type of 
agency problems known as type II agency problems is the possibility of majority 
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shareholders expropriating minority shareholders. In fact, Claessens et al., (2002) in 
their study on ownership structure conclude that the main corporate governance 
problem in emerging markets is the expropriation of minority shareholders by 
controlling shareholders. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, (2002) also 
find that outside (minority) shareholders are prone to be expropriated by controlling 
(majority) shareholders in countries with weak investors protections. At the same time, 
given that the managers in these firms are, in most cases, inseparable from the majority 
shareholders, such that these managers are entrenched and cannot be removed through 
minority shareholder action and market discipline. The type II agency problems 
require remedies, in the form of corporate governance that is different from the one 
that mitigate the classic principal-agent conflicts.  
All of the afore-mentioned arguments raise the question if the dynamics of the existing 
corporate governance mechanisms - a predominant product of the developed country, 
are efficient in alleviating type II agency conflicts by effectively monitoring and 
improving firm practices and subsequently achieving their strategic goals. The 
literature is divided in its opinion about this issue. Some researchers, for example, 
have argued that in countries such as China, while CEO duality and presence of foreign 
shareholders (who presumably have a greater incentive to monitor the management) 
have the expected impact on market valuation of firms, key factors influencing this 
market value may be related to shareholding concentration of the largest shareholder 
and the non-controlling blockholders (Bai, et al., 2004). Similarly, Gibson (2003) 
Gibson find that while firm performance and CEO turnover are not unrelated in 
emerging market economies, there is no link between firm performance and CEO 
turnover in firms that have large domestic shareholder. Indeed, it has been pointed out 
that the effectiveness of corporate governance models in emerging market contexts 
may depend on the institutional context in which they are adopted and informal 
institutions, in particular, may play an important role in determining their effectiveness 
(Globerman, Peng, & Shapiro, 2011). This is consistent with the argument of Allen 
(2005) that factors such as trust and reputation may be more useful at driving corporate 
governance in emerging market economies than law-based mechanisms.  
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Akin to the ownership structure of firms in most emerging markets around the world 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999), Indian listed companies are 
characterised by a high degree of ownership concentration, and presence of large 
majority-controlling shareholders. Indeed, both group-affiliated and unaffiliated firms 
are predominantly family or business group-controlled with high ownership 
concentration. At the same time, business group companies have the capacity and 
perhaps even the incentive to expropriate minority shareholders using mechanisms 
such as tunnelling (Bertrand et al., 2002; Kali & Sarkar, 2011).  
 Given the different characteristics of the affiliated and unaffiliated firms in India, it 
provides a natural setting to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms 
on group-affiliated and unaffiliated firms that have equal ownership concentrated but 
dissimilar ownership structure. Khanna & Palepu (1999) find that external monitoring 
of group affiliates is more problematic than that of unaffiliated firms. The authors 
highlighted the opaqueness of business group structure provides the opportunities for 
business groups to engage in questionable practices to the detriment of minority 
shareholders. Majority or the controlling shareholders are likely to be directly involved 
in the operational management which gives them large discretions over firms’ strategic 
decisions (Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003). However, corporate governance facilitates 
strategic decision making by firms whereby the board of directors is in a position to 
make sure the management works to serve the interests of minority shareholders and 
safeguard them being expropriated by majority shareholders. The findings are 
particularly interesting for this study as it raises the question if the internal monitoring 
in the form of corporate governance (board of directors in this case) plays a different 
role in shaping the risk-taking behaviour of the different types of firms. 
2.5 Firm Risk 
Expansive literature on the effect of ownership types and structure on its financial and 
strategic implications generally takes ownership structure as given (Claessens et al., 
2002; M Faccio, Marchica, & Mura, 2011; Fahlenbrach, Low, & Stulz, 2010; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Low, 2009) and very much focused in 
  22 
Anglo-Saxon countries (Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003; Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 
2007; Grossman & Hart, 1980; Jensen, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Morck, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). Much discussion and research on ownership structure 
focused on the agency relationship between owners and managers in widely held firms 
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Burkart & Panunzi, 2006) and the effect of ownership 
structure on firm performance (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Andres, 2008; Coughlan 
& Schmidt, 1985; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Kocenda & Svejnar, 2002) owing to 
the agency problems due to managers’ failure to act in the interests of shareholders . 
However, this type of agency problem, known as Type I agency problem, is more 
prominent in Anglo Saxon countries then in developing countries (Sraer & Thesmar, 
2007). 
This phenomenon is not widespread in the developing countries because of lack of 
strong institutions to protect minority shareholders and enforce contracts (Friedman, 
Johnson, & Mitton, 2003). Incongruent to the vast literature from the Anglo-Saxon 
economies where agency conflicts take the prominent role in explaining the 
divergence and conflict of interests between the owners and the insiders on firm 
strategic decision making, in developing economies, most large firms are parts of 
business groups or family firms with high ownership concentration with a family or 
the founder of firm holding control blocks in several publicly traded firms. Firms in 
the EMEs have higher ownership concentration. Hence, the convergence of ownership 
and control of owners and insiders, mitigates if not eliminates the type I agency 
problem suffered by firms with diluted ownership. However, such ownership 
structures bring about their own sets of problems (Morck & Yeung, 2003). 
Family firm scholars have found that another form of agency problems, known as 
Type II agency problem, pose a threat to firms with concentrated ownership such as 
family firms and business groups. The divergence of interests of majority and minority 
shareholders is identified as the ground for the problems (Madison, Holt, Kellermanns, 
& Ranft, 2016; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Gómez-mejía et al. (2007) suggest that 
controlling family shareholders often pursue noneconomic goals at the expense of 
financial gain (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). For example, family firms and business 
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groups divert their resources within the group to pursue noneconomic agendas that 
may results in negative impact of affiliates firm performance, thus creating conflict 
between family and non-family shareholders.  
Ownership concentration measures the power of controlling shareholders that are also 
the strategic decision makers of the firm or have the capacity to influence the firm’s 
corporate decisions makers. High level of insiders shareholding has implications 
towards corporations objectives and the way they exercise their power, and this is 
reflected in company strategy with regard to profit goals, dividends, capital structure, 
growth rate (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Figure 2 in Appendix A provides the break-
up of the shareholding and ownership across the year of the sample of this study which 
account for 64% of the total manufacturing firms in the Bombay Stock Exchange and 
National Stock Exchange. It is evident that the average shareholding of “promoters” 
in Indian companies is 50% or even more and group firms have higher promoter’s 
shareholding compared to non-group firms. In this context, it is important to recognize 
how the differences in the structure of ownership and control among the different firms 
influence firm behaviours, especially firm risk-taking behaviour. Examining the link 
between ownership concentrations and firm risk is one way to gauge the non-financial 
implications of ownership concentration on firm behaviour, specifically firm risk. 
Existing theories propose a straightforward relationship the high ownership 
concentration and firm strategies. Since large shareholders, in this case business 
groups, pursue their own interests, they may seek to expropriate other minority 
shareholders by diverting firm resources for their own use or pledging funds in 
unprofitable project to gain personal benefits. The incentives for large shareholders to 
engage in such activities are severe due the excess of control rights over cash-flow 
rights. These activities cause surge in the asymmetry of information between the 
insider and outside shareholders causing the lack of participation of external 
shareholders. 
Understanding firm risk-taking behaviour is both compelling and important in many 
ways. Studying firm risk-taking behaviour is crucial as it is stated as the fundamental 
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driver of performance (Khanna & Yafeh, 2005; Miller & Bromiley, 1990), growth 
(John, Litov, & Yeung, 2008), innovativeness and entrepreneurial orientation 
(Lumpkin & Dess, 2001; Naldi et al., 2007; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005). However, 
firm risk-taking is also an indicator of the financial health of the firm as excessive risk-
taking is believed to have led firm into financial distress and eventual solvency 
(Acharya, Bharath, & Srinivasan, 2007; Samarakoon & Hasan, 2003). It also offers an 
overview of firm’s financial health that could signpost the possibilities of a firm 
heading for financial distress/bankruptcy. Both academicians and practitioners 
studying firm risk-taking behaviour in the wake of global financial crisis in 2007 
identified excessive corporate risk-taking as one of the elements contributing to the 
crisis. 
Nevertheless, risk despite being an indicator of instability in firm returns, is considered 
as one of the dimension for entrepreneurial orientation (Choi, Zahra, Yoshikawa, & 
Han, 2015; Fisher & Hall, 1969; Zahra, 2005). The authors perceive entrepreneurs to 
have more positive attitude towards risky choices and growth orientated than non-
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs making innovative and proactive choices are expected to 
generate greater return, parallel with the CAPM theory that greater risk generate 
greater return, as supported by many empirical and theoretical research (Brealey & 
Myers, 1981; Brick, Palmon, & Venezia, 2015; McNamara & Bromiley, 1999). 
Although it is clear that undertaking risk is essential for entrepreneurs to be innovative, 
venture into new business and remain competitive, empirical evidence suggest that 
excessive risk-taking may lead to bankruptcy. John et al., (2008) in their study on the 
relationship of corporate governance and risk-taking point out that firm risk-taking 
choices and magnitude are criterions for regulators to consider for effective policy-
making and improving investor’s protection. 
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ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AND FIRM RISK 
ABSTRACT 
This study provides evidence on an important yet largely unexplored impact of 
business group affiliation on firm risk-taking in comparison to standalone non-group 
firms in emerging economy. Using firm level panel data of Indian listed manufacturing 
firms, the panel regression analysis finds strong evidence that group firms are 
negatively related to total risk and unsystematic risk compared to non-group firms. 
Both group and non-group firms are strongly characterized by unsystematic risk as it 
accounts for up to 81% of total risk. However, group firms’ total risk and unsystematic 
risk are significantly lower than non-group firms and this characteristic of group firm 
can be contributed to the co-insurance effect exclusive to group firms. Conversely, the 
risk-sharing function may not provide a blanket benefit across the group considering 
the ability of each affiliate to provide co-insurance coverage depending on the 
weightage of affiliates’ size, sales revenue and cash flow weight against overall 
groups. Exploring the risk-taking behaviour of both ownership types facing the risk of 
bankruptcy, this study finds that financially distressed firms both of group and non-
group undertake higher risk than similar type healthy firms. Taken together, the 
statistically and economically significant results show that while ownership 
concentration of both types of firms reduces type I agency problems, it is evident that 
the co-insurance factor and ability to share risk across the group enable certain 
affiliated firms to assume higher risk while smoothing the risk across the group.  
  
Keywords: emerging market, group affiliation, risk-taking, bankruptcy risk. 
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3.1 Introduction 
As argued earlier in this paper, risk-taking lies at the heart of corporate decision-
making. On the one hand, it is considered to be an integral part of a firm’s 
entrepreneurial orientation (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). It has been argued, for 
example, that in organizations such as family firms “risk-taking is a distinct dimension 
of entrepreneurial orientation …. and that it is positively associated with proactiveness 
and innovation” (Naldi et al., 2007; pp. 33). On the other hand, risk-taking has 
implications for likelihood of bankruptcy, with its attendant costs.4 Some scholars 
argue that risk-taking is not necessarily associated with better firm performance and 
that, indeed, risks taken by firms often have low returns (Bromiley, 1991). 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, there is a large literature that examines that determinants of 
risk-taking in firms.  
A significant part of the literature on risk-taking focuses on the familiar agency 
conflicts within firms, and de facto posits risk-taking is a function of the mechanisms 
that are used to mitigate these agency conflicts. The strand of the literature has focused 
on managerial compensation (Armstrong & Vashishtha, 2012; Coles, Daniel, & 
Naveen, 2006; Low, 2009; Rajgopal & Shevlin, 2002), shareholder power (Laeven & 
Levine, 2009), institutional equity ownership and blockholders (Wright, Ferris, Sarin, 
& Awasthi, 1996) board structures (Pathan, 2009), and the corporate governance 
environment (Acharya, Amihud, & Litov, 2011; Bargeron, Lehn, & Zutter, 2010; John 
et al., 2008). Another strand of the literature has focused on firm ownership. For 
example, it has been argued that “firms controlled by large diversified large 
shareholder undertake riskier investments than firms controlled by nondiversified 
large shareholders” (Mara Faccio, Marchica, & Mura, 2016). Similarly, in the context 
of the thrift industry, it has been argued that stock thrifts, for which fixed and residual 
claims are separable, take more risks than mutual thrifts (Esty, 1997). As such, this 
                                                 
4 Correspondingly, it has been argued that “the primary goal of risk management is …. to provide 
protection against the possibility of costly lower tail outcomes – situations that would cause financial 
distress or make a company unable to carry out its investment strategy”(Stulz, 1996). 
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line of analysis suggests that risk-taking behaviour of owners depends on the nature 
of their liability – limited vs unlimited – and their ability to diversify the risk associated 
with their stock holding in firms. 
The literature heretofore is not particularly useful for scholars who focus on emerging 
market firms. These firms often have significant ownership concentration (Mitton, 
2002), such that Type I agency problem between managers and owners is limited and 
owner-managers are generally entrenched (Bhaumik & Selarka, 2012). In these firms, 
there is considerable evidence of Type II agency conflict between majority and 
minority shareholders, and corporate governance mechanisms such as boards are 
typically ineffective (Fan & Wong, 2005; Young et al., 2008). In other words, in these 
contexts, risk-taking by firms is likely to be influenced largely by the incentives of the 
owner-managers. At the same time, given that a vast majority of these firms are family 
owned-controlled, factors such as residual risk bearing by the owners, and their ability 
to diversify their asset portfolio across stocks of multiple firms is likely to have a 
weaker influence on the risk-taking decision, given the significant non-monetary costs 
of bankruptcy of these firms for the owners (Bhaumik & Dimova, 2014; Shepherd, 
Wiklund, & Haynie, 2009; Zellwenger & Astrachan, 2008). In other words, we need 
a new conceptual framework to examine risk-taking behaviour of emerging market 
firms. 
In this chapter, we take advantage of the co-existence of two types of emerging market 
firms – those affiliated to business groups and those that are unaffiliated, with similar 
ownership structures but different organizational forms, and posit that in these 
contexts differences in risk-taking can be explained by differences in organizational 
structures, after we control for other possible factors. Specifically, we argue that 
business group affiliation creates a particular set of incentives of managers that 
influence risk-taking by these firms. In particular, managers of business group 
affiliated firms trade off the moral hazard associated with the coinsurance facility 
available to group affiliated firms, whereby a distressed affiliated firm is bailed out by 
other firms affiliated to the group, with the paucity of incentives to take risks, given 
that extra returns associated with risk-taking may not accrue to the risk-taking 
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firm/managers and may instead be transferred to other group affiliated firms through 
internal capital markets. We hypothesize that, on balance, business group affiliated 
firms would take less risk than their unaffiliated counterparts. We examine this 
hypothesis using data from India where privately-owned business group affiliated 
firms co-exist with privately-owned unaffiliated firms and take into consideration 
factors such as the relative importance of a firm to the overall business group, and 
behavioural factors such as influence of the likelihood of bankruptcy on firm-level 
risk-taking. Our hypothesis finds robust support in the data: business group affiliated 
firms bear less risk than unaffiliated firms. 
We contribute to two different literatures. First, our paper significantly extends the 
literature on emerging market firms, which largely focuses on agency theoretic issues 
such as expropriation of minority shareholders by majority shareholders (Dharwadkar 
et al., 2000), and the influence of ownership on operating performance (Kim et al., 
2004), by focusing on risk, which is a key component-indicator of corporate strategy. 
Specifically, our paper extends the line of inquiry about the impact of ownership and 
organizational form on firm strategy such as internationalization that carry a 
significant amount of risk (Bhaumik et al., 2010). Second, we extend the growing 
literature on business groups which is largely focused on the performance impact of 
business group affiliation (Chacar & Vissa, 2005; Estrin, Poukliakova, & Shapiro, 
2009; Khanna & Palepu, 2000a, 2000b; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Yiu, Bruton, & Lu, 
2005), and specific forms of expropriation such as tunnelling (Bae, Kang, & Kim, 
2002; Baek, Kang, & Lee, 2006; Bertrand et al., 2002) by focusing on the less 
discussed issue of the impact of the incentives associated with the business group 
structure on corporate strategy. Specifically, our paper extends the line of inquiry 
about the impact of business group affiliation on strategic decisions such as R&D 
investment (Bhaumik & Zhou, 2014; Chang et al., 2006; Mahmood & Mitchell, 2004), 
corporate refocusing (Hoskisson et al., 2005), and external orientation (Vissa, Greve, 
& Chen, 2010).  
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3.2  Hypotheses Development 
As noted by Khanna & Yafeh (2007), business groups are ubiquitous in EMEs. It is 
often argued that this organizational form is a response to weak institutions and 
missing markets in emerging economy contexts (Friedman et al., 2003; Ghatak & Kali, 
2001). This view suggests that business groups mitigate the problems associated with 
missing markets for key resources – capital, in particular – by creating internal markets 
for affiliated firms. The liquidity risk associated with this internal capital market, 
which is correlated with group-wide cash flows, is mitigated by the diversification of 
business groups across industries. The liquidity provided by internal capital markets, 
in turn, facilitate the ability to diversify and enter new markets, thereby creating a 
virtuous circle. Even when capital markets in emerging market contexts are 
liberalized, the advantages associated with internal capital markets do not always 
disappear, often because of persistent high transactions cost associated with external 
capital markets (Khanna & Palepu, 1999, 2000b)  
 Kim, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Hong (2004) argue that in order for business 
groups to benefit from their internal capital markets, they should adopt a competitive 
M-form structure. In this organizational form, managers of individual divisions or 
business units within a business group have full autonomy and cash flows to these 
divisions/units are allocated by the group on a competitive basis. In other words, in 
the competitive M-form set up, the internal capital market of a business group mimics 
the market disciplining role of the (imperfect or missing) external capital market. The 
alternative to the competitive M-form structure is the cooperative M-form structure 
whereby capital (and other scarce resources such as managerial skills) are shared by 
the divisions or business units. Available evidence suggests that internal capital 
markets – more generally, sharing of scarce resources through internal markets – do 
exist within business groups (Chang & Hong, 2000; Lamont, 1997; Shin & Park, 
1999).  
Evidence regarding the efficiency of internal capital markets is mixed, with some 
research suggesting that they allocate capital efficiently across affiliated firms 
(Almeida, Kim, & Kim, 2015; Khanna & Tice, 2001), and others suggesting that these 
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markets do not allocate capital efficiently (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2003; Chang & 
Hong, 2000; Estrin et al., 2009; Scharfstein, 1998). However, while capital may or 
may not be allocated across divisions and business units within business groups on the 
basis of the returns of the associated projects, evidence suggests that business groups 
divert resources to affiliated weaker firms that could go bankrupt in the absence of this 
support (Dewaelheyns & Van Hulle, 2006; Gopalan, Nanda, & Seru, 2014). A key 
reason for support is to mitigate possible negative externality of a business group 
affiliated firm’s bankruptcy for access to external capital and cost of capital of other 
firms within the same business group. With some notable dissent (Khanna & Yafeh, 
2005), coinsurance within business group structures is stylized in the literature on 
business groups (Byun, Choi, Hwang, & Kim, 2013; Fisman & Wang, 2010; Jia, Shi, 
& Wang, 2013). 
This coinsurance has two different implications for ability and willingness of firms 
affiliated to business groups to take risks, relative to unaffiliated or independent firms. 
On the one hand, as discussed above, coinsurance reduces bankruptcy cost and thereby 
makes it more feasible for business group affiliated firms to take risk. On the other 
hand, if higher returns associated with successful risk-taking does not accrue to the 
risk-taking firms and is, instead, distributed to weaker firms through internal capital 
markets, then managers of business group affiliated firms might be less willing to take 
risks that are, on average, associated with higher return. This would especially be true 
in contexts where firms, business group affiliated or otherwise, are largely family-
owned such that, on the one hand, managers related to the controlling family by way 
of kinship are less likely to be severely penalized for taking risks that cause financial 
distress, and, on the other hand, compensation for managers of an individual business-
group affiliated firm may be weakly related (or unrelated) to financial performance of 
the firm.5 Evidence suggests that while business group affiliated firms are better able 
to mitigate the negative impact of risk-taking on firm performance than their 
                                                 
5 It has been demonstrated, for example, that family CEOs of family firms receive lower compensation 
than non-family CEOs (Gomez-Meija, Larraza-Kintana and Makri, 2003). Indeed, the family CEO’s 
compensation decreases with family concentrated and is more insulated from risk. 
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unaffiliated or independent counterparts, managers of the business group affiliated 
firms are less entrepreneurially “proactive” (Bhaumik et al., 2017).  
It is possible to argue, of course, that risk-taking by individual affiliated firms within 
a business group may be a group-level decision rather than a firm-level decision, such 
that incentives of firm-level managers do not matter. However, any contract between 
a business group and an affiliated firm is necessarily incomplete, especially when the 
group-level and firm-level management are part of the same kinship network, and 
thereby ex post  (Hart & Moore, 1990). Further, the transactions cost associated with 
enforcing the initial contract and ex post state verification could increase considerably 
in the presence of informational asymmetry – whereby firm-level management know 
more about the risk implications of their decisions than the group-level management 
– “even when parties share organizational goals” (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1989). The 
problem can be made even more complicated by interaction between unforeseen 
contingencies and informational asymmetry (Tirole, 1999). Where business groups are 
also family owned, this problem can, in principle, be mitigated by allowing the 
patriarch/matriarch of the family to be an arbiter of the ex post dispute, but in family 
firms punishment for breaching the initial contract about risk-taking may not be 
credible (Bhaumik & Dimova, 2014). 
 In light of this discussion, we posit the following: 
 Hypothesis 1 (H1): Business group affiliated firms would take less risk than 
their unaffiliated or independent counterparts. 
Thus far, in our discussion, we have implicitly assumed that firms affiliated to a single 
business group are homogenous, which is inevitably not the case. For example, for the 
financial year ending in 2017, the total revenue of the India Hotels Company Limited 
was INR 24.45 billion, while that for Tata Consultancy Services was INR 1.18 trillion. 
Both these companies are part of the Tata Group. It is easy to see that this has 
significant implications for the capacity of the business group to de facto insure these 
companies. Specifically, in the context of our thought experiment, if India Hotels 
Company Limited runs into financial trouble, it may not be difficult for the rest of the 
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group companies, led by Tata Consultancy Services, to insure the former against 
bankruptcy and other extreme outcomes. By contrast, if Tata Consultancy Services is 
in financial distress, the rest of the Tata Group companies may find it difficult to 
provide the same degree of insurance, given the size of the company relative to other 
companies affiliated to the group. In other words, even where coinsurance exists in 
principle, de facto insurance cover is more likely for smaller companies within a 
business group than for larger companies. It is plausible, therefore, that risk-taking 
behaviour of firms affiliated to a business group would depend on their relative size 
within the business group. Specifically, lower insurance cover results in greater 
exposure to bankruptcy risk for larger companies within these groups, without 
affecting the aforementioned disincentive to take risks that are associated with higher 
return. On balance, it is likely that larger companies with a business group would take 
less risk compared to smaller firms within the same group. 
 Our second hypothesis, therefore, is as follows: 
 Hypothesis 2 (H2). Relative to unaffiliated firms, risk taking by business group 
affiliated firms would vary with their relative size within their respective business 
groups, with risk taking declining monotonically with their relative size. 
One of the conclusions drawn by behavioural economists is that economic agents are 
more likely to take risk when they are in distress (Bowman, 1982; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). An extension of this line of argument is that a firm is more likely to 
take risk when their performance is poor and, correspondingly, when their bankruptcy 
risk is high (Wiseman & Gomez-mejia, 1998). Under these circumstances only “bold” 
(i.e., risky) strategies that can lead to ruin but that are also associated with high levels 
of volatility of revenue, cash flows etc can ensure that the firm will escape bankruptcy 
in some states of the world. Available evidence is consistent with this argument. 
(Bromiley, 1991), for example, finds that “poor performance [of firms] appears to 
increase risk-taking” (p. 37). Similarly, Koudstaal & van Wijnbergen, (2013) find that 
“banks with a more troubled loans portfolio are likely to take on more risk” (p. 23). 
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This line of argument has an interesting implication for the difference in risk-taking 
behaviour of business group affiliated and unaffiliated firms.  
The de facto likelihood of bankruptcy of business group affiliated firms is low, given 
the ability of business groups to bail out distressed member firms using the internal 
capital markets. Hence, if the purpose of increased risk-taking at times of distress is to 
ensure that bankruptcy can be avoided in some states of the world, this is more likely 
to be the case for unaffiliated firms than for affiliated firms. At the other end of the 
spectrum, when an unaffiliated firm is safe, i.e., quite a long away from being 
distressed, it is likely to take less risk. A business group affiliated firm that is safe may, 
not only take less risk per se, but also less risk relative to the unaffiliated firm. This is 
on account of the fact that a safe business group affiliated firm should be ready to step 
in and assist other firms affiliated to the business group, should they be in distress, 
unlike the unaffiliated firm. 
 Our third hypothesis, therefore, is as follows: 
 Hypothesis 3a (H3a). Unaffiliated firms that are in distress will increase risk- 
taking but this may not be the case for distressed business group affiliated firms. 
 Hypothesis 3b (H3b). Both business group affiliated and unaffiliated firms will 
reduce risk-taking when they are financially “safe”, but the risk reduction will be 
greater for business group affiliated firms.  
 
3.3 Research Design 
In order to proceed with the analysis, we have to first have firm-year specific estimates 
of risk. Note that we are primarily concerned about the unsystematic or idiosyncratic 
risk that is associated with firms; we posit that this, as opposed to systematic risk, is a 
more appropriate measure of risk in the context of our discussion. We, therefore, use 
the much-used Sharpe’s (1963) single index model to decompose total risk into 
unsystematic and systematic risk (Low, 2009). The relevant model is given by  
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽(𝑟𝑚) + 𝜖𝑖𝑡       [1] 
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where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the return of stock i in period t; 𝛼𝑖𝑡 is the stock’s alpha in period t; β is the 
beta of the stock;  𝑟𝑚 is the market return and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the residual term. In this model, 
total risk (TTL RISK) is given by the variance of 𝑟𝑖𝑡 (𝜎𝑖
2); systematic risk (SYS RISK) 
is given by the variance of 𝛽(𝑟𝑚), i.e., (𝜎
2 (𝛽*𝑟𝑚); and unsystematic risk (UNSYS 
RISK) is given by the variance of the residual (𝜎𝜖2) . 
 Next, we estimate the following baseline model to examine the difference in 
risk-taking by business group affiliated and unaffiliated firms, which is the basis for 
H1: 
RISKi,t =  α + GROUPi,tβ1 + Control Variablesi,t−1 γ + vi,t           [2] 
 
Drawing on the relevant literature, we control for the following firm-specific 
characteristics: firm size (SIZE), firm age (AGE), sales growth of the firm 
(SALES_GRW), future growth opportunities (TOB-Q), and leverage (LEV). The 
respective literature for each firm-specific characteristics is explained in section 3.4.1. 
As we shall see later, the sample period also includes the financial crises periods of 
2008 and 2009, and hence we control for the financial crisis, and distinguish between 
the impact of the crisis on risk-taking by business group affiliated and unaffiliated 
firms. 
 Equation [2] is estimated using a random-effects model. While it is well 
understood that random effects model estimates are consistent under certain 
conditions, in our case, the use of random effects estimators is necessitated by the fact 
that business group affiliation in the Indian context (GROUP) is time invariant, such 
that use of fixed effects models are not feasible. The use of lagged values for the 
control variables enables us to address the endogeneity problem. Hypothesis 1 
suggests that β1<0. 
 Next, we examine whether the risk-taking behaviour of business group 
affiliated firms vary with their relative size within a business group. As we shall see 
later, we can measure relative size in different ways, e.g., using assets, revenue, and 
cash flows. Specifically, we examine size distribution of firms within each business 
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group, and assign each affiliated firm to one of four quartiles. We then estimate the 
following model: 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝛽1 + 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_𝑊𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇_𝑄2𝑖,𝑡𝛽2 + 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 ∗
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_𝑊𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇_𝑄3𝑖,𝑡𝛽3 + 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_𝑊𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇_𝑄4𝑖,𝑡𝛽4 +
 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1𝛾 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡                      [3] 
 
where Q2, Q3 and Q4 refer to the second third and fourth quartiles of size distribution, 
and Q1 is the omitted category. The control variables for equation [3] are the same as 
those for equation [2], and equation [3] too is estimated using a random effects model. 
In keeping with H2, we expect 𝛽2 > 𝛽3 > 𝛽4.  
 Finally, in order to examine H3a and H3b, we first compute the widely used 
Altman’s (1968) z for each firm-year observation. The analysis in Altman’s pioneering 
paper involved use of multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA) involving the 
following variables: working capital/total assets ratio, retained earnings/total assets 
ratio, earnings before interest and taxes/total assets ratio, market value of equity/book 
value of total debt ratio. Most of the models predicting bankruptcy risk involve data 
of firms in the U.S. However, these models may not be very accurate in predicting 
bankruptcy risk in emerging markets without incorporating the peculiarities of 
emerging market environment. Hence, in the 1990s Altman developed a new score 
using data from Mexico to incorporate the local factors that affect a firm’s financial 
health. However, this model has two restrictions: 1) it requires the firm to have 
publicly traded equity 2) it is primarily for manufacturing firms. Later in 2005, Altman 
modified the data to improve the restriction of earlier model. Therefore, this study 
utilizes z-score computed using the financial ratio variables proposed in Altman 
(2005) to predict bankruptcy risk in emerging market. Specifically, we compute 
Altman’s z score for each firm year using the following equation: 
Z = (6.56*wc_ta) –(3.26*re_ta) +(6.72*opprof_ta) + (1.05bv_tl)+ (3.25)           [4] 
 
where wc_ta is working capital/total assets, re_ta is retained earnings/total assets, 
opprof_ta is operating income/total assets, and bv_tl is book value/total liabilities. A 
firm is considered to be distressed if its z measure is less than 1.81, and it is considered 
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to be safe if it’s z measure is greater than 2.99; a score between 1.81 and 2.99 lies 
within a grey zone. 
 Thereafter, we estimate the following model: 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝛽1 + 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1𝛽2 + 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1𝛽3 +
 𝑆𝐴𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1𝛽4 + 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝐴𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1𝛽5 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1𝛾 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡               [5] 
 
The control variables for equation [5] are the same as those for equations [2] and [3], 
and equation [5] too is estimated using a random effects model. In keeping with H3a 
and H3b, we expect 𝛽2 > 0, 𝛽3 < 0, 𝛽4 < 0 and 𝛽5 < 0. 
 For all our regression models, in order to account for the possibility that risk-
taking by business group affiliated firms is correlated within groups, we use clustering 
using a group-level identifier. Each regression models also controls for unobserved 
industry- and time-effects using industry and time dummies. 
 
3.4 Data 
3.4.1 Data Description 
This study utilises firm level data from one of the largest EMEs of the world, India, 
the 10th largest economy in the world by nominal GDP ($2.04 trillion) and 3rd largest 
in the world by purchasing power parity ($7.28 trillion). According to survey 
conducted by Enterprise Surveys Global methodology under the World Bank Group, 
around 85% of the total firms in India constitute of firms held by largest owners. 
Importantly, a significant proportion of these firms are affiliated with business groups. 
Hence, the Indian context gives us a mix of business group affiliated and unaffiliated 
firms that is crucial for our analysis. 
Data used in this study were collected from Prowess database provided by the Central 
for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). The Prowess database contains 
information on financial performances of listed and unlisted Indian companies. The 
database is built from the audited Annual Reports of companies and information 
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submitted to the Ministry of Company Affairs. In the case of listed companies, the 
database also includes company filings with stock exchanges and prices of securities 
listed on the major stock exchanges. It also provides information about business group 
affiliation, including identity of the group with which the firm is affiliated. In addition, 
there is detailed information about the board of directors. Prowess is widely used on 
many published empirical studies on Indian corporate sector, for example (Bhaumik 
& Selarka, 2012; Gopalan et al., 2014; Kali & Sarkar, 2011). It has, specifically, been 
used for studies that involves comparison of business group affiliated and unaffiliated 
firms (Bhaumik et al., 2017). 
In keeping with the vast majority of firm-level studies, our sample includes firms from 
India’s manufacturing sector (Bhaumik & Selarka, 2012; Chacar & Vissa, 2005; J 
Sarkar & Sarkar, 2000). Specifically, we include in our sample manufacturing firms 
listed in the Bombay Stock Exchange Ltd. (BSE) and National Stock Exchange of 
India Ltd. (NSE) in this study. Of the total of 5,395 firms listed in BSE and NSE, 
manufacturing firms were retained using 2-digit National Industrial Classification 
(NIC) from 10 to 32, which gives us an initial sample of 2,434 firms. The sample is 
then narrowed down into two ownership type such that each firm in the sample is 
affiliated with business group or is an unaffiliated or stand-alone private firm. The two 
different groups are identifiable using 6-digit ownership codes as provided by 
Prowess. Firm affiliated with business groups are coded as 201010 and stand-alone 
firms are coded 201020.  
Data for seven (7) financial years were included for this study, from 2008 to 2014. 
The sample period is set after taking into account the evolution of corporate 
governance regulations in India. As discussed in the introductory section, later in this 
dissertation, we shall examine the role of corporate governance in influencing risk-
taking behaviour of firms. One of the most important developments in corporate 
governance in India is the enactment of Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement of Stock 
Exchange imposed by Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) since year 2000. 
It has been much discussed in the literature (Chakrabarti, Megginson, & Yadav, 2008). 
Some of the key mandatory recommendations on the implementation of governance 
  38 
with regards to transparency, risk management, audit reports and directorships were 
implemented by the reformation of Clause 49 in 2006. Any analysis involving 
corporate governance should, therefore, start from 2008, to ensure that we account for 
a two-year post reform period for implementation of corporate governance reforms. In 
order to ensure that the sample period is consistent across the chapters, we opt for 
2008-2014 data for all chapters of this dissertation. 
We designate 2008 and 2009 and crisis years, which has implications for our 
regression analysis. According to data available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St 
Louis, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) announced in 
February 2007 that it would no longer purchase the most risky subprime mortgages 
and mortgage-related securities. In June 2007, Bear Stearns informed investors that it 
was suspending redemptions from its High Grade Structured Credit Strategies 
Enhanced Leverage Fund. In August 2007, the American Home Mortgage Investment 
Corporation filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. In the same month, the credit 
rating of Countrywide Financial Corporation was downgraded. By September 2007, 
the Bank of England was preparing to provide liquidity support to Northern Rock, and 
the FOMC had voted to reduce the federal funds rate. In other words, even though the 
Lehman crisis broke in September 2008, the financial crisis had de facto started in 
2007, such that 2008 was in effect a crisis year. At the other end, the National Bureau 
of Economic Research declared that the Great Recession had ended in June 2009, such 
that 2010 and beyond could in effect be called post-crisis years. 
The final sample consists of unbalanced panel of 1,554 firms with 9,920 firm-years 
observations across 22 industries and 2 ownership types between 2008 and 2014. 
Group firms accounts for 42% (4,153 firm-years) of the total observations and non-
group firms account for the balance 58% percentage (5,767 firm-years) of the 
observations. The breakdown of the final sample selection is simplified as follows: 
Total manufacturing firms      2,434 firms 
(Less) State (23) and Foreign-Owned firms (146)  2,265 firms 
(Less) Firms with less than 5 years obs. (363)  1,902 firms 
(Less) Firms with incomplete accounting data (128)  1,774 firms 
(Less) Unavailability of complete stock prices (220)  1,554 firms (9,920 obs.) 
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Appendix B highlights the basic information of the sample on the distributions of 
group and non-group firms across the industries. It is evident that most of the industries 
are well represented in both ownership types. A closer look at the two-digit NIC code 
reveals that business groups prevail in heavy industries such as manufacturing of 
motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (NIC 29) and other transport equipment (NIC 
30). Meanwhile, non-group firm prevail in industries such as textile (NIC 13), 
pharmaceuticals and medicinal (NIC 21) and rubber and plastic products (NIC 22). 
From the overall sample, 41.86% are group affiliated firms and 58.14% are non-group 
firms. 
In Table 3.1, the measurement and definitions of variables used in the analysis of this 
chapter are presented. 
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Table 3.1: Definitions of Variables 
This table describes the variables in this study and the definitions of the variables     
 
3.4.2 Variable Measurement 
3.4.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 3.2 reports the yearly mean and median of group and non-group firms across 
the years and during the crisis and post-crisis separately. The mean and median of 
overall firm market risk as measured by total variance of stock returns indicates that 
non-group firms are about 1.3 times higher than the mean of group firm’s total risk. 
The pattern of total risk for both types of firms are similar with the total risk declined 
immediately post-crisis and increase thereafter until 2014. 
By decomposing the total risk to unsystematic and systematic risk, it is evident that 
unsystematic risk makes up considerable proportions of firm’s total risk for both the 
ownership types. The overall average unsystematic risk for both group and non-group 
firms consist of 81% of mean total risk concluding that most of the firm-risk is 
Variables Definitions
TTL RISK Total risk is variance of daily stock price using 60 days price. The 
variance is then annualised to get  yearly variance.
UNSYS RISK Unsystematic risk is the residual of single-index market model (Sharpe, 
1963) decomposed from total risk.
SYS RISK Systematic risk is the product of the firms' beta times the market daily 
returns. 
BG Dummy variable: 1 if the firm is a business group member; 0 otherwise
SIZE Natural log of one year lagged total assets - Ln(Total Assets t-1)
LEV One year lagged debt-to-equity ratio - Debt t-1/Equity t-1
AGE Years since firm incorporation t-1
SALES_GRW (Sales t  - Sales t-1)/Sales t-1)
TOB-Q (Market Value / Book Value) t-1
CRISIS Dummy variable: 1 if year is 2008 and 2009; 0 otherwise
POST-CRISIS Dummy variable: 1 if year is 2010 - 2014; 0 otherwise
SIZE_WEIGHT Total assets of Firm it  / Total Assets of Group t 
REV_WEIGHT Total sales of Firm it / Total Sales of Group t 
CF_WEIGHT Total cash flow of Firm it / Total cash flow of Group t 
DISTRESS Dummy variable: 1 if the firm is in distress zone; 0 otherwise
GREY Dummy variable: 1 if the firm is in in grey zone; 0 otherwise
SAFE Dummy variable: 1 if the firm is in safe zone; 0 otherwise
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explained by unsystematic risk.  It is noted that during the financial crisis, from 2008 
to 2009, these percentage is lower for both types of firms as higher percentage of total 
risk are now systematic risk as expected. 
Similar to total risk, on average, the mean of unsystematic risk of non-group firms 
(11.148) is 1.3 times higher that are higher than that of group firms (8.866). 
Unsystematic risk is firm level or industry level risk that can be reduced or diversified 
by firm strategy. This risk has more explanatory power in achieving the objective of 
this study rather than the systematic risk which is market-related risk and may not be 
diversified by firms.  
On average the mean of systematic risk of group firms are higher throughout the 
sample period, while the median of group firms are almost 2 times higher than that of 
non-group firms. However, the percentage of systematic risk is very low that it may 
not be effective to explain the risk-taking behaviour of firms. 
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Table 3.2: Annual Mean & Median of Dependent Variables of Group and Non-Group Firms 
This table reports annual mean and median of selected manufacturing firms listed in Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE Ltd.) and National Stock Exchange of India 
Ltd. (NSE Ltd.) owned by group and non-group firm. Total risk is the annualised variance of daily returns over the fiscal year. Unsystematic risk is the annualised 
residuals from the market model. Systematic risk is the annualised variance of the product of firm beta times the market daily returns. 
 
N 
 
TTL RISK (σᵢ²) 
 
UNSYS RISK (𝝈𝝐²) 
 
SYS RISK (βᵢ²Rm²)  
Group Non-
Group 
 
Group Non-Group 
 
Group Non-Group 
 
Group Non-Group 
Year 
 
Mean Median Mean Median 
 
Mean Median Mean Median 
 
Mean Median Mean Median 
2008 582 766   15.627 15.184 17.513 17.578   11.746 10.879 13.644 13.417   2.288 2.024 1.649 1.312 
2009 586 785   13.122 13.128 15.019 14.919   10.439 10.235 12.082 11.835   1.248 0.921 0.742 0.403 
2010 600 830   8.640 8.014 11.756 11.422   7.007 6.230 9.759 9.435   0.717 0.644 0.557 0.451 
2011 604 852   9.093 8.088 12.660 12.536   7.408 6.267 10.451 10.062   0.832 0.658 0.582 0.430 
2012 601 865   8.501 7.538 11.968 11.725   7.236 6.165 9.904 9.714   0.385 0.218 0.261 0.152 
2013 593 846   10.736 9.705 13.926 14.117   9.040 8.081 11.204 10.915   0.416 0.415 0.312 0.128 
2014 587 827   11.158 10.943 14.029 14.225   9.330 8.880 11.308 11.286   0.565 0.421 0.329 0.188 
CRISIS 1,168  1,551    14.370 14.063 16.251 16.191   11.090 10.515 12.853 12.574   1.766 1.372 1.190 0.707 
POST-
CRISIS 
2,985  4,216    9.615 8.666 12.861 12.902   7.995 7.117 10.520 10.319   0.576 0.412 0.408 0.230 
TOTAL 4,153  5,767    10.953 10.654 13.773 14.036   8.866 8.358 11.148 11.102   0.911 0.544 0.618 0.296 
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Equality of mean and median of the dependent variables are presented in Table 3.3. 
For the equality of means, Welch t-test is used to test if the population mean between 
these two groups are equal. In the same manner, Wilcoxon rank-sum or also known as 
Mann-Whitney test is used to examine if the sample from group and non-group are 
from populations with the same distribution. From the test it is established that group 
firm have significantly lower total risk and unsystematic risk and higher systematic as 
conformed by the value of mean and median in Table 3.3   
Table 3.3: Annual Equality of Mean and Median of Independent Variables between Group and 
Non-Group Firms 
 
In Table 3.4, the equality of mean and median of the control variables are presented. 
These univariate analyses (mean and median tests) provide equal results to indicate 
that group affiliates are generally larger (SIZE), high in leverage (LEV), older (AGE) 
and have higher future growth opportunity (TOB_Q) than non-group firms. Even 
though, the difference in average sales growth (SALES_GRW) between group and 
non-group firms are not as significant as the rest of the variables, generally it is evident 
that sales growth of non-group firms is higher than that of group firms. The results are 
consistent with the characteristics of firms in the context of this study. 
Year N Mean Test Median Test Mean Test Median Test Mean Test Median Test
2008 1347 -7.463*** -8.610*** -7.662*** -8.807*** 7.486*** 7.915***
2009 1372 -8.816*** -9.425*** -8.373*** -9.075*** 8.512*** 9.1144***
2010 1429 -12.934*** -12.730*** -12.941*** -12.767*** 5.816*** 7.048***
2011 1454 -12.826*** -12.266*** -12.147*** -12.020*** 6.837*** 7.546***
2012 1465 -13.038*** -12.359*** -11.438*** -11.347*** 5.048*** 5.497***
2013 1439 -10.199*** -10.188*** -7.822*** -8.405*** 2.408*** 4.817***
2014 1414 -11.229*** -11.295*** -8.750*** -9.059*** 8.955*** 9.964***
CRISIS 2719 -10.860*** -12.214*** -10.988*** -12.603*** 10.445*** 11.492***
POST-
CRISIS
7201 -26.176*** -25.846*** -23.057*** -23.720*** 12.522*** 15.317***
TOTAL 9920 -25.914*** -26.050*** -24.188*** -25.073*** 14.329*** 18.400***
This table reports the univariate analysis of annual equality of mean and median of the two ownership 
type. The difference-in-means t-tests assume unequal variance across groups. Wilcoxon rank-sum test is 
used to test for differences in the medians.  *, ** and *** indicate that group firms risk is significantly 
higher than non-group firms at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
TTL RISK SYS RISKUNSYS RISK
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Table 3.4: Annual Equality of Mean and Median of Control Variables between Group and Non-Group Firms 
This table reports the univariate analysis of annual equality of mean and median of all the independent variables. The difference-in-mean 
t-test assume unequal variance across groups. Wilcoxon rank-sum test is used to test for differences in the median. *, ** and *** indicate 
that group firms are either higher (+ sign) or lower (- sign) than non-group firms at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
 
 
  
Mean  
Test
Median 
Test
Mean   
Test
Median 
Test
Mean   Test
Median 
Test
Mean   
Test
Median 
Test
Mean Test
Median 
Test
2008 1347 19.180*** 17.216*** 2.555*** 2.990*** -1.141 -0.427 9.816*** 11.016*** 3.363*** 4.209***
2009 1372 18.818*** 16.878*** 2.923*** 3.013*** -1.657** -0.432 10.370*** 11.414*** 1.951** 4.080***
2010 1429 18.371*** 16.593*** 2.688** 2.356*** -1.812** -0.491 10.639*** 11.727*** 3.443*** 5.619***
2011 1454 18.237*** 16.529*** 1.950** 1.948** -0.786 -0.785 10.981*** 12.057*** 3.808*** 5.395***
2012 1465 18.750*** 16.840*** 1.270* 1.891* 1.111 1.798* 11.103*** 12.242*** 3.068*** 4.222***
2013 1439 18.297*** 16.402*** 1.113 1.442 -0.464 -0.324 10.746*** 11.892*** 2.883*** 4.506***
2014 1414 18.381*** 16.468*** 1.219 1.311 -2.318*** -2.792*** 10.893*** 11.880*** 3.326*** 4.365***
CRISIS 2719 26.863*** 24.106*** 3.876*** 4.239*** -1.847** 0.593 14.282*** 15.864*** 3.823*** 5.548***
POST-
CRISIS
7201 41.076*** 36.980*** 3.623*** 3.992*** -1.739** -1.158 24.332*** 26.759*** 7.423*** 10.453***
TOTAL 9920 48.830*** 43.998*** 4.958*** 5.583*** -2.300*** -1.195 28.239*** 31.131*** 8.376*** 11.835***
SIZE LEV SALES_GRW AGE TOB_Q
Year N
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Table 3.5: Mean and Median of Dependent and Independent Variables of Group and Non-Group Firms during Crisis and Post-Crisis Period 
This table reports the mean and median of dependent and control variables for both group and non-group firms during the financial crisis and post-crisis.  
 
 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median
Dependent Variables
TTL RISK 4153 10.953 10.654 5767 13.773 14.036 1168 14.370 14.063 1551 16.251 16.191 2985 9.615 8.667 4216 12.861 12.902
UNSYS RISK 4153 8.866 8.360 5767 11.148 11.102 1168 11.090 10.515 1551 12.853 12.574 2985 7.995 7.117 4216 10.520 10.319
Independent Variables
SIZE 4153 4.581 4.504 5767 2.967 2.956 1168 4.419 4.372 1551 2.819 2.806 2985 4.645 4.573 4216 3.021 3.019
LEV 4153 1.694 1.047 5767 1.484 0.897 1168 1.626 1.076 1551 1.352 0.896 2985 1.721 1.033 4216 1.533 0.898
SALES_GRW 4153 0.155 0.098 5767 0.173 0.103 1168 0.222 0.160 1551 0.251 0.159 2985 0.129 0.080 4216 0.144 0.085
AGE 4153 41.34 34.00 5767 30.74 27.00 1168 41.42 34.00 1551 31.36 27.00 2985 41.31 34.00 4216 30.51 27.00
TOB-Q 4153 1.612 0.990 5767 1.205 0.777 1168 1.640 1.092 1551 1.314 0.884 2985 1.602 0.942 4216 1.165 0.730
Non-GroupVariables Group Non-Group Group Group Non-Group
Total Sample Crisis Post-Crisis
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 Table 3.5 presents the mean and median of both dependent and control 
variables for ownership type. The table also reports the statistics for crisis and non-
crisis period. During the crisis period group firm had higher TTL_RISK (1.3 times) 
and UNSYS_RISK (1.2 times) than non-group firms in comparison to their respective 
firms’ total sample mean. Meanwhile, during the post-crisis period, the mean of both 
group and non-group firms are now below the mean of total period sample for both 
TTL_RISK and UNSYS_RISK. However, in the post-crisis period, comparing the risk 
measurement against their own mean in total sample, non-group firms have higher 
percentage of TTL_RISK (12.861) and UNSYS_RISK (10.520).  
As for the control variables, especially LEV, SALES_GRW and TOB-Q there are no 
obvious different in all the three sample categories. Summarizing Table 3.5, it is 
revealed that group and non-group firms are equally affected during the crisis period. 
However, post-crisis group firms UNSYS_RISK reduced significantly in comparison 
to non-group firms.  
The computation of Pearson correlation coefficient as shown in Table 3.6, shows the 
strength of the correlation coefficients between the variables. It is expected to not have 
significant collinearity in the regressions by using this set of variables because of the 
low degree of correlation between independent variables which are between -0.201 
and 0.197. This suggests the absence of multicollinearity in the regression model. The 
unsystematic risk is highly correlated to total risk as considerable proportions of total 
risk are made of unsystematic risk. However, this does not pose a problem as both the 
risk measures are dependent variable.  
The tolerance values (1/VIF) and variance inflation factors (VIFs) is presented in the 
first four columns of Table 3.6. The first two columns report the 1/VIF and VIF for 
TTL_RISK and the following two columns report 1/VIF and VIF of UNSYS_RISK.   
Tolerance values are more than 0.90 which is higher than the recommended 0.1. While 
the VIF values are less than 1.1 indicating that VIF values are below the threshold of 
10. The overall results indicate that multicollinearity does not pose a serious problem 
to the results as they are all within the recommended range. 
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Table 3.6: Pearson Correlation Coefficients Matrix 
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients matrix of both dependent and control variables   
 
 
VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF TTL RISK
UNSYS 
RISK
SIZE LEV
SALES-
GRW
AGE TOB_Q
TTL RISK - - 1.40 0.72 1
UNSYS RISK 1.43 0.70 - - 0.938*** 1
SIZE 1.40 0.71 1.44 0.69 -0.511*** -0.489*** 1
LEV 1.05 0.95 1.05 0.95 0.095*** 0.105*** 0.122*** 1
SALES_GRW 1.02 0.98 1.02 0.98 0.008 -0.018 0.025* -0.021* 1
AGE 1.05 0.96 1.05 0.95 -0.160*** -0.157*** 0.197*** 0.012 -0.058*** 1
TOB_Q 1.06 0.94 1.06 0.94 -0.195*** -0.201*** 0.165*** -0.005 0.106*** 0.070*** 1
TTL RISK UNSYS RISK
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3.5 Regression 
In this section the findings from the empirical tests are reported. On each of the tabled 
results are reported for the firm level regressions. Standard errors are clustered by 
group in all the random-effects regressions. In section A, the results from equations 
(2) are discussed. In section B, discusses the effect of group relative size (eq. 3) on 
firm risk. Section C describes the results from the regressions of effect of financial 
distress on firm risk (eq. 5).  
3.5.1 Results and Discussion 
A. Group Affiliation and Firm Risk Results. (Hypothesis 1) 
Table 3.7 presents the regressions of the eq. 2 using the full sample. Column (1) reports 
the OLS regressions on the effect of group affiliation on TTL_RISK taking into 
account the control variables that remain constant to control any determinants of firm 
risk-taking behaviour as per eq. 1. In column (2), random-effects regression of eq. 3 
is presented to estimate the effect of group ownership on TTL_RISK. It is evident that 
the two different estimations provide similar coefficient to show group firms assume 
lesser risk than non-group firms. In column (3), eq. 4 is estimated to identify the effect 
of group affiliation on TTL_RISK during the financial crisis period. The same 
estimation is repeated for UNSYS_RISK and reported in column (4) – OLS, column 
(5) – random-effects model and column (6) – random-effects during financial crisis 
period. All the regressions were done by clustering group id (VCE/Cluster Group) to 
address the endogeneity problem as discussed in Section 3.3.3.  The independent 
variables are one year lagged as mentioned in Section 3.4.2. 
The findings of the base model of both OLS (column 1 and 4) and random-effect 
regression (column 2 and 5) provide similar findings. On average, both group and non-
group large firms have negative significant coefficient to firm risk. This is supported 
by the argument that the owners of large firms have with higher stake in firms seek to 
avoid higher risk for the fear of losing their wealth (Anderson, Duru, & Reeb, 2012). 
However, the effect of group affiliation is not statistically significant on 
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UNSYS_RISK. As for TTL_RISK, affiliates’ firm-risk is significant at 10% level. In 
summary, all the regression estimates derived from the different equations give 
negative relations between the group ownership and firm risk; suggesting that after 
controlling for endogeneity concerns, group firms undertake lower risk than group 
firms. 
Table 3.7: Regression Results on the Relationship between Group Ownership and Firm Risk 
This table reports the basic OLS and random-effects model regression on the relationship of 
group ownership on firm risk. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *, ** and *** 
indicate the significant level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BG -0.2148* -0.2309* -0.5769*** -0.0912 -0.1227 -0.3114
(0.1279) (0.1315) (0.1490) (0.1667) (0.2011) (0.2095)
CRISIS   3.1646*** 1.9424***
(0.1357) (0.1999)
CRISIS * BG 1.2500*** 0.6819***
(0.1630) (0.1231)
-1.4773*** -1.4564*** -1.4548*** -1.2304*** -1.1666*** -1.1665***
(0.0334) (0.0551) (0.0554) (0.0978) (0.1263) (0.1263)
0.3831*** 0.3255*** 0.3227*** 0.3449*** 0.2938*** 0.2925***
(0.0312) (0.0312) (0.0312) (0.0310) (0.0344) (0.0344)
0.0643 -0.0137 -0.0052 -0.1255 -0.1868* -0.1820
(0.1068) (0.0878) (0.0880) (0.1055) (0.0930) (0.0929)
-0.0167*** -0.0173*** -0.0171*** -0.0150*** -0.0159*** -0.0159***
(0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0036)
-0.2512*** -0.1656*** -0.1637*** -0.2294*** -0.1548*** -0.1536***
(0.0278) (0.0331) (0.0330) (0.0257) (0.0284) (0.0285)
Intercept 23.0475*** 23.2165*** 19.6564*** 18.8416*** 18.8285*** 16.6700***
(0.3398) (0.3688) (0.2905) (0.3151) (0.3433) (0.4011)
Observations 9920 9920 9920 9920 9920 9920
R-Squared 0.446 0.447 0.450 0.447 0.374 0.377
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
VCE/Cluster Group Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TTL RISK
AGE
TOB_Q
SIZE
LEV
SALES_GRW
Variable
UNSYS RISK
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Crisis Period and Firm Risk Results. 
As seen in Table 3.8, when the crisis period dummy is included in to the regression as 
per column (3) and (4), it is evident that group affiliates are now taking even lesser 
TTL_RISK (-0.5769) compared non-group firm. There is not much movement on the 
UNSYS_RISK which is expected as the financial crisis will have more impact on 
SYS_RISK than on UNSYS_RISK. The crisis dummy (CRISIS) indicate the level of 
firm risk taken by all type of firms in the sample. The positive sign shows that 
TTL_RISK are very high at 3.165 and UNSYS_RISK is at 1.9424. The high 
TTL_RISK in comparison to UNSYS_RISK proves that all types of firms in this 
context are highly affected by the market-level risk. In the next row, to examine the 
effect of group affiliation in the crisis period, group dummy is integrated with the crisis 
dummy (CRISIS * BG). It is established that group firms take even higher risk than 
non-group firm during the financial crisis and once again it is evident that TTL_RISK 
(1.25) are higher than that of UNSYS_RISK (0.6819). Thus, hypothesis H2 is 
supported.  
The effects of all the independent variables are similar across both the risk 
measurement and are mostly significant at 1% level with the exception of 
SALES_GRW. This is consistent with the summary statistics as shown in Table 3.4. 
The evidence shows that SIZE is negatively related to firm risk. Evidence from prior 
empirical studies shows that large firms (in term of assets) are more stable and are less 
prone to default (Harris & Raviv, 1991) hence are expected to take less risk than 
smaller firms. In this context where most firms have high ownership concentration, 
the survival of large firms is the main objective of the owners. 
Firm leverage (LEV) has positive and significant correlation with firm risk as firm 
with higher leverage tends to lead to higher risk (Kwok & Reeb, 2000). While prior 
literature has time and again provided evidence that business group have higher 
leverage than stand-alone firms, very few direct evidence is given on the link between 
stand-alone firm, leverage and firm-risk. This is also evident in our sample. Typically, 
firms with higher leverage are deemed to have increased bankruptcy risk (Anderson 
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et al., 2012). The very nature of our risk measurement which is variance of stock price 
which is the interpretation of market perceptions on firm implies that higher leverage 
indicates higher risk. 
It is important to note that SALES_GRW and TOB-Q have negative coefficients for 
both the ownership types in spite SALES_GRW is statistically insignificant. The 
negative correlations of SALES_GRW and TOB-Q to firm risk indicate and firms with 
growth opportunity exhibit lower risk. This finding suggests that both group and non-
group firms are not taking higher risk even when they have historical growth and 
potential growth in the future. These firms could potentially increase growth level if 
they invest in R&D or innovative industries, however, our findings show otherwise. 
The plausible explanation for the findings possibly lies on prior literature suggests that 
family shareholding have strong incentives to monitor and that potentially influence 
the increase in efficiency of strategic decisions and in particular investment strategy 
and process (Anderson et al., 2012). This allows firm with high ownership 
concentration to commit fewer resources on investments and still achieve similar 
outcomes. 
Meanwhile, AGE is also negatively related to firm risk. This suggests that older firms 
tend to take less risk. This finding is well documented in previous literature that 
suggest older firms tend to be closer to their optimal size and therefore have less 
growth opportunity (Bilsen & Konings, 1998) that can lead inertia and rigidness in 
innovating (Kumar, 2004). Overall all these factors may lead to lower risk-taking. 
These findings are continuing across all the regression performed here forth. Hence, 
the relationship between control variables and firm risk will not be discussed for the 
rest of the hypotheses. 
  
  52 
B. Firm Characteristics and Firm Risk Results 
Table 3.8 reports the results of regressions of equations Eq. 3 is estimated for the size 
weightage in column (1), the revenue weightage in column (2) and cash flow 
weightage in column (3). Column (4), (5) and (6) reports the relationship of the same 
variables’ with UNSYS RISK.  
Firm size as measured by total assets being one of the key determinants that influences 
the firm risk is included in this regression. Affiliates’ size weightage towards overall 
group size is used to differentiate firm risk. The firms in the lower quartile (q1) are 
affiliates that contribute the lowest towards overall groups’ assets. Firm-risk of the rest 
of the firms that are higher contributors (q2, q3 and q4) is then compared to that of 
affiliates in q1. 
As reported in column (1) and (4) of Table 3.8, the outcome of the analyses, for both 
TTTL RISK and UNSYS RISK, discloses that group firms in the three quartiles (q2, 
q3 and q4) take lower risk than that affiliates that are in q1. Even though the findings 
are statistically insignificant, economically it can be stated that affiliates that are 
highest contributor (q4) take the lowest risk (-0.3251 & -0.5836) implying that smaller 
firms in their particular group take higher risk than the bigger firms within the same 
group. 
In column (2) and (5), the coefficient of affiliates’ revenue weight on overall groups’ 
revenue is reported. The results, once again show that firms in the higher quartile are 
negatively related to firm risk as compared to firms in the lowest quartile (q1). The 
coefficients of both TTL RISK and UNSYS RISK are significant at 10% and 5% level 
respectively. The findings indicate that firm-risk keeps reducing as the quartile 
increases, suggesting that firms that contribute the most towards overall groups’ 
revenue tend to take lower risk.  
Next, the overall weight of affiliates’ cash flow as reported in column (3) and (6). The 
value is negatively related to firm risk for all three quartiles. Affiliates in the highest 
quartile (q4) are highly significant (1% level) for both TTL RISK and UNSYS RISK 
as compared to the other 2 quartiles.   
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The outcome reported in Table 3.8 repeatedly attest that affiliates that are the highest 
contributors towards groups value tend to take lower risk. While all the variables tested 
- total assets, sales revenue and operating cash flow equally towards an affiliates’ 
assets/income that could be reallocated to other affiliates experiencing distress, it is 
evident that size (total assets) and (sales) revenue are not as liquid as cash flow. Hence, 
the affiliates that are considered the cash cows of the groups may be more risk averse 
compared to the rest of the affiliates. This evidence further proves that affiliates risk-
taking appetite hugely depends on their ability to provide co-insurance immediately to 
other affiliates in the case of financial distress. 
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Table 3.8: Regression Results on the Relationship between Firm Characteristics and Firm Risk 
This table reports the basic OLS and random-effects model regression on the relationship of size, 
revenue and cash flow weightage on firm risk. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
*, ** and *** indicate the significant level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BG  -0.4467 -0.1131 -0.3713 -0.0110 0.2256 -0.0352
(0.2455) (0.2682) (0.1725) (0.2164) (0.2303) (0.1926)
CRISIS 3.1754*** 3.1757*** 3.1823*** 1.9585*** 1.9552*** 1.9661***
(0.1316) (0.1309) (0.1276) (0.1956) (0.1953) (0.1895)
BG * CRISIS 1.2102*** 1.2140*** 1.2157*** 0.6356*** 0.6429*** 0.6360***
(0.1667) (0.1681) (0.1669) (0.1252) (0.1273) (0.1262)
-0.1454 -0.2886
(0.2752) (0.2409)
0.0463 -0.2396
(0.2802) (0.2816)
-0.3251 -0.5836
(0.2977) (0.3120)
-0.5006 -0.5631*
(0.2882) (0.2472)
-0.5829* -0.7056*
(0.2938) (0.2767)
-0.7545* -0.8687**
(0.3136) (0.3062)
-0.0533 -0.0185
(0.1561) (0.1487)
-0.1132 -0.1877
(0.1588) (0.1443)
-0.5646*** -0.7742***
(0.1596) (0.1545)
-1.4451*** -1.4280*** -1.4399*** -1.1468*** -1.1353*** -1.1456***
(0.0526) (0.0450) (0.0491) (0.1222) (0.1149) (0.1175)
0.3222*** 0.3193*** 0.3184*** 0.2913*** 0.2886*** 0.2865***
(0.0313) (0.0306) (0.0299) (0.0347) (0.0339) (0.0326)
SALES -0.0077 0.0101 0.0127 -0.1839* -0.1645 -0.1573
(0.0884) (0.0844) (0.0854) (0.0933) (0.0869) (0.0839)
AGE -0.0173*** -0.1622*** -0.1605*** -0.0157*** -0.0153*** -0.0157***
(0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035)
TOB_Q -0.1630*** -0.1622*** -0.1605*** -0.1532*** -0.1524*** -0.1495***
(0.0332) (0.0335) (0.0342) (0.0286) (0.0288) (0.0299)
Intercept 19.7683*** 19.9981*** 19.8053*** 16.9049*** 17.0629*** 16.8700***
(0.3113) (0.3106) (0.2849) (0.3484) (0.3414) (0.3691)
Observations 9920 9920 9920 9920 9920 9920
R-Squared 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.315 0.315 0.316
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
VCE/Cluster Group Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LEV
BG * SIZE_WEIGHT_Q2
BG * SIZE_WEIGHT_Q3
BG * SIZE_WEIGHT_Q4
BG * REV_WEIGHT_Q2
BG * REV_WEIGHT_Q3
BG * CF_WEIGHT_Q4
BG * CF_WEIGHT_Q2
BG * CF_WEIGHT_Q3
BG * REV_WEIGHT_Q4
SIZE
Variable
TTL RISK UNSYS RISK
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C. Bankruptcy Risk and Firm Risk 
In Table 3.9, annual mean and median value of bankruptcy risk is presented to show 
the bankruptcy risk for both group and non-group firms across the years in the 3 
different bankruptcy risk zones. Using the well-known Z-Score distress prediction 
model by Altman (2005), the Z-score were computed using coefficients and variables 
proposed for emerging markets and subsequently comparing the risk-taking behaviour 
of the firms.  
 The comparison involves classifying the firms into three zones, namely distress, grey 
and safe, on the basis of the cut-off points for each zone given by Altman (2005). The 
cut-off points for each zone are given in Table 3.9. The results show that more of group 
firms are in the distress and grey zones compared to non-group firms. Only 8.4% of 
non-group firms are in the distress zone versus 10% of group firms. Whereas, for grey 
area where firms are quite close to the distress zones, there are 7.4% non-group firms 
compared to 12% of group firms. 84% of non-group firms and 78% of group firms are 
in the safe zone. 
However, on the closer look on the firms classified as distress, it is noted that mean of 
Z-score of non-group firms are far worse than group firms with an overall average of 
-1.606 compared group firms’ -0.928. This demonstrates that while there are fewer 
number of non-group firms in the distress zone, these firms are deeper into financial 
distress compared group firms. Meanwhile, the value for both group and non-group 
firms in the grey zone are almost similar (2.595 and 2.534). In the safe zone, non-
group firms have higher Z-score (5.060) than group firms (4.539). 
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Table 3.9: Bankruptcy Risk Score Comparison by Group and Non-Group Firms 
This table presents the annual comparison of group and non-group firms in three zones of bankruptcy risk using the coefficient and variables proposed by Altman 
(2005) for emerging markets. The bankruptcy zones are Z < 1.81 “Distress”, 1.81 < Z < 2.99 “Grey” and Z > 2.99 “Safe zone. 
  
N 
Distress 
N 
Grey 
N 
Safe 
 Group Non-Group Group Non-Group Group Non-Group 
Year Group 
Non-
Group 
Mean Median Mean Median Group 
Non-
Group 
Mean Median Mean  Median Group 
Non-
Group 
Mean Median Mean  Median 
2008 46 43 -0.923 0.060 -2.099 -0.602 56 35 2.582 2.619 2.495 2.455 480 687 4.826 4.646 5.158 4.961 
2009 60 63 -0.846 -0.633 -1.430 -0.394 69 61 2.504 2.545 2.545 2.670 457 662 4.787 4.597 5.096 4.822 
2010 44 43 -0.912 0.148 -2.557 -0.574 53 48 2.538 2.530 2.566 2.608 503 738 4.832 4.618 5.165 4.952 
2011 53 62 -0.976 0.102 -1.506 -0.229 65 57 2.564 2.663 2.523 2.556 486 731 4.804 4.595 5.055 4.753 
2012 70 86 -0.910 0.164 -1.126 0.059 86 77 2.567 2.649 2.434 2.461 445 701 4.760 4.497 5.017 4.677 
2013 73 88 -0.779 0.213 -1.540 -0.333 90 80 2.506 2.569 2.480 2.496 430 678 4.690 4.392 4.933 4.648 
2014 81 97 -1.120 -0.178 -1.629 -0.313 84 69 2.497 2.460 2.500 2.501 422 661 4.684 4.368 4.983 4.702 
CRISIS 106 106 -0.880 0.286 -1.701 0.036 125 96 2.539 2.595 2.527 2.625 937 1349 4.807 4.614 5.127 4.906 
POST-
CRISIS 
321 376 -0.945 -3.532 -1.579 -0.212 378 331 2.532 2.595 2.493 2.518 2286 3509 4.758 4.506 5.033 4.760 
TOTAL 427 482 -0.928 -3.805 -1.606 -0.205 503 427 2.534 2.595 2.501 2.529 3223 4858 4.772 4.539 5.060 4.806 
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In the final regression results presented in Table 3.10, the firm that have been classified 
as Distress, Grey and Safe are included in the regression to analyse the risk-taking 
behaviour of group firms related to non-group firms. The firms that are in the distress 
and safe zones are compared against firms in the grey zone to differentiate their risk-
taking behaviour. Hence, the omitted category is “GREY” and the coefficient reported 
are those of firms in Distress and Safe zones related to Grey zone.  
The estimation shows that the group affiliates risk-taking is not significant when the 
bankruptcy dummies are included. However, in the crisis period the high positive 
coefficient of both types of risk measures show that high firm risk during the financial 
turmoil did not change even though the firms may be in distress. Firms that are in the 
Distress zone have higher risk (0.3071 and 0.2405) than the firm the firms in the Grey 
zone. This value is also statistically very significant. While group affiliates take even 
higher risk than non-group firms (0.3071 + 0.2140) even though this finding is not 
statistically significant.  
Meantime, all firms in the Safe zone take very little risk (-0.5411 and -0.3167) related 
to firms in the Grey zone. Group affiliated firms in the Safe zone are very risk averse 
compared to the affiliates in the Grey zone. This value is statistically very significant. 
This finding validates our argument that group firms that are in the Safe zone and will 
not face any financial distress in the coming years do not tend to take more risk to 
avoid being unable to provide co-insurance towards the group. Whilst, group firms 
that are in the Distress zone take even higher risk compared to the rest of the categories 
and non-group firms as they cannot get into more trouble by taking risk as they are 
already facing the possibilities of going bankrupt soon. By taking the additional risk, 
firms in the Distress zone are taking the gamble of making higher profit or in the worse 
scenario of further loss they can be assisted by the co-insurance effect of business 
groups.   
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Table 3.10: Regressions Results on the Relationship between Financial Distress and Firm Risk 
This table reports the basic OLS and random-effects model regression on the relationship of size, 
revenue and cash flow weightage on firm risk. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
*, ** and *** indicate the significant level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
Variables TTL RISK UNSYS RISK 
(1) (2) 
BG -0.2504 0.2316 
  (0.2526) (0.2669) 
CRISIS 3.2526*** 2.2110*** 
(0.0143) (0.0184) 
BG * CRISIS 1.2967*** 0.7297*** 
(0.1639) (0.1229) 
DISTRESS 0.3071*** 0.2405*** 
(0.0258) (0.0598) 
BG * DISTRESS 0.2140 0.1081 
(0.2994) (0.2777) 
SAFE -0.5411*** -0.3167*** 
(0.0236) (0.0190) 
BG * SAFE -0.6549** -0.8901*** 
  (0.2458) (0.2229) 
SIZE -1.3961*** -1.1123*** 
  (0.0468) (0.1131) 
LEV 0.2775*** 0.2532*** 
  (0.0223) (0.0236) 
SALES_GWR -0.1061 -0.2924* 
  (0.1045) (0.0926) 
AGE -0.0177*** -0.0163*** 
(0.0046) (0.0035) 
TOB_Q -0.1320*** -0.1324*** 
  (0.0369) (0.0288) 
Intercept 18.6582*** 15.8263*** 
  (0.2423) (0.2964) 
Observations 9920 9920 
R-Adj 0.416 0.354 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
VCE/Cluster Group  Yes Yes 
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3.5.2 Conclusion 
The overall objective of this study is to understand the effect of group affiliation on 
firm risk in the emerging market using the data from Indian manufacturing firms. 
Group affiliates are characterized as having more dispersed ownership and diversified 
operations suggest the probability that they have the comparative advantage for 
affiliates to undertake higher risk in comparison to non-group firms. However, it is 
shown that despite having similar ownership concentration, hence the likelihood to 
suffer from similar type of agency problems, both group and non-group have 
distinguishable firm risk-taking behaviour.  
First, the results also show that high proportion of firm total risk consists of 
unsystematic risk. High unsystematic risk suggests that firms are able to manage this 
type of risk using strategies derived within the firms. Second, even though systematic 
risk only accounts for less than 10 percentage of overall risk, group affiliates exhibit 
a higher level of systematic risk related to non-group firms. The findings of this study 
show that on average group firms are more risk averse than non-group firms. 
Business groups consist of widely diversified firms and any individual affiliate may 
benefit from the diversification effects at group level. The assumption that group-
affiliated firms may reallocate resources to assist other financially distressed firms can 
be further supported by observing the unsystematic risk of both group and non-group 
firms. This is the justification for performing all the regressions on the total risk and 
unsystematic risk only.  
It is predicted that business group affiliated firms will be able to manage risk using co-
insurance effect, hence, managing the group affiliated firm as a portfolio rather than 
as a single entity proves the existence of risk sharing among group firms consistent 
with the findings documented by Nakatani (1984) and Nivoix & Nguyen (2009). 
Fortuitously, groups have higher incentives to monitor group firm risk-taking 
behaviour and consequently allocating assistance to the affiliates that are in 
difficulties. 
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Whilst it has been demonstrated that co-insurance effect which is exclusive to business 
groups facilitates risk sharing across the group, it is further argued that not every 
affiliate will be able to assume equal amount of risk across the board. This could be 
implicated directly to the characteristics of affiliates that form the business groups. 
Some affiliates might be ‘too big to fail’ while others may be the ‘cash cow’ of the 
whole group that cannot fail at any costs thus not able to take high risk.    
To examine this, group affiliates are categorised in quartiles according to the 
weightage of their contribution towards groups’ overall size, revenue and cash flow 
and analyse their risk-taking behaviour. The results show that group affiliates risk-
taking behaviour is negatively related to their contribution size. The affiliates that are 
in the highest quartile take much lower risk than those affiliates in the lower quartile 
for all three sizes relative to further prove the argument that risk-taking behaviour of 
group firms are co-related to their ability to provide co-insurance to other affiliates. 
Given that group affiliates exhibit lower level of unsystematic risk and obliged to 
provide co-insurance for other affiliates in the network, one can expect them to be 
conservative in taking higher risk when the firms are facing the risk of bankruptcy. 
However, the findings show the opposite occurs in this context, with both types of 
firm exhibit equal risk-taking behaviour when they are in the distress and safe zones. 
The firms in the distressed zone take higher risk relative to the firms that are in grey 
area, whilst firms in the safe zone assumes significantly lower risk compared to the 
firms in the grey area with group affiliates even lesser risk. The results highlight the 
power of prospect theory in explaining how firms are sensitive to loss relative to gain 
as well as the inability of group firms to provide de-facto coverage for affiliates that 
are ‘too big to fail’ firms.  
Besides the main findings, group and non-group firms in India show lower firm risk 
when the firms are bigger (measured by total assets), older (age) and in the presents 
of growth opportunities (represented by Tobin’s q). Whereas, historical growth 
(represented by sales growth) do not have much effect on firm risk.  
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It is concluded with the argument that group affiliated firm’s lower risk-taking is 
attributed to the effect of co-insurance on group affiliated firm. It can be argued that 
co-insurance of group firms not only allow resource reallocation but also to ensure 
survival of group affiliates in the long run. 
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 : 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM RISK 
ABSTRACT 
Extending the previous research on the effectiveness of corporate governance on firm 
performance, value and risk in developed countries have been ample but very little 
evidence of the same effect on firms from developing countries with different 
ownership structure. Hence, in this study, we aim to examine the role of corporate 
governance mechanisms in defining firm risk in business group affiliated firms 
relative to non-group firms in developing economy. Using a sample of firms from 
India, one of the largest emerging economy, we show that having similar ownership 
concentration and family control that causes type II agency problems, business group 
affiliated firms and non-group firm risk are affected similarly by all the different 
corporate governance attributes. We further check on the robustness of this study by 
analysing how group-affiliated firms’ asset, sales and cash flow contribution towards 
its overall group affect firm risk. We deepen the robustness check by examining the 
risk-taking behaviour of group- affiliated firms facing low and high bankruptcy risk. 
Overall, we find that corporate governance mechanism, which is a wide range of board 
characteristics in this case, is a effective tool to monitor and control controlling 
shareholders in firms with high ownership concentration.   
 
Keywords: emerging economies, risk-taking, group-affiliated, corporate governance 
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4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, it is established that group affiliated and stand-alone private 
firms have dissimilar firm-risk, even though it can be suggested that high ownership 
concentration in both group and non-group firms will coerce them to have similar risk 
appetite. While both types of firms have comparable agency problems and incentives 
in the form of private benefit of control to undertake similar firm risk, it is shown that 
group affiliated firms take lesser risk that non-group firms. It has been emphasized 
that the main factor that inhibits group affiliated firm risk-taking behaviour is the co-
insurance effect that is exclusively available to affiliated firms. The moral hazard - a 
result of the co-insurance effect, is also argued to be contributing to the risk-taking 
behaviour of affiliated firms. 
In this chapter, we extend the discussion in the previous chapter by examining how 
corporate governance in emerging market contexts may influence risk-taking by firms, 
and how corporate governance may work differently for business group affiliated and 
unaffiliated firms. The motivation for this chapter is the observation that emerging 
market economies have adopted corporate governance regulations and practices from 
the developed country contexts. For example, corporate governance codes in both 
China and India have emphasised the role of independent directors. In China, 
independent directors are meant to be independent of controlling shareholders and all 
committees except the corporate strategy committee are meant to be chaired by and 
largely composed of these directors (Jiang & Kim, 2015). Similarly, in India, half of 
the board of a listed company is expected to be comprised of independent directors 
(Chakrabarti et al., 2008). However, it is unclear as to whether these corporate 
governance practices (or regulations) can have a significant impact on firm behaviour 
in a context where ownership is concentrated and hence incumbent owner-managers 
cannot be removed or disciplined either by way of internal mechanisms such as 
shareholders’ meetings, nor by way of markets. Further, corporate governance codes 
in these countries often want to ensure that minority shareholders are not expropriated 
by the majority-controlling shareholders, and therefore emphases issues such as 
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minority shareholders’ rights and disclosure of related party transactions (Rajagopalan 
& Zhang, 2008). 
There is an emerging literature that focuses on the impact of corporate governance on 
firms with concentrated ownership which are more prominent in developing 
economies. However, this area of study is still very new (Black & Khanna, 2007; 
Black, Kim, Jang, & Park, 2015; John et al., 2008; Yoo & Sung, 2014) and mainly 
focused on the effect of corporate governance on firm value, other measures of 
performance, R & D investment and issues such as related party transactions and 
earnings management. The impact of corporate governance on risk-taking by firms in 
these contexts, however, remains unexplored and yet it is important to better 
understand both the impact of corporate governance on emerging market firms with 
concentrated ownership, and also the difference in the impact of corporate governance 
on risk-taking by business group affiliated and unaffiliated firms. The rationale for this 
has been discussed in an earlier chapter.   
Risk-taking is one of the critical determinants of corporate success. While it is true 
that excessive risk is pointed out as one of the contributors to financial crises 
(Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011; Rose-ackerman, 1991), it is also safe to infer that firms 
may not thrive if certain degrees of risk is not undertaken. Firm risk is a key policy to 
improve efficiencies in the utilisation of assets and the resulting profitable 
opportunities, returns, firm growth and innovativeness (Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 
2013; Bromiley, 1991; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; John et al., 2008). If owner-
managers of firms with concentrated ownership are less willing to take risk – see 
Bhaumik & Dimova (2014) for a discussion about risk-taking by family firms – this 
may have a detrimental effect on the future wealth of the minority shareholders who 
may not share the risk attitude of the majority-controlling shareholders. As we have 
already seen, business group affiliated firms may actually take even less risk than 
unaffiliated firms, further aggravating the problem. Even though risk sharing is an 
important function of business groups, both group and non-group firms have similar 
ownership structure, that is, highly concentrated with ownership of shares in the hands 
of family owners or groups (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). Both types of firms are managed 
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by managers who are entrenched. Entrenched managers manage firms may undertake 
less risky investments to reduce exposure of company and themselves (John et al., 
2008). This raises the question as to whether, in emerging market contexts, the role of 
corporate governance may be used to constraint corporate decision makers’ to induce 
firms to take more risks for both group and non-group firms. 
The main contribution of this chapter, therefore, is to the literature which examines 
the efficacy of corporate governance codes and mechanisms that are based on 
developed country contexts with dispersed ownership and principal-agent problem in 
emerging market ownership where owner-managers are entrenched. Prior research in 
Anglo-Saxon contexts with diluted ownership suggests that agency problems between 
the contracting parties and the economic players of the firms determine their risk-
taking incentives (Panageas & Westerfield, 2009). There is a limited literature on the 
impact of corporate governance on firm risk-taking behaviour in both Anglo-Saxon 
and developing country contexts (John et al., 2008), but many of  the studies outside 
the Anglo-Saxon contexts are focused on Japanese firms (Huang & Wang, 2015; 
Nakano & Nguyen, 2012; Nguyen, 2011). We extend that literature by focusing on the 
Indian context which also gives us the ability to explore how corporate governance 
may differently impact risk-taking for business group affiliated and unaffiliated firms. 
We find strong and robust evidence that corporate governance plays a strong role in 
monitoring and controlling the controlling shareholders who also hold the managerial 
position in firms with high ownership concentration. Successful monitoring and 
controlling of the managers subsequently shape firm strategies in particular firm risk. 
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4.2 Hypotheses Development 
In this section, we first explore the literature to draw some conclusions about the 
influence of corporate governance on risk-taking by firms. For our purposes, we adopt 
the stylised way to capture corporate governance of firms, namely, by way of their 
board characteristics (Su & Lee, 2013). This is consistent with the experiences of firms 
in Anglo-Saxon contexts where a company’s Board of Directors exists to protect the 
interests of the shareholders who cannot observe the actions of the managers, and who 
are also widely dispersed and therefore do not have the incentive to directly monitor 
these managers. Indeed, besides defining the firm’s business concept, developing 
firms mission  and implementing the strategy to achieve the firm’s strategy, one other 
crucial role of board members is to appoint and reward executives for their 
performance but at the same time monitor the inclination of executives in pursuing 
their self-interest over the shareholders’ interests (Pearce & Zahra, 1992).   
The composition of board is critical to ensure that the board members fully utilise their 
business expertise to formulate and set the company’s structure, strategic goals and 
financial policies, provide advice towards putting the goals and policies to effect, 
overseeing the implementation and supervise the management of the firm and report 
to all shareholders including the non-controlling ones. Therefore, board composition 
is an important consideration in explaining the ability of internal monitoring in the 
form of corporate governance. There are numerous studies that demonstrate that not 
only do Board characteristics such as independence – which is an important concern 
of regulators – matter (Garg, 2007), but so also does factors such as the gender 
composition of the Board (Buse, Bernstein, & Bilimoria, 2016; Liu, Wei, & Xie, 
2013). 
The literature suggests that Board characteristics can influence risk-taking by firms; 
we discuss this literature in greater detail below. A priori, there is nothing to suggest 
that the influence of corporate governance on risk-taking would be qualitatively 
different for business group affiliated and unaffiliated firms. In emerging market 
contexts, and certainly in the Indian context, both types of firms have concentrated 
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ownership and entrenched owner-managers. However, given that business group 
affiliated firms take less risk than unaffiliated firms, ceteris paribus, the quantitative 
impact of corporate governance on these two types of firms may differ.  
4.2.1 Board Size and Firm Risk 
Literature in psychology and organizational behaviour on group decision-making 
suggests that the final decision made by a group is a result of compromise between 
each individual in the group as group members try to minimise conflicts and reach 
consensus. Kogan & Wallach (1966) argue that an individual does not deviate much 
from his/her own judgments when making decisions privately but clings closer to 
central tendency when making decisions as a group. Since the pressure for conformity 
increases with size of the group, it is less likely that extreme choice is likely to be 
taken in a large size group. Kogan & Wallach, (1964); Sah & Stiglitz, (1991) studies 
further support the aforementioned claim by observing the risk level of projects 
rejected and approved by the final decisions of decision-making groups. The approval 
of sufficient members to approve projects shows that the likelihood of accepting risky 
projects is as much as accepting less risky projects. However, large groups end up 
selecting average projects in anticipation of stable performance. Applying this to 
corporate boards’ decision-making, Cheng (2008) provides evidence that firms with 
larger board size have less volatile accounting and market-based performance. Firms 
with larger boards also appear to select less risky investments and associated with 
lower return volatility. Nakano & Nguyen (2012) extending similar study to Cheng 
(2008) in Japanese kiretsu type of firms, find that larger boards are associated with 
lower risk-taking by demonstrating the lower performance volatility as well as lower 
bankruptcy risk. Huang & Wang (2015) using Chinese firms sample find systematic 
relationship between board size and firm risk-taking. The firms with smaller board 
size are more likely to pursue riskier investment policies. As such, much of the 
literature on corporate governance postulate the negative relationship between board 
size and risk-taking. While CEOs do not necessarily have to agree with the 
mean/median Board opinion when they are part of the majority-controlling 
  68 
shareholder group – an argument that can be translated to other contexts with powerful 
CEOs (Pathan, 2009), on the basis of the existing evidence we hypothesise the 
following:  
Hypothesis1 (H1): Boards’ size is negatively associated with firms’ risk. 
4.2.2 Board Independence and Firm Risk 
The concept of board independence originated in the United States in response to some 
of major corporate and accounting scandals such as Enron and Worldcom. By having 
independent directors that have no material relationships with the company, 
independent directors with no vested interests in the business practices are expected 
to monitor the firms with impartiality (Ringe, 2013). In India the minority shareholders 
rights are protected under the Companies Act 2013 by being able to nominate a 
director on the board of the company. The mandatory appointment of independent 
directors in listed companies is made with the objective to ensure a balance of interests 
between promoters and other shareholders. Section 149 of the Companies Act 2013 
sets out the composition of a board for a listed company. It must include executive as 
well as non-executive directors. The non-executive directors should comprise at least 
half of the directors on the board. If the chairman of the board is a non-executive 
director, then at least one third of the directors on the board must be independent 
directors. Where the company does not have a non-executive chairman, then at least 
half the directors on the board must comprise independent directors, and where the 
non-executive chairman is a promoter of the company or is related to any promoter or 
person at board level, at least half of the directors on the board must comprise 
independent directors.6 
Board independence has been an important component of the corporate governance 
code in much of the developed world, and can be traced back to the recommendations 
of, among others, the Cadbury Committee. Correspondingly, much of the recent 
                                                 
6 Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India 
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academic research on corporate governance examines board governance and its 
implications for firm performance and managerial decisions such as dividend 
payments (Zattoni & Cuomo, 2010). There is also considerable scepticism about the 
ability of independent directors to effectively monitor and discipline managers even 
within the institutional contexts of the developed economies. For example, it has been 
argued that companies tend to appoint independent directors who are over-optimistic 
and overly sympathetic to the company management, and yet who may not be good 
performers (Cohen, Frazzini, & Malloy, 2012). Indeed, it has been argued that 
management-friendly boards can be optimal for companies (Adams & Ferreira, 2007).  
The challenge of meeting corporate governance objectives by way of independent 
directors becomes even more challenging in the context of EMEs, where the corporate 
landscape is dominated by firms with concentrated ownership (OECD, 2012), many 
of them owned or controlled by families. Anderson & Reeb (2004) find that dominant-
controlling shareholders in, for example, family firms seek to minimise the presence 
of independent directors while minority shareholders seek to have independent 
directors’ representation. This finding highlights the importance of independent 
directors in protecting and representing the interests of minority shareholders. This is 
mainly because independent directors on board firms with high ownership 
concentration such as family or business group-controlled firms are expected to 
monitor the owner-manager’s activities, such as tunnelling, diversification and bailing 
out weak affiliates, that can be detrimental to the minority shareholders’ wealth and 
subsequently reduced the private benefits of control of owner-manager (Holmén et al., 
2016). However, it is unclear as to whether independent directors are able to address 
corporate governance problems in EMEs. Clarke (2006), for example, argues 
“proponents of the institution of independent directors misconceive the nature of the 
corporate governance problem in China …. and have not taken into account specific 
features of the Chinese institutional environment – particularly the legal environment 
– that affect the viability of any proposed solution” (pp. 126). This is consistent with 
the findings (Peng, 2004), namely, that while outside directors are associated with 
improvement in firm performance when performance is measured by sales growth, 
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there is little impact of outside directors on firm profitability which may matter more 
to the shareholders. This argument is generalisable to other EMEs contexts where the 
cost of attempting to discipline errant managers by way of litigation can be 
significantly high, and where entrenchment of manager-owners in firms with 
concentrated ownership makes it difficult to discipline them under any circumstances. 
Further, within certain EMEs cultural contexts, independent board members may defer 
to the top management as part of a social exchange (Ma & Khanna, 2016). The 
problem is further exacerbated by paucity of qualified independent directors. For 
example, Balasubramanian, Black, & Khanna (2010) do not find any relationship 
between board independence and firm performance in India.  
There is evidence to suggest that, scepticism notwithstanding, independent board 
members can have some impact on managerial decisions. For example,  (Peasnell, 
Pope, & Young, 2005) find that outside directors can influence the extent of earnings 
management in companies. Similarly, evidence suggests that board independence may 
be positively associated with dividend payments (Sharma, 2011). In the specific 
context of firms’ risk-taking, evidence suggests that independent directors can 
influence management decisions, for example, by reducing excessive risk-taking by 
firms (Jiraporn & Lee, 2008). More generally, a positive association between board 
independence and firm performance has been found in the context of EMEs (e.g., Liu, 
Miletkov, Wei, & Yang, 2015). Related research suggests that paucity of qualified 
independent directors and their consequent “busyness” may not pose a problem in the 
context of EMEs (Sarkar & Sarkar, 2009). Hence, it is perhaps possible to postulate 
that independent directors will be able to defend interests of shareholders – minority 
shareholders in the case of EMEs. Since firms with concentrated ownership and/or 
family control are expected to take less risk than is optimal for long run growth, this, 
in turn, may imply that in the context of these firms board independence may have to 
be associated with greater risk-taking. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) : Independent directors are positively related to firm risk. 
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However, independent directors in group affiliated firms may have different 
motivation and incentives when it comes to shaping firm risk of individual group 
affiliated firms. Individual group affiliated firms typically have sufficient power to 
pursue their firm strategies but these strategies may affect other firms in the group as 
they are interdependent for internal capital and risk-sharing. Even though Clause 49 
requires independent directors to be unrelated to any of the board members, given the 
lack of supply of outside directors with directorship expertise and professional 
qualification, most of independent directors may seat in multiple boards within the 
same group. Hence, instead of monitoring and advising individual group affiliated 
firms using only information from that individual firm, independent directors may take 
into consideration the overall group position in performing their duty.  
Moral hazard in group affiliated firms due to the presence of co-insurance is a factor 
that can also influence independent directors to discourage risk-taking by group 
affiliated firm. Even though individual group affiliated firms within the group enjoy 
the benefit of having shielded from bankruptcy risk in the eventual of failed risky 
business ventures, this co-insurance effect may not be de-facto to all the firms within 
the group. For example, failure of main provider to group income and cash flow may 
contribute to the failure of the total group. Keeping this in mind, independent directors 
may discourage risk-taking in group affiliated firms.  
Therefore, it can be hypothesised that independent directors discourage risk-taking. 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Independent directors are negatively related to group affiliated 
firms’ risk. 
4.2.3 Female Directors and Firm Risk 
Extensive studies in the psychology and other fields show the behavioural differences 
in gender. These studies investigate women’s risk-averse nature when allocating 
pension funds, insurance, investment and purchasing common stocks along with 
gambling. Although the studies yielded mixed results, there is a strong prevalence that 
women are more risk averse in most matters including health, investments (Borghans, 
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Golsteyn, Heckman, & Meijers, 2009), insurance decisions and gambling (Barber & 
Odean, 2001). The wide-ranging empirical studies document the evidence of women’s 
tendency of being less likely to undertake risks and more sensitive to losses than gains 
when compared to men.    
In the corporate finance field of study, empirical evidence shows that board gender 
diversity enhances monitoring process (Melero, 2011), female executive, directors and 
board members are cautious in making corporate decisions (Huang & Kisgen, 2013) 
and more diligent monitors than their male counterpart (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). 
Corporate strategic decisions that are shown to have been impacted by the presence of 
female CEOs include lower leverage, less volatile earnings and higher chance of 
surviving when compared to similar firms run by male CEOs. It can be suggested that 
firms with the presence of female board members engage in less risk-taking or make 
less risky policy choices and investment decisions (Sila, Gonzalez, & Hagendorff, 
2016).  
A number of studies have analysed how bank risk is affected by CEO and senior 
executive gender (Berger, Kick, & Schaeck, 2014; Mara Faccio et al., 2016), the effect 
of female CEO on firm risk (Elsaid & Ursel, 2011) and the effect of board diversity 
on firm risk (Sila et al., 2016). Findings from the banking industries suggest that 
female CEO are more risk averse than their male counterpart (Berger et al., 2014; Mara 
Faccio et al., 2016). From the limited number of studies made on non-financial firm, 
the mixed findings make it difficult to arrive to a conclusion. A number of countries 
have passed legislation mandating female board representation, firms in emerging 
economies are not mandated to have female board members. 
Drawing from the above literature, it can be postulated that females’ nature of being 
risk-averse accentuates the possibility of female board members encouraging less risk-
taking. Especially so in EMEs where ownership concentration is high and most of the 
personal wealth are concentrated in particular firm or group, it can be hypothesized 
that female directors will be more risk-averse than male directors.  
Hypothesis 3 (H3) : Female directors are negatively related to firms’ risk. 
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4.2.4 Financial Institutions Nominees and Firm Risk 
Financial institutions appoint representatives to sit on the board of firms it lends money 
to closely and actively monitor the firm’s behaviour. These financial institutions can 
be either commercial banks, life insurance companies or investment banks. Having a 
representative on the board of directors is mainly a strategic position taken by financial 
institutions to obtain financial information that will benefit them, which can otherwise 
be very costly if the bank has no insider information. At the same time, by having 
representative on a firm’s board of directors, the financial institution can curb 
managerial opportunism.   
The fiduciary duty of directors to protect the interests of shareholders can be the source 
of conflict of interests on the part of the financial institutes nominees (Kroszner & 
Strahan, 1999). This is mainly because of the different payoff structures of debt and 
equity. This conflict of interest between the shareholders and lenders may contribute 
to the financial institute nominee in the board can have significant impact on the firm 
strategies mainly the firm risk-taking behaviour. In the case of India, apart from bank 
representatives, financial institute nominees also include insurance company 
representatives. 
When it comes to risk-taking, the main aim of the representative is to ensure that board 
of directors do not make decisions that are detrimental to the firms’ ability to repay 
debt or undertake excessive risk. However, in EMEs with the high ownership 
concentration the concern of the board of directors are more towards protecting the 
interests of minority shareholder and to ensure majority shareholders do not have 
access to excessive free cash flow.    
Hypothesis 4 (H4) : Financial institutes’ representatives presence are positively 
related to firm risk. 
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4.2.5 State Nominees and Firm Risk 
Government and state ownership is quite common across the world (Boubakri et al., 
2013; Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000). In India, state government holds certain 
percentage of shares in private firms especially in development corporations. Even 
though the states’ shareholding is minimal, they have representative sitting on board 
of the corporations. These state appointees, having the responsibility of protecting the 
interests of the states, will monitor and advice the board in favour of states’ objectives. 
Thus, government intervention in the firms’ strategic decisions is very likely.  
As state agents, these board members may be responsible for achieving different 
objectives than the rests of the shareholders. One side of the literature suggests that 
the government share ownership has negative effect on corporate risk-taking 
(Boubakri et al., 2013; Uddin, 2016; Uddin, Halbouni, & Raj, 2014). They report that 
government ownership discourages firm from taking excessive risks due to promoting 
public employment, social stability, and political control over the economy, and 
supplementing government revenue by additional dividends incomes, capital gains, 
and corporate taxes (Uddin, 2016). Besides promoting economic efficiency, their 
interests also vest in the social effectiveness of any investments or projects. Hence, it 
can be argued that despite being minority shareholder, political pressure can be exerted 
to achieve government objectives. 
However, the minimal number of state appointees on board firms with highly 
concentrated ownership may function differently from widely held firm. The state 
appointees on board, that do not interfere with the day-to day operations of the firm, 
are said to be influential monitors. It is claimed that state owned firms have better 
corporate governance than publicly traded companies (Ang & Ding, 2006), hence, 
board with state appointees can be expected to serve the interests and protections of 
minority shareholders. Which denotes that state appointees would discourage 
excessive free cash flow available to owner-manager by encourage undertaking of 
more investment. Hence, the relationship between state nominees and business group 
risk-taking is expected to be positive. 
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Hypothesis 5 (H5) : State appointees presence is positively related firm risk. 
4.2.6 CEO Duality and Firm Risk 
CEO duality is when a person holds both the Chief Executive Officer and board 
chairperson positions in a firm. Having dual positions denote that the person is mainly 
responsible for firm strategic decisions. However, the CEOs will not adopt a separate 
leadership structure for the two positions. The board of directors being the apex of the 
decision control system of firms will be led by CEO who has the responsibility for 
both making decisions to maximise shareholder value and monitoring those decisions 
on behalf of the firm. Having CEO that lead the decision control hierarchy will most 
likely result in compromises in the control system and eventual conflict of interest 
(Yang & Zhao, 2014). It also implies a higher authority and concentrated power in 
CEO’s hand which enables CEOs to dominate and reduce board effectiveness in 
monitoring and controlling of the management. Therefore, this dual role may impair 
the ability of the rest of the board to monitor the CEO’s activities that may result in 
potential agency problem.  
According to agency theory, conflict of interests occurs when the CEO assumes the 
dual role (D’Aveni & Finkelstein, 1994). In firms with diluted ownership, the CEO of 
the firm will have decision rights but not necessarily hold control rights over 
shareholder capital. This can be the cause CEO have conflicting interests to the 
shareholders and do not always act to maximise shareholder value (Yang & Zhao, 
2014). However, in the case of firms with concentrated ownership, the CEO is most 
likely to be a family member who holds significant ownership rather than a 
professional manager whose risk-taking incentive is controlled through pay-to-
performance sensitivity. The literature on owner-CEO versus agent-CEO found that 
owner-CEO is more risk tolerant in comparison to agent-CEO (Eisenmann, 2002; 
Fahlenbrach, 2009; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2009) due to the vastly different economic 
pay-offs for their efforts in engaging in positive net present value yet risky projects 
(Amihud & Lev, 1981). 
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On the other hand, some other researchers argue that the benefits of CEO duality 
outweigh the negative impact. A CEO who is also the chair of the board enjoys greater 
benefits as the duality allows information on firm-specific strategic challenges and 
opportunities (Jensen & Meckling, 1995) readily available to the board chairperson. 
Having this specific knowledge enable the CEO to coordinate board actions and 
execute strategies that can give the firm competitive edge specifically in harsh 
business conditions (Eisenmann, 2002). Similarly, consolidation of power and 
decision making in the hands of the CEO is beneficial in making firm strategic 
decisions such as firm-risk mainly because the CEO will be able to make informed 
decisions. 
CEOs in group-affiliated firms and non-group firms in India have high shareholding 
and higher sunk costs because they have invested greater time, energy and resources 
(Tang, Li, & Liu, 2016) which can curb their risk-taking appetite. With the CEO who 
is also the chair of board having long-term approach and greater firm-specific 
expertise, it is critical that the firm take only a reasonable amount of risk as the CEO 
will also be concerned about the survival of the firm. Accordingly, CEOs will be risk 
averse by avoiding investment in new business ventures or even entrepreneurial 
activities and subsequently influencing board decisions on firm risk-taking propensity.   
This benefit of duality especially in a group setting allows clarity regarding strategic 
decisions that will shape the direction of the group as a whole. As excessive risks may 
expose the whole group to potential bankruptcy risk, CEO of group-affiliated firms 
may not make strategic decisions truly for economic reasons but also other 
consideration such as group survival. Hence, it is argued that power concentration on 
dual CEO who is risk-averse and subsequent ineffective controlling functions from 
the board suggest a negative relationship between CEO duality and firm-risk. 
Hypothesis 6 (H6) : CEO duality is negatively related to firm risk. 
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4.2.7 The Model 
In this study, the risk proxies, variance in stock returns (TTL_RISK) and residuals of 
market return model - unsystematic risk (RISK) will be regressed on all the possible 
variables that influence its value such as business group dummy (GROUP), crisis 
period dummy (CRISIS) and the interactions with business group. It is also crucial to 
control for the various firm specific characteristics such as firm size (SIZE), firm 
leverage (LEV), firm sales growth (SALES_GRW) and Tobin’s Q (TOB_Q).  
Building on this and to test the hypotheses, the linear regression model can be model 
as follows: 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝛽 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡𝛿 +
 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1𝛾 + 𝑒𝑖       [1]  
 
Whilst the random effects model for this study can be specified as follows:  
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝛽 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1𝛾 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡       [2] 
 
And the random effects model for this study including the crisis period can be 
specified as follows: 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝛽1 + 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝛽2 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 𝛾 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡      [3] 
4.2.8 Robustness Tests 
The main hypothesis of this study is that group affiliated firms will co-insure each 
other in the event of distress as proven by Claessens et al. (2006) that financially 
constrained firms benefit from group affiliation as they receive financial support when 
not financially viable. It can also be established that not all firms within the same group 
have the ability to co-insure every other firm in the group. Since the co-insurance 
effect is not de-facto for all the firms within the same group, group affiliated firms are 
able to take the risk when the benefits of co-insurance outweigh the costs of financial 
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distress in the case of negative outcome of investment. Building on these, arguably, 
corporate governance mechanisms play a role in monitoring firm risk-taking relative 
to group affiliates relative size. 
To test on the robustness of these arguments, the weightage of particular affiliate 
towards the overall groups’ total assets, total revenue and total cash flow are 
hypothesized to have negative effect on firm risk.   
Hypothesis 7 (H7): Affliates’ size relative of overall group have negative 
effects on firm risk 
To test on these hypotheses the random effects model can be specified as follows: 
𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝛽1 + 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝛽2 + 𝐵𝐺 ∗ 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝛽3 + 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 ∗
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_𝑊𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇_𝑄2𝑖,𝑡𝛽4 + 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_𝑊𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇_𝑄3𝑖,𝑡𝛽5 + 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 ∗
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸_𝑊𝐸𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇_𝑄4𝑖,𝑡𝛽6 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1𝛾 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡      [5] 
4.2.8.1 Behavioural Factor  
Similar to chapter 3, to further analyse the likelihood that group affiliates co-
insurance effects have different effects on affiliates with different characteristics, a 
second robustness test is included to analyse if group affiliates assume a different 
strategy when in financial distress and financially safe. Applying the reasoning of 
prospect theory, group affiliated firms are likely to frame their strategy to avoid higher 
firm risk in affiliates that are safe from financial distress and undertaking higher risk 
in affiliates that are in the danger of financial distress. 
Hypothesis 8 (H8): Affiliates bankruptcy risk has positive effects on firm-risk. 
To verify the testable hypothesis H8, the relationship between firm risk and group firm 
is estimated using the following random effects specification (7) to have an estimate 
of the group risk-taking on bankruptcy score computed using the methods proposed 
by Altman (2005) described in detailed in the following section. 
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𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝛽1 + 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝛽2 + 𝐵𝐺 ∗ 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝛽3 +
 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1𝛽4 + 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1𝛽5 + 𝑆𝐴𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 ∗
𝑆𝐴𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1𝛽6 + 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1𝛾 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡       [6] 
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4.2.9 Definition of Variables 
Corporate governance variables  
The role of corporate governance mechanisms has been subject to considerable 
empirical analysis and therefore, we include in this study a number of corporate 
governance mechanisms specially board characteristics. The board of directors of a 
firm is meant to perform the critical functions of monitoring and advising top 
management (Coles et al., 2008) and based on Fama (1980) and Jensen & Meckling 
(1976) arguments that board of directors are central internal control mechanism for 
monitoring and influencing managerial strategic decisions, we include the following 
various board characteristics as independent variables to analyse the effect on firm 
risk-taking;   
• board size (BOD) – studies suggest that board size matters in determining the 
effectiveness of monitoring and functioning. Lipton et al. (1992) suggest that 
larger boards could be less effective than smaller boards in monitoring due to 
coordination and free-rider problems.    
• board independence (defined as the proportions of independent directors 
against total board size) (ID_PROP) – the increasing trend around the world 
towards board independence shows the common believe that greater level of 
board independence allow more competent monitoring and effective in 
protecting minority shareholder’s  rights. Starting from US, many countries 
issued recommendation and event mandatory guidelines on minimum 
requirement of independent directors.  
• proportion of female directors (FE_PROP) – psychology and behavioural 
studies on risk-taking behaviour and investment decisions show gender 
differences in attitude towards risk-taking. Studies have shown inconclusive 
results. Adams & Funk (2012)  show that female directors are risk-seekers and  
Farrell & Hersch (2005) find inverse relationship between female directors and 
firm-risk. 
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• number of financial institute nominees (FI_INS) – financial institute investors 
appoints nominees to the board to look after the interest of shareholders.  
• number of state nominees (STATE) – firms such as state development 
corporations have representatives on the board to represent the state.   
• CEO duality (CEO_DUAL) - CEO-chairman duality is when the same person 
makes firm decisions and also have the duty to monitor those decisions. The 
concentration of power on a single person can only mean the same attitude 
towards risk-taking   
4.3 Data 
4.3.1 Data Description 
Table 4.1: Definitions of Variables 
This table describes the variables in this study and the definitions of the variables     
 
Variables Definitions
TTL	RISK Total	risk	is	variance	of	daily	stock	price	using	60	days	price.	The	variance	is	then	annualised	to	get	
yearly	variance.
UNSYS	RISK Unsystematic	risk	is	the	residual	of	single-index	market	model	(Sharpe,	1963)	decomposed	from	total	
risk.
SYS	RISK Systematic	risk	is	the	product	of	the	firms'	beta	times	the	market	daily	returns.	
BG Dummy	variable:	1	if	the	firm	is	a	business	group	member;	0	otherwise
BOD Total	number	of	executives	in	board	of	directors
ID_PROP Proportion	of	independent	directors	within	the	board	of	directors
FE_PROP Proportion	of	female	directors	within	the	board	of	directors
FI_INS Representatives	of	financial	insitute	on	board	of	directors
STATE Representatives	of	financial	insitute	on	board	of	directors
CEO_DUAL Dummy	variable	:	1	if	CEO	of	the	firm	is	also	the	Chair	of	Board	of	Directors;	0	otherwise
SIZE Natural	log	of	one	year	lagged	total	assets	-	Ln(Total	Assets	t-1)
LEV One	year	lagged	debt-to-equity	ratio	-	(Debt	t-1/Equity	t-1)
AGE One	year	lagged	of	years	since	firm	incorporation	-	
SALES_GRW (Sales	t	-	Sales	t-1/Sales	t-1)
TOB-Q (Market	Value	/	Book	Value)	t-1
CRISIS Dummy	variable:	1	if	year	is	2008	and	2009;	0	otherwise
POST-CRISIS Dummy	variable:	1	if	year	is	2010	-	2014;	0	otherwise
SIZE_WEIGHT Total	assets	of	Firm	it	/	Total	Assets	of	Group	t	
REV_WEIGHT Total	sales	of	Firm	it	/	Total	Sales	of	Group	t	
CF_WEIGHT Total	cash	flow	of	Firm	it	/	Total	cash	flow	of	Group	t	
DISTRESS Dummy	variable:	1	if	the	firm	is	in	distress	zone;	0	otherwise
GREY Dummy	variable:	1	if	the	firm	is	in	in	grey	zone;	0	otherwise
SAFE Dummy	variable:	1	if	the	firm	is	in	safe	zone;	0	otherwise
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4.3.2 Summary Statistics 
Appendix C reports the summary of the 2 digit industry code of both group and non-
group firms across 2008-2014. From the total sample of 9,853 firm-years, 41.9% are 
group firms and the remaining 58.1% are non-group firms. Both types of firms are 
well represented in our sample with the exception of 2 industries.7 
Table 4.2 reports the summary statistics of both the independent and dependable 
variables for both group and non-group firms. Non-group firms have 9.6% higher total 
risk median than group firms. The median of unsystematic risk of non-group firms is 
7.3% higher than group firms. The summary statistics of the corporate governance 
variables show that on average group firms are better governed than non-group firms. 
The median of board size of group firms is found to be 43% larger than non-group 
firms. The median of proportions of independent directors in both group and non-
group firms are similar at 50 percentage. In contrast to other board characteristics, the 
proportions of female directors in non-group firms 28.6% are higher than group firms. 
Both financial institute nominees and state appointees in group firms are marginally 
higher than non-group firms. CEO duality is slightly more common in group firms 
than non-group firms, which is about 8% higher in group firms. 
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables for Group and Non-Group Firms 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the independent and dependent variables of group 
and non-group firms. 
 
                                                 
7 Books & cards and Motor vehicles, trailers & semi-trailers industry have small samples and are only 
present in non-group and group categories respectively.    
N Min Mean Median Max N Min Mean Median Max
TTL_RISK 4128 2.29 10.94 10.64 35.56 5725 2.29 13.76 14.02 56.75
UNSYS_RISK 4128 1.72 8.85 8.34 33.29 5725 1.72 11.15 11.10 56.47
BOD 4128 1.00 9.77 10.00 21.00 5725 1.00 7.80 7.00 24.00
ID_PROP 4128 0.00 0.49 0.50 1.00 5725 0.00 0.48 0.50 1.00
FE_PROP 4128 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 5725 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00
FI_INS 4128 0.00 0.18 0.00 1.00 5725 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00
STATE 4128 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 5725 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00
CEO_DUAL 4128 0.00 0.94 1.00 1.00 5725 0.00 0.87 1.00 1.00
Variables
Group Non-Group
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Endorsing the findings in Table 4.2, the univariate analysis of annual equality of mean 
and median between group and non-group firms in Table 4.3 once again show that 
group firms have lower risk in comparison to no-group firms. Throughout the years, 
both TTL RISK and UNSYS RISK of group firms are significantly lower risk than 
non-group firms and on the increasing trend until 2012 and reduced in 2013 and 2014.  
Table 4.3: Annual Equality of Mean and Median of Dependent Variables 
This table reports the univariate analysis of annual equality of mean and median of the ownership 
types. The difference-in-means t-tests assume unequal variance across groups. Wilcoxon rank-
sum test is used to test for differences in the median. *, ** and *** indicate that group firms are 
significantly higher than non-group firms at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.  
 
Similarly, Table 4.4 also affirms the findings in Table 4.2 that with the exception of 
proportion of female directors, all other corporate governance measures of group firms 
are significantly higher than non-group firms. This table once again concurs to the 
earlier argument that group firms are better governed compared to non-group firms. 
In Table 4.5, the equality of mean and median of the control variables are presented. 
These mean and median tests provide equal results to indicate that group affiliates are 
significantly larger (SIZE), high in leverage (LEV), older (AGE) and have higher 
future growth opportunity (TOB_Q) than non-group firms. Even though, the 
difference in average sales growth (SALES_GRW) between group and non-group 
firms are not statistically significant as the rest of the variables, on average it is evident 
that sales growth of non-group firms is higher than that of group firms. 
Year N Mean	Test Median	Test Mean	Test Median	Test
2008 1331 -7.354*** -8.503*** -7.690*** -8.808***
2009 1361 -8.914*** -9.488*** -8.583*** -9.212***
2010 1421 -12.957*** -12.756*** -12.929*** -12.765***
2011 1448 -12.815*** -12.269*** -12.100*** -11.998***
2012 1456 -12.990*** -12.313*** -11.398*** -11.322***
2013 1434 -10.262*** -10.199*** -7.992*** -8.510***
2014 1402 -11.341*** -11.382*** -8.972*** -9.292***
Total	 9853 -25.891*** -26.011*** -24.332*** -25.154***
TTL	RISK UNSYS	RISK
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Table 4.4: Annual Equality of Mean and Median of Independent Variables between Group and Non-Group Firms 
This table reports the univariate analysis of annual equality of mean and median of all the independent variables. The difference-in-mean t-test assume unequal 
variance across groups. Wilcoxon rank-sum test is used to test for differences in the median. *, ** and *** indicate that group firms are either higher (+ sign) or lower 
(- sign) than non-group firms at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
 
  
Mean	Test
Median	
Test
Mean	Test
Median	
Test
Mean				Test Median	Test Mean	Test
Median	
Test
Mean	Test
Median	
Test
Mean	Test
Median	
Test
2008 1331 11.087*** 11.105*** 3.172*** 2.079*** -2.664*** -1.599* 8.113*** 8.366*** 2.438*** 2.538*** 5.125*** 4.837***
2009 1361 11.037*** 11.067*** 1.919*** 0.842 -2.404*** -1.688* 6.750*** 7.054*** 1.858*** 1.929** 4.172*** 3.964***
2010 1421 11.149*** 11.252*** 2.047** 1.896** -3.062*** -2.155** 6.932*** 7.381*** 2.361*** 2.495*** 3.912*** 3.725***
2011 1448 12.412*** 12.035*** 1.456** 0.866 -2.537*** -1.420 6.963*** 7.427*** 2.552*** 2.708*** 4.575*** 4.304***
2012 1456 13.028*** 12.444*** 2.341*** 2.172** -2.231*** -1.467 6.885*** 7.433*** 2.610** 2.794*** 4.447*** 4.182***
2013 1434 13.275*** 12.450*** 2.214*** 1.913** -3.153*** -2.499*** 6.422*** 6.868*** 2.310*** 2.465** 5.172*** 4.802***
2014 1402 11.973*** 11.703*** 2.646*** 2.054** -3.043*** -2.457*** 6.107*** 6.488*** 1.793*** 1.886** 4.228*** 4.009***
Total	 9853 31.604*** 30.991*** 5.819*** 4.349*** -7.258*** -5.038*** 18.291*** 19.375*** 6.067*** 6.399*** 11.949*** 11.270***
CEO_DUAL
Year N
BOD ID	_PROP FE_PROP FI_INS STATE
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Table 4.5: Annual Equality of Mean and Median of Control Variables between Group and Non-Group Firms 
This table reports the univariate analysis of annual equality of mean and median of all the independent variables. The difference-in-mean 
t-test assume unequal variance across groups. Wilcoxon rank-sum test is used to test for differences in the median. *, ** and *** indicate 
that group firms are either higher (+ sign) or lower (- sign) than non-group firms at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
 
Mean					
Test
Median	
Test
Mean					
Test
Median	
Test
Mean					Test Median	Test
Mean					
Test
Median	
Test
Mean					
Test
Median	
Test
2008 1331 18.897*** 16.934*** 1.622*** 1.908** -1.358** -0.946 9.828*** 11.020*** 3.567*** 4.349***
2009 1361 18.757*** 16.831*** 1.777*** 2.123** -1.639** -0.509 10.325*** 11.379*** 2.041** 4.143***
2010 1421 18.283*** 16.529*** 1.601** 1.691* -1.643** -0.384 10.639*** 11.719*** 3.795*** 5.750***
2011 1448 18.099*** 16.429*** 0.806 1.691* -0.698 -0.377 10.970*** 12.022*** 3.879*** 5.424***
2012 1456 18.734*** 16.805*** 0.342 1.284 1.103 1.694* 10.986*** 12.095*** 3.235*** 4.411***
2013 1434 18.341*** 16.411*** 0.702 0.863 -0.032 -0.324 10.607*** 11.761*** 3.037*** 4.645***
2014 1402 18.262*** 16.346*** 0.582 0.950 -2.327*** -3.028*** 10.762*** 11.740*** 3.218*** 4.379***
Total	 9853 48.584*** 43.765*** 2.703*** 3.908*** -2.084*** -1.305* 28.076*** 30.945*** 8.740*** 12.109***
Year N
SIZE SALES_GRW AGELEV TOB_Q
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The computation of Pearson correlation coefficient is shown in Table 4.6 to indicate 
the strength of the correlation coefficients between the variables. This suggests the 
absence of multicollinearity in the regression model. The unsystematic risk is highly 
correlated to total risk as considerable proportions of total risk are made of 
unsystematic risk. However, this does not pose a problem as both the risk measures 
are dependent variable.  
The variation inflation factors (VIF) and the tolerance values (1/VIF) is presented in 
the first four columns of the table. The first two columns report the VIF and 1/VIF for 
TTL_RISK and the following two columns report VIF and 1/VIF of UNSYS_RISK. 
High VIF value denote multicollinearity and the most common cut-off threshold is a 
value of 10. This is to ensure there is no serious collinearity problems between the 
variables. The highest VIF of 1.92 for firm size shows that there are no collinearity 
problems as the VIF values are below the threshold of 10. Next using the bivariate 
Pearson can increase the understanding of causal relationship among variables. This 
correlation measures how variables are related to each other and coefficient has 
possible values between +1 and -1. The value indicates the strength of the relationship 
and the + and – indicates the direction. The overall results indicate that 
multicollinearity does not pose a serious problem to the results as they are all within 
the recommended range.
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Table 4.6: Pearson Correlation Coefficients Matrix 
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients matrix of both dependent and control variables 
 
VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF TTL	RISK
UNSYS	
RISK
SIZE LEV
SALES-
GRW
AGE TOB_Q
TTL	RISK - - 1
UNSYS	RISK - - - 1
SIZE 1.08 0.92 1.08 0.92 -0.511*** -0.489*** 1
LEV 1.02 0.98 1.02 0.98 0.095*** 0.105*** 0.122*** 1
SALES_GRW 1.02 0.98 1.02 0.98 0.008 -0.018 0.025* -0.021* 1
AGE 1.05 0.96 1.05 0.96 -0.160*** -0.157*** 0.197*** 0.012 -0.058*** 1
TOB_Q 1.04 0.96 1.04 0.96 -0.195*** -0.201*** 0.165*** -0.005 0.106*** 0.070*** 1
TTL	RISK UNSYS	RISK
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4.4 Regression 
In this section the findings from the empirical tests are reported. On each of the tables, 
results are reported for the firm level regressions. Standard errors are clustered by 
group in all of the random-effects regressions.  
4.4.1 Results and Discussion 
In section A, the results of equations (2), (3) and (4) that examine the effect of 
corporate governance on firm risk including crisis period is reported. Section B 
discusses the effect of corporate governance on firm risk according to group affiliates’ 
weightage of size (eq. 5), sales revenue (eq. 6) and cash flow (eq. 7) on firm risk. 
Section C describes the results from the regressions of effect of financial distress on 
firm risk (eq. 8). All the regressions were done by clustering group id (VCE/Cluster 
Group) to address the endogeneity problem and the independent variables are one year 
lagged. 
A. Corporate Governance and Firm Risk Results. (Hypothesis 1-6) 
The results of regression estimates are presented in Table 4.7. Using the two measures 
of firm risk, the first estimate presented in column (1) and column (4) is the OLS 
regression for group and non-group firms for TTL RISK and UNSYS RISK 
respectively. It is shown that group affiliated firm risk is lesser than non-group firms’ 
risk for both risk measures with -2.698 for TTL RISK and -2.126 for UNSYS RISK. 
The difference is statistically and economically significant. 
Next, in column (2) and column (5) the OLS regression estimates for both risk 
measures are reported. The regression now includes the corporate governance 
mechanisms and control variables. It is now observed that there is an increase in group 
affiliated firms’ risk compared to non-group firms when corporate governance 
mechanism and control variables are included. However, the results are now not 
statistically significant and even then, non-group firms are still taking lower risk in 
comparison to group firms. This seems to suggest that the presence of corporate 
governance mechanism encourages risk-taking in group affiliated firms.  
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In column (3) and (6) the random effects model estimates for TTL RISK and UNSYS 
RISK are reported. Even though the relationship between group affiliated firm and 
both risk measures are now insignificant, the inclusion of the rest of the variables yield 
exactly the similar effect as the OLS regression effect. 
As seen in the table, the crisis dummy (CRISIS) indicate the level of firm risk of both 
types of firms in the sample. In column (2) and (5) show that the inclusion of crisis 
period into the regression increases TTL RISK is very high (3.3767 & 3.1952) in 
comparison non-crisis period. UNSYS RISK in column (5) and (6) are a little lower 
(2.0092 & 1.9535) than TTL RISK. The high TTL_RISK in comparison to 
UNSYS_RISK proves that all types of firms in this context are highly affected by the 
market-level risk. This result is predictable as the financial crisis will have more 
impact on systemic risk than on firm’s idiosyncratic risk. In the next row, to examine 
the effect of group affiliation in the crisis period, group dummy is integrated with the 
crisis dummy (BG * CRISIS). It is established that group firms are highly affected by 
firm risk than non-group firm during the financial crisis and once again it is evident 
that TTL_RISK (1.252 & 1.216) are higher than that of UNSYS_RISK (0.693 & 
0.656). 
Inclusion of corporate governance variable and accounting for the control variables 
that remain constant to control any determinants of firm risk, the following section 
discusses the results of both OLS and random effect model regression estimates:- 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1) 
Size of Board of Directors - The role of board of directors as the representatives of the 
shareholders and other stakeholders of the company is to monitor and advice the 
managers specially the strategic decisions. As discussed in the hypothesis section, the 
results show that large group of board members face pressure of conformity and 
difficulty in reaching consensus, hence, accepting less risky projects. Additionally, 
large size of board members indicates the presence of people from diverse fields which 
show the extent of knowledge and expertise of the individual members. Taking 
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advantage of this, the pool of experts is utilised for making strategic decisions in firm 
risk show that larger boards are negatively related to firm risk indicating that the 
direction of the influence depends on the extent to which board is able to reach 
consensus as a whole. It shows that the bigger the board size the less risk the firm 
undertake which is supported by previous literature as discussed on the hypothesis 
development section. The results show that the bigger board size that is delegated with 
the monitoring task act better in the best interests of all shareholders and do not 
differentiate group and non-group as both the firm have lower risk as the interaction 
between board size and group firm does not give any statistically significant result.     
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2 and H2a) 
Proportion of Independent Directors – As per hypothesis 2 (H2) the proportion of 
independent directors on board of directors significantly affects firm risk. Both TTL 
RISK and UNSYS RISK are positively related to the proportion of independent 
directors indicating that independent directors encourage firm risk for all firms. This 
is supported by our earlier argument that independent directors, especially when 
regulated mandatorily to not have no material relationships with the company, are 
expected to monitor the owner-manager’s activities, such as tunnelling, diversification 
and bailing out weak affiliates acting in the best interest of minority shareholders.  
 Subsequently, hypothesis H2a is also supported by the findings. Results of the 
regression in Table 4.7 suggest that the moral hazard in group affiliated firms due to 
the presence of co-insurance influences. Independent directors discourage firm risk in 
group affiliated firms because independent directors are concerned that pursuing risky 
investment may affect other firms in the group as all the firms are interdependent for 
internal capital market. The compulsion of providing co-insurance for other affiliates 
within the group and the fact that not all the group affiliated firms are de-facto 
receivers of this benefit, independent directors discourage risk-taking in group 
affiliated firms 
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Hypothesis 3 (H3) 
Proportion of Female Directors – Prior to 2014, there was no regulations in India to 
make appointment of female directors mandatory, hence the low level of female 
representative on board. Even though the proportion of female directors on board of 
directors is considerably low, similar to other corporate governance variance the 
proportion of female directors is positively related to firm risk indicating that female 
directors encourage firm risk, which is not supported by our earlier hypothesis. 
Correspondingly, the proportion female directors does not affect firm risk of group 
and non-group firms differently. It is observed here that the objective of the female 
directors corresponds with the one of independent directors on board, whereby in order 
to mitigate expropriation by the entrenched managers, female directors encourages 
more risk-taking most likely in the form of new investments in positive NPV projects 
and reducing the accessibility of free cash flow to majority shareholders who also hold 
the managerial positions. 
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4) 
Financial Institute Nominees - The findings of both OLS (column 2 and 5) and 
random-effect regression (column 3 and 6) provide similar findings. On average, the 
presence of financial institute’s representative on board of directors have positive 
significant coefficient to firm risk for both types of firms. The risk-taking of group 
firm is not significantly different from non-group firms as the coefficient is not 
statistically significant. More specifically, in India, typically one representative from 
the bank that lend largest amount of money sits on the board of directors. All large 
banks in India, with the exception of ICICI are state-owned banks. Agency theory 
would suggests that financial institute nominees on board of directors will increase 
monitoring and discourage firm risk, however, state-owned banks have been argued 
to lack the incentives to  monitor  and their lending pattern increases and decreases to 
play countercyclical role (Micco & Panizza, 2006)  
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Hypothesis 5 (H5) 
State Appointee – State appointee on board are positively related to TTL RISK and 
UNSYS RISK for both types of firms. As we have discussed in the hypotheses section, 
state appointee does not interfere with the day-to-day operations of the firm. However, 
as noted in the previous paragraph, even though the number of state appointee on board 
of a firm (if any) is usually one, the state appointee on board play similar role as the 
state-owned banks and explains the result and its relations to the hypothesis. Similar 
to state-owned banks, state appointee may lack the incentives to monitor majority 
shareholders, however, state appointee acts largely in line with the views of financial 
nominees and independent directors. 
 
Hypothesis 6 (H6) 
CEO Duality –  Even though CEO duality was argued to be a ‘double-edged sword’ 
that can either entrench CEO of the organisation by challenging a board’s ability to 
effectively monitor and discipline management or the concentration of the power of a 
CEO and board chairman creates an explicit firm leadership structure that may 
facilitate decision-making (Deman, Jorissen, & Laveren, 2018). It is observed from 
the results that CEO of firms, regardless of group or non-group, discourage firm risk. 
This corroborate with the argument that CEOs with dual power in firms with high 
ownership concentration are most likely to be a family member who hold significant 
ownership rather than a professional manager whose risk-taking incentive is controlled 
through pay-to-performance sensitivity. The literature on owner-CEO versus agent-
CEO found that owner-CEO is more risk tolerant in comparison to agent-CEO 
(Eisenmann, 2002; Fahlenbrach, 2009; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2009) due to the vastly 
different economic pay-offs for their efforts in engaging in positive net present value 
yet risky projects (Amihud & Lev, 1981). 
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Firm Specific and Firm Risk Results 
The effects of all the independent variables are similar across both the risk 
measurement and are mostly significant at 1% level with the exception of 
SALES_GRW. This is consistent with the summary statistics as shown in Table 4.7. 
The evidence shows that SIZE is negatively related to firm risk. Evidence from prior 
empirical studies shows that large firms (in term of assets) are more stable and are less 
prone to default (Harris & Raviv, 1991) hence are expected to take less risk than 
smaller firms. In this context where most firms have high ownership concentration, 
the survival of large firms is the main objective of the owners. 
Firm leverage (LEV) has positive and significant correlation with firm risk as firm 
with higher leverage tends to lead to higher risk (Kwok & Reeb, 2000). While prior 
literature has time and again provided evidence that business group have higher 
leverage than stand-alone firms, very few direct evidence is given on the link between 
stand-alone firm, leverage and firm-risk. This is also evident in our sample. Typically, 
firms with higher leverage are deemed to have increased bankruptcy risk (Anderson 
et al., 2012). The very nature of our risk measurement which is variance of stock price 
which is the interpretation of market perceptions on firm implies that higher leverage 
indicates higher risk. 
It is important to note that SALES_GRW and TOB-Q have negative coefficients for 
both the ownership types in spite SALES_GRW is statistically insignificant. The 
negative correlations of SALES_GRW and TOB-Q to firm risk indicate and firms with 
growth opportunity exhibit lower risk. This finding suggests that both group and non-
group firms are not taking higher risk even when they have historical growth and 
potential growth in the future. These firms could potentially increase growth level if 
they invest in R&D or innovative industries, however, our findings show otherwise. 
The plausible explanation for the findings possibly lies on prior literature suggests that 
family shareholding have strong incentives to monitor and that potentially influence 
the increase in efficiency of strategic decisions and in particular investment strategy 
and process (Anderson et al., 2012). This allows firm with high ownership 
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concentration to commit fewer resources on investments and still achieve similar 
outcomes. 
Meanwhile, AGE is also negatively related to firm risk. This suggests that older firms 
tend to take less risk. This finding is well documented in previous literature that 
suggest older firms tend to be closer to their optimal size and therefore have less 
growth opportunity (Bilsen & Konings, 1998) that can lead inertia and rigidness in 
innovating (Kumar, 2004). Overall all these factors may lead to lower risk-taking.  
These findings continued across all the regression performed here forth. Hence, the 
relationship between control variables and firm risk will not be discussed for the rest 
of the hypotheses. 
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Table 4.7: Regression Regressions Results on the Relationship between Corporate Governance 
and Firm Risk 
This table reports the basic OLS and random-effects model regression on the relationship of 
corporate governance and firm risk. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *, ** and 
*** indicate the significant level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BG -2.6980*** -1.0456* 0.2095 -2.1259*** -0.1957 0.8509
(0.1720) (0.4915) (0.4264) (0.1976) (0.4271) (0.3731)
CRISIS 3.3767*** 3.1952*** 2.0092*** 1.9535***
(0.1152) (0.1337) (0.1756) (0.1904)
BG	*	CRISIS 1.2519*** 1.2157*** 0.6925*** 0.6557***
(0.1691) (0.1652) (0.1311) (0.1249)
BOD -0.3037*** -0.0993*** -0.2368*** -0.0632***
(0.0034) (0.0065) (0.0034) (0.0160)
BG	*	BOD 0.0107 -0.0094 -0.0367 -0.0476*
(0.0326) (0.0270) (0.0277) (0.0229)
1.1620*** 0.6845*** -0.6762*** 0.2600**
(0.0406) (0.0591) (0.0412) (0.0809)
-1.4247* -0.5317 -0.7752 0.0046
(0.6037) (0.5476) (0.5400) (0.4974)
1.3150*** 0.8233*** 1.0852*** 0.6974***
(0.0604) (0.0691) (0.1046) (0.1357)
1.8808 -1.2310 -1.8015 -1.3549
(1.2264) (0.9884) (1.0509) (0.8868)
0.2734*** 0.5310*** 0.2637*** 0.4509***
(0.0111) (0.0303) (0.0123) (0.0374)
BG	*	FI_INS 0.1488 0.1047 0.0717 0.0161
(0.2610) (0.2335) (0.2455) (0.2111)
1.0475*** 0.5314*** 0.7121*** 0.3263***
(0.0328) (0.0426) (0.0247) (0.0486)
BG	*	STATE 1.0695* -0.8797* -0.7433 -0.6248
(0.4674) (0.4170) (0.4538) (0.3951)
-0.1941*** -0.1493*** -0.0732 -0.0384
(0.0358) (0.0324) (0.0375) (0.0279)
BG	*	CEO_DUAL -0.8475 -0.5740 -0.9651* -0.7123*
(0.4512) (0.3834) (0.3910) (0.3513)
-1.4632*** -1.3821*** -1.1831*** -1.1080***
(0.0479) (0.0484) (0.1193) (0.1167)
0.2677*** 0.2574*** 0.2355*** 0.2261***
(0.0181) (0.0178) (0.0224) (0.0211)
-0.0533 -0.0309 -0.2180* -0.1979
(0.0914) (0.0881) (0.1076) (0.1026)
-0.0163*** -0.0157*** -0.0147*** -0.0141***
(0.0042) (0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0031)
-0.1716*** -0.1655*** -0.1596*** -0.1543***
(0.0337) (0.0335) (0.0291) (0.0290)
Intercept 20.8494*** 18.1110*** 19.6828*** 16.8609**** 15.3577*** 16.5551***
(0.4367) (0.3212) (0.3344) (0.3085) (0.3193) (0.3939)
Observations 9853 9853 9853 9853 9853 9853
R-Squared 0.232 0.310 0.455 0.383 0.376 0.375
Year	FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry	FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
VCE	Group/Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
TTL	RISK UNSYS_RISK
BG	*	FE_PROP
FI_INS
STATE
CEO_DUAL
AGE
TOB_Q
SIZE
LEV
SALES_GRW
Variable
ID_PROD
BG	*	ID_PROP
FE_PROP
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B. Affiliates’ Size and Firm Risk Results 
Hypothesis 7 (H7) 
As reported in column (1-3) of Table 4.8, the outcome of the analyses, for both TTL 
RISK and UNSYS RISK, discloses that group firms in the three quartiles (q2, q3 and 
q4) take lower risk than that affiliates that are in q1. The findings for firm size are not 
statistically significant but firms’ revenue and cash flow, especially in q3 & q4 are 
significant. The findings imply that group affiliates especially the bigger contributor 
towards the groups’ overall revenue and income are risk averse compared to affiliates 
that contribute less towards overall group. This is the case for both revenue and cash 
flow. 
The outcome reported in Table 4.8 repeatedly attest that affiliates that are the highest 
contributors towards groups value tend to take lower risk. The finding corroborates 
our earlier findings in chapter 3 that cash flow, being the most liquid compared to total 
assets and sales revenue, are the immediate resources that can be reallocated to other 
affiliates within the group. This evidence suggests that board of directors are equally 
concerned about firm survival as well as protecting minority shareholders (as it was 
shown before). 
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Table 4.8: Regressions Results on the Relationship between Corporate Governance, Firm 
Characteristics and Firm Risk 
The regression in column (1) reports the random-effects estimation eq.5 to measure effect of 
group ownership on firms' size weight on overall group size. Column (2) reports the random-
effects estimation on eq.6 to measure effect of group ownership on firms' revenue weight against 
overall group revenue. Column (3) reports the regression of eq.7 to measure the effect of group 
ownership on firms' cash flow weight. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The 
dependent variables are the two (2) risk measures. The independent variables are the interaction 
between business group and size of individual firm against group size in three quartiles, lagged 
size, leverage, sales growth, age and Tobin's Q. *, ** and *** indicate the significant level at 10%, 
5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
BG 0.3388 0.5558 0.3293 1.0845** 1.2160** 1.0061**
(0.4407) (0.4521) (0.4263) (0.3832) (0.3868) (0.3718)
CRISIS 3.2079*** 3.2038*** 3.2102*** 1.9694*** 1.9625*** 1.9733***
(0.1283) (0.1300) (0.1267) (0.1853) (0.1872) (0.1818)
BG	*	CRISIS 1.1675*** 1.1722*** 1.1835*** 0.6041*** 0.6102*** 0.6121***
(0.1698) (0.1707) (0.1692) (0.1279) (0.1296) (0.1286)
BOD -0.1071*** -0.1093*** -0.1073*** -0.0700*** -0.0714*** -0.0699***
(0.0067) (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0163) (0.0153) (0.0159)
BG	*	BOD 0.0195 0.0274 0.0193 -0.0350 -0.0293 -0.0366
(0.0286) (0.0287) (0.0282) (0.0242) (0.0243) (0.0237)
0.6843*** 0.6917*** 0.6885*** 0.2598*** 0.2641*** 0.2639***
(0.0587) (0.0553) (0.0565) (0.0780) (0.0752) (0.0738)
BG	*	ID_PROP 0.5569 -0.5686 -0.5346 -0.0362 -0.0330 0.0012
(0.5467) (0.5468) (0.5434) (0.4995) (0.4973) (0.4920)
FEMALE 0.1044*** 0.1046*** 0.1043*** 0.0690** 0.068624** 0.0687**	
(0.0216) (0.0217) (0.0219) (0.0218) (0.0219) (0.0219)
BG	*	FEMALE -0.1278 -0.1297 -0.1205 -0.1303 -0.1309 -0.1216
(0.1190) (0.1191) (0.1200) (0.1029) (0.1029) (0.1038)
FIN_INS 0.5261*** 0.5237*** 0.5300*** 0.4430*** 0.4424*** 0.4489***
(0.0284) (0.0282) (0.0295) (0.0346) (0.0339) (0.0358)
BG	*	FIN_INS 0.1149 0.1337 0.1024 0.0351 0.0475 0.0143
(0.2351) (0.2346) (0.2313) (0.2123) (0.2121) (0.2078)
0.5443*** 0.5535*** 0.5464*** 0.3378*** 0.3443*** 0.3395***
(0.0431) (0.0401) (0.0422) (0.0485) (0.0454) (0.0467)
BG	*	STATE -0.9192* -0.9225* -0.8891* -0.6637 -0.6616 -0.6294
(0.4192) (0.4126) (0.4189) (0.3974) (0.3913) (0.3976)
CEO_DUAL -0.1483*** -0.1464*** -0.1462*** -0.0363 -0.0352 -0.0334
(0.0321) (0.0310) (0.0311) (0.0270) (0.0259) (0.0262)
BG	*	CEO_DUAL 0.5716 -0.5333 -0.5184 -0.70696* -0.6703 -0.6412
(0.3800) (0.3802) (0.3822) (0.3486) (0.3475) (0.3476)
BG_SIZE_WEIGHT_Q2 -0.1006 													 -0.1954
(0.2747) (0.2342)
BG_SIZE_WEIGHT_Q3 0.0657 -0.1511
(0.2820) (0.2696)
BG_SIZE_WEIGHT_Q4 -0.3594 -0.5367
(0.2921) (0.2891)
BG_REV_WEIGHT_Q2 -0.4019 -0.4042
(0.2927) (0.2445)
BG_REV_WEIGHT_Q3 -0.5571 -0.5969*	
(0.2969) (0.2685)
BG_REV_WEIGHT_Q4 	-0.7616*	 -0.8039**
(0.3130) (0.2895)
BG_CF_WEIGHT_Q2 -0.0002 0.0363
(0.1573) (0.1510)
BG_CF_WEIGHT_Q3 -0.1034 -0.1495
(0.1607) (0.1435)
	-0.5204**	 -0.7024***
(0.1582) (0.1468)
SIZE -1.3708*** -1.3566*** -1.3685*** -1.0896*** -1.0807*** -1.0893***
(0.0446) (0.0389) (0.0429) (0.1122) (0.1059) (0.1086)
LEV 0.2571*** 0.2540*** 0.2536*** 0.2252*** 0.2226*** 0.2209***
(0.0178) (0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0213) (0.0206) (0.0197)
SALES_GRW -0.0321 -0.0103 -0.0117 -0.1987 -0.1757 -0.1717
(0.0884) (0.0830) (0.0841) (0.1027) (0.0943) (0.0916)
AGE 0.0159*** -0.0154*** -0.0157*** -0.0141*** -0.0138*** -0.0141***
(0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0030) (-0.0031) (0.0031)
TOB_Q -0.1647*** -0.1639*** -0.1624*** -0.1537*** -0.1528*** -0.1502***
(0.0337) (0.0341) (0.0347) (0.0291) (0.0294) (0.0304)
19.8009*** 20.0471*** 19.8274*** 16.7682*** 16.9351*** 16.7465***
(0.3527) (0.3603) (0.3240) (0.3499) (0.3537) (0.3568)
Observations 9853 9853 9853 9853 9853 9853
R-Squared 0.455 0.455 0.455 0.383 0.383 0.384
Year	FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry	FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
VCE	Group/Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
UNSYS	RISKTTL	RISK
BG_CF_WEIGHT_Q4
Intercept
STATE
Variable
ID_PROD
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C. Behavioural Factor and Firm Risk Results 
Hypothesis 8 H(8)  
As reported in column (1-3) of Table 4.8, both TTL RISK and UNSYS RISK, show 
that both group affiliates and non-group firms assume similar risk under their 
respective condition. Similar to our findings in Chapter 3, applying the reasoning of 
prospect theory, firms that are already having the possibility of getting into financial 
distress do not take more risk. Both group affiliates and non-group firms frame their 
risk-taking strategy to avoid higher risk in firms that are safe from financial distress. 
This is especially if the firms are non-group firms. The findings are statistically 
significant. The outcome reported in Table 4.9 shows that both group affiliates and 
non-group firms that are financially sound are equally loss averse.  
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Table 4.9: Regression Results on the Relationship between Corporate Governance, Financial 
Distress and Firm Risk 
The regressions in column (1) presents the estimation of eq.8. The table presents the effects of 
group ownership, interaction between group dummy and firm in distress and safe zones. 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The dependent variables are the two(2) risk 
measures. The independent variables are the lagged size, leverage, sales growth, age and Tobin's 
Q. *, ** and *** indicate the significant level at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively 
 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
BG 0.6159 0.4834 0.4137 1.3424**
(0.5217) (0.4617) (0.4656) (0.4151)
CRISIS 3.5320*** 3.2505*** 2.1444*** 1.9964***
(0.1012) (0.1282) (0.1608) (0.1874)
BG	*	CRISIS 1.2921*** 1.2543*** 0.7406*** 0.7035***
(0.1700) (0.1660) (0.1299) (0.1247)
DISTRESS 0.8542*** 0.2294*** 0.7601*** 0.2069***
(0.0087) (0.0215) (0.0150) (0.0503)
BG	*		DISTRESS 0.1134 0.1480 -0.0326 0.0167
(0.2953) (0.2780) (0.2903) (0.2840)
SAFE -0.4600*** -0.4934*** -0.3168*** -0.2971***
(0.0113) (0.0246) (0.0254) (0.0219)
BG	*	SAFE -0.7281** -0.5326* -0.9530*** -0.7955***
(0.2333) (0.2238) (0.2149) (0.2065)
BOD -0.2966*** -0.0970*** -0.2288*** -0.0617***
(0.0033) (0.0063) (0.0033) (0.0150)
BG	*	BOD 0.0092 0.0102 -0.0378 -0.0461*
(0.0320) (0.0268) (0.0272) (0.0229)
1.2079*** 0.6904*** 0.7091*** 0.2665***
(0.0389) (0.0564) (0.0400) (0.0787)
BG	*	ID_PROP -1.3907* -0.4711 -0.7085 -0.0771
(0.5966) (0.5466) (0.5340) (0.4983)
FE_PROP 1.4726*** 0.9003*** 1.2126*** 0.7521***
(0.0526) (0.0629) (0.0965) (0.1343)
BG	*	FE_PROP -1.6337 -1.1550 -1.5733 -1.2687
(1.1889) (0.9856) (1.0270) (0.8905)
FIN_INS 0.1171*** 0.4815*** 0.1414*** 0.4258***
(0.0108) (0.0318) (0.0098) (0.0489)
BG	*	FIN_INS 0.1381 0.0416 0.0261 -0.0754
(0.2413) (0.2237) (0.2236) (0.2002)
1.0125*** 0.5340*** 0.6883*** 0.3384***
(0.0327) (0.0385) (0.0242) (0.0417)
BG	*	STATE -1.0918* -0.9352* -0.7705 -0.6794
(0.4507) (0.4000) (0.4335) (0.3769)
CEO_DUAL -0.1658*** -0.14273*** -0.0504 -0.0245
(0.0334) (0.0324) (0.0347) (0.0278)
BG	*	CEO_DUAL -0.7896 -0.5557 -0.9069* -0.6904*	
(0.4308) (0.3781) (0.3713) (0.3457)
SIZE -1.3614*** -1.0900***
(0.0428) (0.1115)
LEV 0.2136*** 0.1878***
(0.0186) (0.0169)
0.0388 -0.1415
(0.0841) (0.0963)
-0.01543*** -0.0138***
(0.0038) (0.0030)
0.15234*** -0.1424***
-0.0364 (0.0313)
Intercept 18.1775*** 19.9979*** 15.3406*** 16.7305***
(0.2926) (0.3273) (0.2823) (0.3779)
Observations 9853 9853 9853 9853
R-Squared 0.325 0.461 0.259 0.389
Year	FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry	FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
VCE	Group/Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes
UNSYS	RISK
AGE
TOB_Q
SALES_GRW
ID_PROD
Variable
STATE
TTL	RISK
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4.4.2 Conclusion 
Effective corporate governance mechanism at firm level is highly important for firms 
to have access to financing, preferred cost of capital, higher return on equity, increased 
valuation and performance (Claessens & Laeven, 2003). Hence, the objective of this 
study is to identity the effectiveness of corporate governance in influencing corporate 
strategy. Although the importance of board of directors as a corporate governance at 
firm level has been previously questioned, our findings reveal that board of directors 
is effective in improving overall governance especially firm risk. The study finds 
evidence to support negative relationship between the number of directors on board of 
directors (the size of board of directors) firm risk. Contrarily, independent directors, 
female directors, financial institute nominees and state appointees have positive 
relationship towards firm risk. The findings of this study indicate that even though 
corporate governance is a product of developed economies, it is still effective in 
environment less transparent and the board members play crucial role in monitoring 
the owner-manager’s strategic decisions in both group and non-group firms. Corporate 
governance is shown to be an important factor in influencing the strategic decisions of 
firms with concentrated ownership. It is not only an effective governance in emerging 
economies where enforcement is weak, but also successful in providing investors 
protection for minority shareholders. By encouraging risk-taking in firms with high 
ownership concentration, corporate governance can ensure that the private benefits of 
control of owner-manager is alleviated can ensure that large shareholders the power 
to expropriate minority shareholders. More importantly, better risk-taking can 
encourage entrepreneurial orientation and increase economic growth as a whole. 
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FIRM RISK AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE: TWO-WAY 
ANALYSIS USING STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELLING 
ABSTRACT 
This study uses Structural Equational Modelling (SEM) to confirm the 
interrelationship between firm risk and capital structure. The overall model aims to 
examine the influence of corporate governance and relationship banking on firm risk 
and firm capital structure to explain firms’ risk management strategies. Using firm 
level panel data of Indian listed manufacturing firms, the SEM model finds no 
difference in the two-way relationship of capital structure and firm risk between 
business groups and non-group firms. This suggests that both type of firms’ strategic 
capital structure decisions are highly dependent on firm survival and limit the 
probability of going into financial distress. The model also yields implications that 
corporate governance is the key determinant of capital structure choices and firm risk 
of both group and non-group firms. It explains the dynamics of corporate governance 
in making strategic capital structure decisions based on each type of firms’ ownership 
nature. However, relationship banking has equal influence on group affiliated and non-
group firms’ capital structure decisions. 
Keywords: emerging economy, group affiliation, capital-structure, firm risk, structural 
equation modelling.   
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5.1 Introduction 
Arguably, the total risk borne by any firm can be divided into non-capital risk and 
capital risk (Peterson, 1964). The non-capital risk aspect is a result of instability and 
uncertainty of the firm’s market. The other aspect of firm risk is the capital risk which 
is result of adding debts into the capital structure. We have in the earlier chapters 
explored the non-capital risk by examining how business group affiliation, which are 
characterised by internal capital markets, influence risk-taking by firms, and how 
corporate governance structures affect risk-taking of business group affiliated and 
unaffiliated firms.  
If risk-taking by firms is manifested in the variability of their revenues and cash flows, 
given a firm’s capital structure, its likelihood of bankruptcy increases with the extent 
of the risk that it bears. The firm can then reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy either 
by adjusting its capital structure (Castanias, 1983) or by adjusting the risk it bears. 
Variants of these arguments can be found in a relatively small but interesting literature 
that relates risk management strategies of financial and non-financial firms to their 
capital structure (Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein, 1993; Froot & Stein, 1998; Stulz, 1996).  
The relationship between risk and capital structure can also be approached in a 
different way, using the stylised framework of Jensen & Meckling (1976). 
Specifically, within the Jensen-Meckling framework, firm insiders can finance 
excessively risky projects using external debt (Williams, 1987). Leland (1998, pp. 
1213) has argued that “[s]uch predatory behaviour creates agency costs that the choice 
of capital structure must recognize and control.” He demonstrates that inability to 
“precontract risk levels before debt is issued” influences a firm’s capital structure. The 
empirical literature on capital structure has, therefore, is pre-supposes that a firm’s 
capital structure is determined by the volatility of its earnings, which is a measure of 
risk (Titman & Wessels, 1988).  
A smaller literature has examined the relationship between capital structure and firm 
risk. For example, Mandelker & Rhee (1984) have found that a firm’s operating and 
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financial leverage explains a large proportion of the variation in a firm’s systematic 
risk.  
It is evident that it could be instructive to jointly model a firm’s risk-taking and capital 
structure decisions within the same empirical framework, to further extend the 
literature on risk-taking. Yet, there is very little recent research on this relationship 
between these two firm-level variables. In this chapter, we model firm-level risk and 
capital structure jointly, using a structural equation model (SEM) framework. 
Consistent with the earlier chapters, this framework enables us to compare the risk-
capital structure relationship of business group affiliated and unaffiliated firms. Our 
prior is that since business group affiliated firms experience lower threat of bankruptcy 
on account of their internal capital market, risk-capital structure relationship would be 
different for these firms compared to the unaffiliated firms. 
The SEM framework also enables us to push the envelope of empirical modelling of 
risk and capital structure in other ways. First, we are able to treat corporate governance 
as a latent variable that is influenced by observable board characteristics such as board 
size, board independence, and CEO duality. Second, since emerging market financial 
sectors are characterised by high information costs and transactions costs, such that 
capital structure may be influenced by mechanisms such as relationship banking that 
reduces at least the information cost. This aligns our framework to the literature that 
suggests that capital structure decisions may be influenced by the nature of the 
financial market – bank-based vs market-based (Rajan & Zingales, 1995) , as well as 
to the large literature on relationship banking.   
5.2 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
The focal point of this empirical research is the two-way relationship between firm 
risk and capital structure of the firms. The hypothesis is based on two logical 
arguments:  
Even though Modigliani & Miller (1958) suggest that a firm’s capital structure is 
insignificant from an economic view-point, other scholars suggest that the level of 
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firm debt may have effect on firm’s behaviour such as firm risk (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Myers & Majluf, 1984) .  
Capital structure can be construed as a double-edged sword that, on one hand, it can 
be used to provide positive signal to investors (Gaud, Jani, Hoesli, & Bender, 2005) 
as high usage of debt may signal better performance to outside investors (Joshi, 2018). 
The issuance of debt allows the market to make inferences about a firm’s strategies 
and performance. And on the other hand, high usage of debt firm may face higher 
bankruptcy cost as firm now has to meet higher debt repayment resulting in higher 
firm risk.  
Taken together, capital structure and firm risk not only affect each other directly but 
also indirectly through other firm attributes.   
5.2.1 The Mediating Role of Corporate Governance 
The theory of capital structure by Modigliani & Miller (1958) pointed out that in 
frictionless market, capital structure of a firm is irrelevant. However, more than 4 
decades later, other research theorize other potential determinant of capital structure. 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) identifies agency costs as one of the determinants of firm’s 
capital structure. Corporate governance, a mechanism that is set to alleviate agency 
problems that arise due to the separation of ownership and management resulting in 
large deviation in cash and control rights (Berle & Means, 1932) is associated to 
capital structure decisions through agency costs. The enforcement of good governance 
is only feasible in countries with strong legal framework. Claessens & Laeven (2003) 
suggest that stronger legal environment which ameliorate governance helps develop 
better financial markets that attract investors to invest in firms with investment needs. 
Hence, it can be argued that in countries with developed corporate governance, firms’ 
capital structure choices are influenced by corporate governance. 
In emerging economies context, corporate governance is an enforced check and 
balance concerning minimizing the opportunistic behaviour of controlling 
shareholders towards minority shareholders. When it comes to capital structure, it a 
very common view in finance is that the wealth of shareholders maximizes when the 
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capital structure of the firm reaches optimal level. However, controlling shareholders 
in firms with concentrated ownership, who are also the entrenched managers of the 
firm, may not make financing decisions that maximise minority shareholders wealth. 
Therefore, the agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders play a 
role in firms’ financing decisions (Morellec, Nikolov, & Schurhoff, 2012). The 
objective of board of directors being effective monitoring, advising and improving 
firm practices to ensure firm managers act on the best interests of shareholders and 
work towards maximising shareholders value is an internal governance that is 
advantageous to minority shareholders. The presence of independent directors and 
non-executive directors on the board of both dispersed ownership and concentration 
ownership firms are very crucial in increasing the quality of monitoring, advising and 
improving firm practices (Crespí-Cladera & Pascual-Fuster, 2014). Hence, it lies with 
the board members of the firm to discipline the firm by making optimal capital 
structure decisions through governance. 
Morellec et al. (2012) argue that an effective corporate governance system advances 
shareholders’ interest by persuading managers to use more debt as well as to make 
more timely capital structure rebalancing. Overall, they show that agency conflicts 
have a first-order effect on capital structure decisions. This indicates that through good 
governance the tendency of controlling shareholders to favour low debt to equity ratio 
will be extenuated. Through enforcement of good governance, agency problems 
within firms are mitigated to certain extend and reduces information asymmetry 
between management and investors. Alleviated agency problems lessen agency cost 
which in return determine the capital structure of the firm. Hence, capital structure of 
firms and corporate governance are linked through their association with agency costs 
(Hasan & Butt, 2009). 
From strategic and stability viewpoint, the uniqueness of the ownership structure of 
business groups and the co-insurance effect dictate that corporate governance will 
make capital structure decisions keeping in mind the survival of group as a whole. 
Even though encouraging debt over equity can discipline group affiliated firms’ 
controlling shareholders, exposing group affiliated firm to possible bankruptcy will 
  106 
affect the group as a whole. The co-insurance effect of group affiliated firms has an 
influence on firms’ debt capacity. This effect is expected to be intense in affiliated 
firms that are big, large contributor towards the group’s revenue and sales (refer to 
Chapter 4). Hence, coinsurance effect predicts a negative relationship between 
corporate governance and capital structure. 
On the other hand, non-group firms are governed in a different manner than group 
affiliated firms. The ultimate objective of corporate governance when it comes to 
capital structure decisions is now purely to discipline controlling shareholders. 
Managers cum controlling shareholders of non-affiliated firms do not prefer debt as 
debt commitment restricts managerial flexibility (Jensen, 1986) and increases 
bankruptcy costs. Trade-off theory suggests that controlling shareholders make 
financing decisions by trading-off tax savings from debt financing against bankruptcy 
costs. In contrary, minority shareholders may prefer debt financing as debt constrains 
the private benefits of control accessible to managers cum controlling shareholders by 
reducing free cash flow and potential cash diversion (Jensen, 1986). Morellec et al., 
(2012) argue that the trade-off between agency cost of debt and the benefit of debt as 
the factor that disciplines controlling shareholders affect capital structure. Hence, it 
can be hypothesised that controlling shareholders of non-affiliated firms will turn 
down higher debt financing and corporate governance will do the exact opposite. 
The opportunistic behaviour of managers may reduce in firms from the emerging 
economies because the ownership concentration of the firms rests in the hands large 
business groups or influenced family. When compared to firms with diluted 
ownership, majority shareholders of firms with concentrated ownership will not be 
effective in monitoring firm managers as the managers and the majority shareholders 
are often the same group of people. Since the interests of the managers and majority 
shareholders are closely aligned, which is maximise group/family wealth, majority 
shareholders lack the incentives to monitor the managers. Therefore, the need for 
internal governance that possesses the incentives to monitor both managers and the 
majority shareholders on behalf of the minority shareholders. 
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From this argument, it can be established that the corporate governance of firms play 
an important role in firms’ capital structure choices and subsequently affects  firm risk. 
The concentration of ownership in the hands of certain number of people within a 
family or groups can result in high agency costs. In the case of firms in emerging 
economies, as discussed before, both type of firms have high ownership concentration 
thus suffer from similar agency problems demonstrating that corporate governance 
plays a major role in shaping the capital structure of firms’ with high concentration. 
Hence, the necessity to include corporate governance as a mediator in the SEM model. 
5.2.2 The Mediating Role of Relationship Banking. 
The pecking order theory firms suggests that firms prefer internally generated funds 
such as retained earnings before resorting to external finance. The theory posits that 
because of adverse selection firm owners prefer internal financing over debt (Myers, 
1984). However, when only external financing is available, firms will turn to debt and 
equity will be the final choice. Pecking order theory recognises information 
asymmetry as another factor that effects firms’ capital structure. In light of pecking 
order theory, firms prefer debt over equity. However, information asymmetry is a 
barrier for firms in acquiring debts. 
Firm’s capital structure is highly dependent on the degree of information asymmetry 
between controlling shareholder and other stakeholders. Firm managers and insiders 
are in possession of private information of the firm, such as investment opportunities 
and return streams (Harris & Raviv, 1991), which outside investors or creditors are 
less informed causing information asymmetry. The information asymmetry has an 
immense effect on firms’ capital structure as it makes equity less desirable because 
external investors are not keen to invest in the firm. 
The entities involved in making the capital structure decisions are also plagued with 
other issues that will be a concern to minority shareholders. In firms with diluted 
ownership, the role of managerial self-interest and entrenchment (Berger, Ofek, & 
Yermack, 1997; Friend & Lang, 1988) play a major role in financing decisions. 
Similarly, in firms with high concentration, the controlling shareholders are 
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entrenched, subject to non-diversifiable risk and bankruptcy risk were highlighted as 
among the main reasons for low level of debt.   
Motivated to discipline controlling shareholders of firms, board of directors can make 
decisions on the allocation of debts, equity and other claims. (Grinstein, 2006). 
Addressing this problem through systematic governance ensures that minority 
shareholders are not appropriated. Encouraging debt in capital structure is an 
appropriate tool used to discipline the entrenched controlling shareholders (Harris & 
Raviv, 1988).  
Debt is used as a disciplining device because default allows creditors the option to 
force the firm into liquidation if debt repayments are not fulfilled (Harris & Raviv, 
1988). Hence, bank, one of the main creditors of firms, is taken into the equation to 
determine the two-way relationship between capital structure and risk. Although it is 
highly important to discipline firm managers or insiders, private information that is 
not freely available to banks increases cost of information asymmetry.  
Even though pecking order theory suggests that firms have an apparent order when 
allocating capital structure and debt is the first choice when it comes to external 
financing arrangements, debt may not be readily available to firms with high 
ownership concentration. Moral hazard and adverse selection problems within firms 
with high ownership concentration require banks to invest in obtaining private 
information to make lending decisions and manage credit risk (Berger et al., 2008). 
Having a long-term relationship with banks helps resolve not only the moral hazard 
and adverse selection, but also several market imperfections in capital and 
intermediate product markets at lower costs (Mahmood & Mitchell, 2004). As firms 
with good reputation have the opportunity as well as ability to secure 1) financial 
resources and 2) at a significantly lower interest rate.  
The long-term relationship with bankers proves to benefit both types of firms as a 
result of banks having easier means to make credit assessment of firms. Banker-
customer relationship also serves as an advantage for bankers because banker are able 
establish their customers’ creditworthiness much easier with the lower information 
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asymmetry and able to provide debts at a lower interest rates because of the lower cost 
of securing the private information (Li, Feng, Lu, & Song, 2015).  
Having access to the co-insurance effect within the group, group affiliated firms are 
believed to have easier access in raising external financing due to lower bankruptcy 
risk (Mahmood & Mitchell, 2004), however, the opaqueness of group affiliated firms’ 
ownership structure increases the degree of information asymmetry. This pose as a 
disadvantage to group affiliated firms to secure debt as this increased transaction costs 
compared to unaffiliated firms. Group affiliated firms are not at a superior position to 
secure lower interest rates relative to non-affiliated firms. Hence, the influence of 
relationship banking to both types of firms. 
5.3 Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) 
This study employs Structural Equation Modelling (SEM), hence in the section 
explains SEM, justification for using SEM followed by the data collection procedures, 
and regression analyses adopted in this chapter - SEM, Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
(CFA) and the Goodness of Fit Index (GFI).  
This study uses Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) which is a comprehensive 
statistical approach to test hypotheses about relations among observed and latent 
variables. SEM is a collection of statistical techniques that allow examination of a set 
of relationships between one or more independent variables and one or more 
dependent variables. The independent variables and dependent variables in the 
analysis can be either continuous or discrete and either factors or measured variables. 
SEM is also referred to as causal modelling, causal analysis, simultaneous equation 
modelling, analysis of covariance structures, path analysis or confirmatory factor 
analysis. SEM overcomes the limitations in the traditional multivariate analysis. Some 
of the limitations of multivariate analysis include 1) the results of the analysis may be 
biased because of measurement error, 2) absence of model estimation to analyse 
several equations simultaneously, 3) not able to test hypotheses that are exploratory 
variables. Second generation multivariate analysis, such as SEM, developed to 
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overcome some weaknesses of the earlier analysis technique especially when the 
model involves a construct that is measured by a number of variables. The use of SEM 
technique is appropriate for several reasons 1) two-way relationship between capital 
structure and unsystematic risk can be modelled simultaneously, 2) SEM technique 
offers comprehensive estimates of measurement error, 3) SEM technique can consider 
both observed and unobserved variables into the model, 4) multiple structural 
equations can be estimated concurrently. 
The empirical method used in this study is based on the statistical theory of unobserved 
variables that assumes multivariate normal data and a large sample size using SEM. 
The main idea behind using this model is to examine the relationship between an 
unobserved variable and a set of observable variables using covariance information. 
SEM does this by comparing a sample covariance matrix of the observed variables 
with parametric structure imposed on it by the hypothesized model. 
Using SEM, the model will consider corporate governance and relationship banking 
as the latent variables and analyse the relationship to the observed variables using the 
covariance matrix of the latent variables. The latent variable approach was taken to 
address the cross-sectional data with multiple items that measure the same construct 
that incorporates the focus of the dimensional approaches with identifying latent 
mixture in the population (i.e. the interrelatedness among observed variables). 
Estimation of latent variable is done by analysing the variance and covariance of the 
observed variables. Hence, latent variable approach thereby combines the strength of 
conventional multilevel modelling and SEM.   
To construct the model, the latent variable is measured in the first step linking the 
observed indicator variables in a factor analytical model also called measurement 
model. Second, the relationships between the latent variable and the observed 
explanatory (causal) variables are specified through a structural model. Different 
specifications can also be used to see which variables turn out to be significant. By 
using subsamples of business group and private firms it will be interesting to see which 
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variables have influence on the capital structure and firm risk and finally the two- way 
relationship between capital structure and firm risk. 
5.3.1 Justification for Using SEM 
There are number reasons for using SEM in this study. First, SEM has numbers 
advantage over other models in estimating the relationships among the factors. SEM 
allows examination of complex relationships. Especially when the phenomena of 
interest are complex and multidimensional, SEM is the only analysis that permits 
complete and simultaneous tests of all the relationships. Second, regardless of the 
complexity, SEM takes into account the modelling of interactions, non-linearities, 
correlated independents, measurement error, correlated error terms, multiple latent 
independents measured by multiple indicators, and one or more latent dependent 
measured by multiple indicators. By using latent variable which is measured by 
multiple observed indicators, SEM extenuates reliability and validity problems. 
Whereas, using a single observed variable that assumes no measurement error is 
associated with the measurement of a variable. This ensures the ability of a measure 
to be consistent and accurately define the construct of the measures. 
Data analyses by SEM involves three stages: data screening, confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) for latent variable and finally the path analysis of structural equation 
modelling (SEM). First, the data are tested for violations of statistical assumptions 
such as sample size, normality and multicollinearity. Second, confirmatory factor 
analysis was conducted for both exogenous and endogenous variables. The third and 
final step in SEM is to develop a complete path model and analysis the model. A path 
diagram is used to achieve this. In the complete path model, all latent variables are 
measured by multiple observed indicators which have associated error terms in 
addition to the residual error factor associated with the latent variable to determine if 
the proposed factor solution fits the data. 
SEM begins with the specification of a model to be estimated. There are two types of 
models involved in specification of a model. The first step is known as measurement 
model which involves connecting a construct with all the observed variables that 
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measure the construct as shown in Figure 5.1. This procedure is known as 
confirmatory factor analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Measurement model for Corporate Governance construct using six observed 
variables 
 
5.3.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is done by assessing the factor loading of the 
variables to determine if the proposed factor solution fits the data. The procedure 
validates measurement model of a construct. CFA also assesses the validity and 
reliability of a construct. The validation of the construct must be conducted before 
modelling the causal-effect correlations between constructs can be established. CFA 
is conducted by modelling all the constructs of theoretical framework into a structural 
model to be analysed. Therefore, using Graphic User Interface (GUI) of STATA is the 
appropriate method to analyse and estimate the theoretical framework. 
Through the CFA procedure, STATA will estimate the loading factor for each 
measured variable in the construct. The value of loading factor higher than 0.6 
indicates that the measured variable is a meaningful to the measurement of the 
construct (Hair, et al., 2017). Item with loading factor less than 0.6 should be 
bod 
id_prop 
CG 
fi_ins 
fe_prop 
state 
ceo_dual 
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eliminated one by one because the variable not only does not contribute in explaining 
the construct but also will affect the fitness indices.   
The next step in CFA is to examine the fitness indices - Chi-square, indices of 
goodness-of-fit (GFI) and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) test 
results. Acceptable value for each of the test differs from literature to literature. 
However, to test for an absolute fit for sample size larger than 200 Chi-square can be 
waived (Hair, et al., 2006). The other tests, GFI values greater than 0.90 for a basic 
model and 0.85 for a more complex model are considered good. RMSEA is another 
measure that corrects for the tendency of the measurement for goodness-of-fit and it 
represents how well a model fits a population and not just the sample used in this 
estimation. Lower RMSEA values indicate better fit which is typically less than 1.0 
and the ideal value should be less than 0.8. To achieve a better goodness-of-fit of the 
CFA on the proposed construct, items are removed one by one starting from the lowest 
loading factor to model and achieve the desired value.  
Subsequently, convergent validity of the constructs is validated in order to determine 
that all measurement is internally consistent, reliable and valid for further analysis 
(Byrne, 2012). STATA reports fitness indices, factor loading and R2 value for each 
item and the correlation value between the constructs. The validity of the model can 
be interpreted from the results displayed on STATA GUI. Next, the composite 
reliability will be computed to verify the internal consistency of measurement scale. 
Construct reliability can be calculated as follows: square of the summation of the 
factor loading divide with square of the summation of the factor loading plus 
summation of standard error. Composite reliability considers the actual loading rather 
than assuming each factor is equally weighted. 
5.3.3 Path Modelling 
The concept of structural model is a statistical statement about the relations among the 
constructs. Once the model is specified, estimates of the free parameters from the set 
of data is obtained. A path model of the theoretical framework is built on the graphical 
user interface (GUI) STATA to test hypotheses. 
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Path modelling and analysis are done to analyse the relationship between endogenous 
and exogenous variables. The latent variables are developed by assigning weights to 
the indicators using path analysis which is run by STATA and assigned with the 
highest eigenvalue. Developed by geneticist Sewall Wright (1918), path analysis a 
diagram that also known as “causal modelling” that shows the independent, 
intermediate and dependent variables. It is a straightforward extension of multiple 
regression technique allows us to test theoretical propositions on cause and effect. Path 
analysis involves testing a theoretically or empirically determined specific pattern to 
decompose correlations into different interpretation of effects. 
Typically path models are diagrams presented comprise of exogenous and endogenous 
variables connected by single and double-headed arrows. The arrows in the modelling 
show the assumed relations. The single-headed arrow points from cause to effect. A 
double-headed or curved arrow shows that the variables are correlated and no causal 
relations are assumed. The independent variables are called exogenous variables and 
the dependent variables are called endogenous variables. The path coefficient of one 
variable (the cause) to the other (the effect) indicates the direct effect of the cause to 
the effect. The key notations of the variables in the diagram are :- 
Xn : observed/measured independent variables * 
 : latent independent variables 
n : latent dependent variables * 
 n : indicators for the dependent variables * 
en : residual error * 
*n : sample/observed covariance matrix 
 
The path coefficients are written with two subscripts with the effect being the first 
subscript followed by the causal. The simplest model posits a relationship between a 
single measured variable as presented in Figure 5.2. In the sample model shown below, 
the two measured variables appear in boxes connected by lines with arrows indicating 
that the independent variables (X1, X2) having direct relationship to the measured 
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dependent variable (1). Lines with two-headed arrows indicate the covariance among 
the independent variables. The residual indicates the unexplained portion of the ID. 
In the sample model shown on Figure 5.2 below, the two exogenous variables (X1 and 
X2) are modelled as being correlated and as having both direct effects on Y1. The 
regression model of the following path coefficient is as follows: 
ɳ1 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑋1 + 𝛾2𝑋2 + 𝑒1 
 
 
  
   
 
 
Figure 5.2: Path diagram of a multiple regression model 
 
A more complex model appears in Figure 5.3. In this model, the dependent variables 
(1 and 2) are latent variables. The dependent variables, 1 is measured by X3, X4 and 
2 is predicted by X5 and X6. The model shows path diagram that X1 and X2 have 
direct effect to 1 and indirect effect on 2 translated from the following regression 
model: 
ɳ2 = 𝛾0  + Ø1𝜉1 + 𝛾1𝑋1 + 𝛾2𝑋2 + 𝑒1  
  
X1 
X2 
 1 𝛼2,1 

1,1
 

1,2
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   Figure 5.3: Path diagram of multiple regression model 
 
5.3.4 Estimation and Model Fit 
Once the relationship between the factors effecting capital structure and firm risk has 
been established, the next step will be to develop a complete structural equation model 
using GUI in STATA. The analysis was conducted by constraining 6 variables as the 
corporate governance (CG) factors, four relationship banking (BR) factors and the 
endogenous variable namely capital structure (CS) and unsystematic risk 
(UNSYS_RISK). The proposed structural model that incorporated the exogenous and 
endogenous variables (CG, BR, control variables, CS and UNSYS_RISK) is reported 
on Figure 5.4. 
The structural model in Figure 5.4 shows the path diagram of the proposed Structural 
Equation Modelling  
𝜉1 : The mediating role of Corporate Governance on Capital Structure 
𝜉2 : The mediating role of Corporate Governance on Firm Risk 
𝜉3 : The mediating role of Relationship Banking on Capital Structure  
𝜉4 : The effect of Capital Structure on Firm Risk 
𝜉5 : The effect of Firm Risk on Capital Structure 
1 

1,1
 
𝛼2,1 

1,2
 
X1 
X2 
2 
X6 X5 
X3 
X4 

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Figure 5.4: Structural Equation Path Modelling
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5.4 Data 
5.4.1 Data Description 
In addition to the existing data from previous chapters, we obtain more data on 
bankers’ relations. The data was obtained partly from Prowess and another part from 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI)8. Information on annual market share and ownership type 
of banks was obtained from RBI and firms’ bankers information was obtained from 
Prowess. The information of bank’s age was obtained from individual bank’s website 
as this information was not available on either Prowess or RBI.   
The final sample consists of unbalanced panel of 1,336 firms with 25,466 firm-
years observations across 21 industries and 2 ownership types between 2008 and 2014. 
Group firms accounts for 62% (15,948 firm-years) of the total observations and non-
group firms account for the balance 38% percentage (9,518 firm-years) of the 
observations. The breakdown of the final sample selection is simplified as follows: 
Total manufacturing firms      2,434 firms 
(Less) State (23) and Foreign-Owned firms (146)  2,265 firms 
(Less) Firms with less than 5 years obs. (363)  1,902 firms 
(Less) Firms with incomplete accounting data (128)  1,774 firms 
(Less) Unavailability of complete stock prices (220)  1,554 firms  
(Less) Unavailability of board of director (59)  1,495 firms 
(Less) Unavailability of bankers’ detail (159)  1,336 firms (25,466 obs.) 
 
5.4.2 Variable Measurement 
The variables use in this study are defined as follows;  
Dependent Variables Definitions 
Two dependent variables are used in this study. The unsystematic risk 
(UNSYS RISK) is measured with the annualized variance of residuals from the single 
                                                 
8 https://dbie.rbi.org.in/DBIE/dbie.rbi?site=publications#!4 
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index model of market model (𝜎𝑒2). The second dependent variable is the firms’ 
capital structure (CS) measured as the book value of long-term debt over market value 
of total assets which is calculated as book value of total assets minus book value of 
equity plus market value of equity. This method of measurement is use following 
method widely used (Jong, Kabir, & Nguyen, 2007; Titman & Wessels, 1988). 
Relationship Banking Variables 
Banking specific variables are included in this modelling as a mediating factor that 
affects firms’ risk.   
• Market share (MKT_SHARE) – There is a strong relationship in the credit-to-
deposit ratios of banks (Bhaumik & Piesse, 2006), indicating the lending 
volume will be high when deposit market share is high. Increase in banks’ 
market share increases the banks’ market concentration, an indication of 
market power of the bank. Market share is also an important strategic decisions 
that addresses bank stability issue (Berger & Bouwman, 2013). Thus, market 
share is an indicator of bank that is stable and are in healthy position to increase 
lending volume (Ariccia & Marquez, 2006).   
• Length of relationship banking (TENURE) – banks develop close relationships 
with borrowers over time. The close relationship facilitates screening and 
monitoring of their borrowers (Ariccia & Marquez, 2006). Banks benefit from 
the screening and monitoring by elevating information asymmetry and use the 
information to perform multiple transactions rather than single transaction at 
arms-length. 
• Bank ownership type (TYPE) – bank ownership type has a strong relationship 
with its lending behaviour. Evidence suggest that the level of risk averseness 
and interest rates differs across the different ownership types (Bhaumik & 
Piesse, 2006). Thus, bank ownership type has been included to describe 
relationship banking.   
• Bank age (BANK_AGE) – bank’s age has been previously shown to be an 
indicator of the bank’s survival rate. Halling & Hayden, (2006) used bank age 
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as an explanatory variable when predicting bank failure. Thus, this study 
employs bank age as one of the factor that influence banking’s lending 
behaviour. 
Control variables 
The modelling includes a number of firm specific control variables that are considered 
to affect either firm’s capital structure, relationship banking, firm-risk or the 
measurement of risk which are similar to the previous chapters except for tangibility. 
• Tangibility – The ratio of net fixed assets over book value of total assets. Tangible 
assets are likely to have an impact of a firm’s borrowing decisions. Tangible assets 
are subject to less information asymmetries and have greater value than intangible 
assets. Harris & Raviv, 1991) predict that firm with tangible assets choose to have 
higher debt as the liquidation value is higher. Additionally, tangible assets are good 
collateral for loans. All these factors put together makes firms with greater tangible 
assets provides positive signal and attractive to creditors. However, firms with 
high tangible assets are claimed to be more likely to default. The intuition behind 
this theory is that firms with higher debt level and increased liquidation value 
makes liquidation the best strategy. 
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Table 5.1: Description of Variables 
This table describes the variables in this study and the definitions of the variables     
Variables Definitions 
UNSYS RISK Unsystematic risk is the residual of single-index market model (Sharpe, 1963) 
decomposed from total risk. 
CS Book value of long-term debt over market value of total assets which is 
calculated as book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market 
value of equity 
BOD Total number of executives in board of directors 
ID_PROP Proportion of independent directors within the board of directors 
FE_PROP Proportion of female directors within the board of directors 
FI_INS Representatives of financial institute on board of directors 
STATE Representatives of financial institute on board of directors 
CEO_DUAL Dummy variable: 1 if CEO of the firm is also the Chair of Board of Directors; 0 
otherwise 
MKT_SHARE 
Percentage of deposits held by banks against total deposit of other banks in the 
year 
TENURE Length of relationship banking between firms and individual bank 
TYPE Ownership type of the banks 
BANK_AGE Age since the incorporation of the bank 
SIZE Natural log of one year lagged total assets - Ln(Total Assets t-1) 
AGE One year lagged of years since firm incorporation 
SALES_GRW (Sales t - Sales t-1/Sales t-1) 
TOB-Q (Market Value / Book Value) t-1 
TANGIBILITY  The ratio of net fixed assets over book value of total assets 
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5.5 Statistical Analysis 
This section presents the preliminary data analysis and the findings of the research. As 
discussed in section 5.3.1, the analysis begins with the testing of any violations in 
statistical assumptions followed by confirmatory factor analysis and finally the path 
analysis in conducted using the structural equation modelling. 
5.5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Prior to testing the hypotheses, there is a need to verify the data meet the statistical 
assumptions. All the variables used in this measurement were first examined through 
descriptive analysis to describe the characteristics of the variables used. Table 5.2 
reports the summary statistics of the dependent, independent and control variables. 
The results are shown for overall sample and for group and non-group firms. 
The descriptive statistics show that firms group firms have lower mean of 
unsystematic risk compared to non-group firms. The mean of capital structure, i.e. the 
ratio of debt and equity, is almost equal for both type of firms. Group firms, on 
average, have larger board size (11) compared to non-group firms (9.5). Meanwhile, 
the rest of the board characteristics are almost equal for both types of firms. 
As for relationship banking (BR), there are no significant difference in all of the 
variables analysed suggesting relationship banking are equal between group and non-
group firms. Control variables describes the characteristics of the firms. On average, 
group firms are larger and older than non-group firms. Higher Tobin’s Q of group 
firms indicates group firms have higher growth opportunity compared to non-group 
firms. Non-group firms have more tangible assets compared to group firm. 
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Table 5.2: Mean and Median of Dependent, Independent and Control Variables 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of all the variables for total sample, group and non-group firms. 
 
 
N Min Mean Median Max N Min Mean Median Max N Min Mean Median Max
Dependent Variables
UNSYS RISK 25466 2.294 9.640 8.954 42.557 15948 2.294 8.894 8.053 34.250 9518 2.294 10.890 10.584 42.557
CS 25466 0.000 1.526 1.225 5.998 15948 0.000 1.459 1.176 5.998 9518 0.000 1.637 1.331 5.902
CG Variables
BOD 25466 1.000 10.429 10.000 21.000 15948 1.000 10.990 11.000 21.000 9518 1.000 9.486 9.000 21.000
ID_PROP 25466 0.000 0.485 0.500 1.000 15948 0.000 0.490 0.500 1.000 9518 0.000 0.475 0.500 1.000
FE_PROP 25466 0.000 0.118 0.000 3.000 15948 0.000 0.110 0.000 1.000 9518 0.000 0.131 0.000 3.000
FI_INS 25210 0.000 0.175 0.000 1.000 15844 0.000 0.210 0.000 1.000 9366 0.000 0.115 0.000 1.000
STATE 25466 0.000 0.032 0.000 1.000 15948 0.000 0.043 0.000 1.000 9518 0.000 0.015 0.000 1.000
CEO_DUAL 25466 0.000 0.942 1.000 1.000 15948 0.000 0.964 1.000 1.000 9518 0.000 0.906 1.000 1.000
BR Variables
MKT_SHARE 25466 0.000 4.407 2.860 18.260 15948 0.000 4.218 2.770 18.260 9518 0.000 4.724 2.980 18.260
TENURE 25466 3.000 8.325 9.000 18.000 15948 3.000 8.422 9.000 18.000 9518 3.000 8.163 9.000 18.000
TYPE 25466 1.000 1.815 2.000 4.000 15948 1.000 1.818 2.000 4.000 9518 1.000 1.809 2.000 4.000
BANK_AGE 25466 12.000 103.008 99.000 328.000 15948 14.000 101.553 99.000 328.000 9518 12.000 105.496 99.000 328.000
Control Variables
SIZE 25466 -0.344 5.305 5.235 7.970 15948 -0.344 5.682 5.679 7.970 9518 -0.344 4.674 4.587 7.970
AGE 25466 10.000 37.082 31.000 106.000 15948 10.000 41.018 34.000 106.000 9518 10.000 30.486 27.000 106.000
SALES_GRW 25466 -0.543 0.188 0.133 2.504 15948 -0.543 0.162 0.124 2.504 9518 -0.543 0.232 0.419 2.504
TOB-Q 25466 -6.590 1.701 1.052 14.189 15948 -6.590 1.820 1.111 14.189 9518 -6.590 1.501 0.975 14.189
TANGIBILITY 25466 0.000 3.305 1.637 17.991 15948 0.000 2.517 0.950 17.991 9518 0.000 4.626 3.269 17.963
TOTAL SAMPLE GROUP NON-GROUP
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Following this, in Table 5.3the annual capital structure by quartile is reported. The 
table shows both type of firms have similar debt equity ratio pattern throughout the 
sample period. The capital structure is on increasing trend throughout the quartile and 
is at the highest at the end of the year. Subsequently, Table 5.4, unsystematic risk of 
firm is tabled against capital structure by quartile. The table concede with the result 
on Table 5.3 as unsystematic risk moves in the same direction as capital structure 
suggesting positive relationship between firm risk and capital structure.  
Table 5.3: Annual Capital Structure Comparison Between Group and Non-Group by Quartile 
This table presents annual capital structure of group and non-group firm by quartile.  
 
Table 5.4: Unsystematic Risk Comparison Between Group and Non-Group by Capital Structure 
Quartile 
This table presents annual capital structure of group and non-group firm by quartile.  
 
5.5.2 Univariate Analysis 
Table 5.5 reports the equality tests across group and non-group firms samples. t-
statistics test was employed to tests for equality of means and Wilcoxon Mann–
Whitney tests to test for equality of medians. Both tests reveal that group and non-
group firms are significantly different.  
Group
Non-
Group
Group
Non-
Group
Group
Non-
Group
Group
Non-
Group
2008 0.615 0.621 1.224 1.224 2.060 2.011 5.465 5.290
2009 0.624 0.611 1.219 1.209 2.037 2.042 5.690 5.460
2010 0.598 0.594 1.193 1.213 2.056 2.024 5.951 5.800
2011 0.612 0.618 1.209 1.178 2.060 2.020 5.985 5.680
2012 0.608 0.597 1.225 1.216 2.039 2.007 5.994 5.411
2013 0.614 0.607 1.224 1.204 1.983 2.063 5.836 5.823
2014 0.618 0.626 1.222 1.222 2.049 2.051 5.576 5.877
Total 0.618 0.618 1.222 1.217 2.054 2.042 5.892 5.800
CS_Q1 CS_Q2 CS_Q3 CS_Q4
Total Group
Non-
Group
CS_Q1 20.959 20.493 21.267
CS_Q2 22.007 21.548 25.060
CS_Q3 23.031 22.113 23.390
CS_Q4 24.808 24.079 24.955
Unsys_Risk
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Table 5.5: Equality of Mean and Median of Control Variables 
This table reports the univariate analysis of annual equality of mean and median between group and 
non-group firm of all the variables. The difference-in-mean t-test assume unequal univariate analysis 
of annual equality of mean and median of all the independent variables. ***, ** and * indicate the that 
group firms are either higher (+ sign) or lower (- sign) than non-group firms at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively. 
 
5.5.3 Normality Test 
The check the fitness of the data before proceeding to multivariate analysis. It is a 
basic assumption in multivariate analysis that a significant deviation from normality 
will result in an invalid statistical outcome (Hair et al., 2006). The variables are tested 
for normality using the common statistical normality tests by assessing levels of 
skewness and kurtosis. Skewness will identify the symmetry of the distribution (Hair, 
et al., 2006) and kurtosis will identify the peakedness or flatness of the distribution 
relative to the normal distribution.  
N Mean Test
Median 
Test
Dependent Variables
UNSYS RISK 25466 -1.997*** -32.939***
CS 25466 -0.178*** -11.793**
CG Variables
BOD 25466 1.505*** 39.352***
ID_PROP 25466 0.015*** 9.350***
FE_PROP 25466 -0.021*** -7.545***
FI_INS 25210 0.095*** 19.381***
STATE 25466 0.028*** 12.088***
CEO_DUAL 25466 0.057*** 18.970***
BR Variables
MKT_SHARE 25466 -0.506*** -6.583***
TENURE 25466 0.259*** 17.308***
TYPE 25466 0.009 1.048***
BANK_AGE 25466 -3.974*** -4.238***
Control Variables
SIZE 25466 1.008*** 56.434***
AGE 25466 10.531*** 49.057***
SALES_GRW 25466 -0.070*** -12.438***
TOB-Q 25466 0.318*** 13.501***
TANGIBILITY 25466 -2.109*** -47.358***
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The possibility of the tendencies of skewness and kurtosis being sensitive to a large 
set of data and often display considerable deviation from normality, the normal 
distribution of the data is also observed with histogram and graphs show that the data 
are normally distributed as confirmed by Table 5.6. The table shows the result of 
normality test that has been executed on dependent, independent variables and control 
variables of this study. The skewness and kurtosis ranges below the suggested range 
of + 2.58 for 1% significance and + 1.96 for 5% significance level (Hair et al., 2006) 
to show that the data for this study is normally distributed.  
Table 5.6: Normality Analysis 
This table reports the skewness and kurtosis of all the variables in this study 
 
 
N Skewness Kurtosis
Dependent Variables
UNSYS RISK 25466 0.015 0.256
CS 25466 0.001 0.152
CG Variables
BOD 25466 0.035 0.020
ID_PROP 25466 0.015 0.578
FE_PROP 25466 0.084 0.369
FI_INS 25210 0.000 0.201
STATE 25466 0.000 0.010
CEO_DUAL 25466 0.005 0.086
BR Variables
MKT_SHARE 25466 0.115 0.394
TENURE 25466 0.004 0.258
TYPE 25466 0.009 0.142
BANK_AGE 25466 0.050 0.153
Control Variables
SIZE 25466 0.499 1.582
AGE 25466 0.000 0.257
SALES_GRW 25466 0.059 0.891
TOB-Q 25466 0.016 0.255
TANGIBILITY 25466 0.045 0.345
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5.5.4 Multicollinearity Analysis 
To test if the independent variables in this study are highly correlated, multicollinearity 
test was conducted. The most common measure for assessing multicollinearity are 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance value (the inverse of VIF, 1/VIF). The 
acceptance value for VIF is 10 and the tolerance value has a cut-off threshold of 0.10.  
5.5.5 Correlation Analysis  
In order to understand the causal relationship among variables and ultimately improve 
the ability to predict the hypotheses, correlation analysis using bivariate Pearson 
correlation coefficient matrix. The correlation measures the relatedness of the 
variables and has a range of possible values from +1 to -1. 
Table 5.7 shows the results of multicollinearity analysis and the correlation analysis 
of the all the variables. The results in the first 4 columns show that VIF values for all 
the variables against the two dependent variables. The values are between 1.05 and 
2.09 are within acceptable level of 10. Meanwhile, the tolerance value (1/VIF) are also 
above the acceptance level of 0.10. Hence, it is concluded that there is no 
multicollinearity problem among the dependent, independent and the control 
variables.  
The Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables are reported from column 
5 onwards. The finding suggests that at significant level of 1%, unsystematic risk 
(UNSYS_RISK) is significantly correlated to all the variables except to proportion of 
female directors (FE_PROP). The other dependent variable, capital structure (CS), is 
significantly related to most of the variables at 1%, MKT_SHARE at 5% and 
uncorrelated to TENURE, BOD, ID_PROP and FE_PROP. 
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Table 5.7: Pearson Correlation Coefficients Matrix 
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients matrix of dependent, independent and control variables.  ***, **, * denotes the significant level of 1%, 5% and 10% 
level of significant respectively. 
 
 
 
VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF
UNSYS 
RISK
CS BOD ID_PROP FE_PROP FI_INS STATE CEO_DUAL MKT_SHARE TENURE TYPE BANK_AGE SIZE SALES_GRW AGE TOB_Q
UNSYS RISK - - 1.27 0.79
CS 1.15 0.87 - - 0.195***
BOD 1.35 0.74 1.35 0.74 -0.241*** 0.006
ID_PROP 1.07 0.94 1.07 0.94 -0.077*** -0.010 0.033***
FE_PROP 1.05 0.95 1.05 0.95 -0.001 -0.011 -0.031*** -0.198***
FI_INS 1.16 0.86 1.14 0.87 0.030*** 0.224*** 0.212*** -0.18** 0.015*
STATE 1.05 0.95 1.05 0.95 -0.004 0.059** 0.167*** -0.016* 0.025*** 0.119***
CEO_DUAL 1.07 0.934 1.05 0.95 -0.100*** -0.143*** 0.160*** 0.016** 0.008 -0.058*** -0.058***
MKT_SHARE 1.62 0.62 1.62 0.62 0.079*** -0.014* -0.051*** -0.011 0.002 -0.008 -0.007 0.000
TENURE 1.05 0.96 1.05 0.95 0.071*** -0.008 0.052*** 0.014* -0.027*** 0.053*** 0.032*** 0.052*** 0.145***
TYPE 1.18 0.85 1.18 0.85 0.045*** 0.077*** 0.000 0.013* -0.003 0.059*** 0.033*** -0.011 0.128*** 0.052***
BANK_AGE 1.07 0.94 1.79 0.56 0.031*** -0.024*** -0.013* 0.003 -0.014* -0.012 -0.007 0.002 0.597*** 0.121*** 0.360***
SIZE 1.91 0.52 2.09 0.48 -0.399*** 0.114*** 0.426*** 0.042*** -0.007 0.238*** 0.026*** 0.077*** -0.132*** -0.017** 0.016** -0.043***
SALES_GRW 1.05 0.96 1.06 0.95 -0.110*** -0.071*** 0.120*** 0.099*** -0.043*** -0.004 -0.014* 0.053*** -0.015* 0.077*** -0.013* 0.003 0.077***
AGE 1.06 0.95 1.07 0.94 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.015* -0.068*** 0.004 0.029*** -0.005 -0.063*** 0.003 -0.029*** 0.005 0.004 0.079*** -0.125***
TOB_Q 1.11 0.902 1.1 0.91 -0.169*** -0.151*** 0.170*** -0.001 0.030*** -0.064*** -0.005 0.073*** -0.024*** 0.048**** -0.054*** 0.025*** 0.155*** 0.080*** 0.103***
TANGIBILITY 1.72 0.58 1.67 0.60 0.245*** -0.194*** -0.295*** -0.053*** 0.039*** -0.191*** -0.015* -0.099*** 0.094*** -0.008 -0.001 0.041*** -0.627*** -0.086*** -0.037*** -0.072***
 129 
 
5.5.6 Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
Before proceeding to test the hypothesised model, CFA is conducted to verify the 
validity and reliability of the measures. This step is necessary to appraise a sound 
measurement and reduce measurement errors. The latent variables in this study (CG 
& BR) were measured with multiple observed variables, hence there is a need to check 
the degree to which the specific measurement represents the latent variable (Cronbach, 
1988). The confirmatory measurement assessment, confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA), analyses the 2 latent (exogenous) variables namely corporate governance (CG) 
and banking relation (BR) are conducted to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of the 
measured variable to estimate the latent variables. 
Latent Variable 1: Corporate Governance (CG) 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) of SEM using GUI STATA was conducted using 
the six (6) measured variables board size (BOD), proportion of independent directors 
(ID_PROP), proportion of female directors (FE_PROP), financial institute nominees 
(FI_INS), state nominees (STATE) and CEO duality (CEO_DUAL). Table 
5.8presents the goodness-of-fit for corporate governance characteristics. The overall 
loading factor with the exception of STATE are well above the recommended value 
of 0.6 (Hair et al., 2017) and can be used in the structural model. Hence, during the 
fitting of the model, STATE will be removed from the measurement model in order to 
achieve convergent.   
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Table 5.8: Goodness-of-fit of Corporate Governance 
This table reports goodness-of-fit of the measured variable used to estimate the latent variable corporate 
governance (CG) 
 
Latent 
Variable 1: 
CG 
Measured 
Variable 
Factor 
Loading 
Standard 
Error 
Significant 
Level 
Corporate BOD 0.97 0.027 *** 
Governance ID_PROP 0.83 0.033 *** 
(CG) FE_PROP 0.93 0.052 ** 
  FI_INS 0.88 0.078 ** 
  STATE 0.51 0.041   
  CEO_DUAL 0.98 0.009 *** 
 
 
Latent Variable 2: Relationship Banking (BR) 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) of SEM using GUI STATA was conducted using 
the four (4) measured variables; bankers market share (MKT_SHARE), length of 
relationship banking (TENURE), type of bank ownership (TYPE) and age of banks 
(AGE).  
Table 5.9 presents the goodness-of-fit for the relationship banking characteristics. The 
overall loading factor of MKT_SHARE and TENURE are above 0.6 and are 
determined to correctly measure the latent variable BR. However, the measured 
variable TYPE and BANK_AGE does not meet the criteria to be a right measurement 
for latent variable BR. Hence, during the fitting of the model, BANK_AGE will be 
removed first followed by TYPE (if necessary, as TYPE is border lining the cut-off 
value of 0.6) from the measurement model first in order to achieve convergent.   
Table 5.9: Goodness-of-fit of Relationship Banking 
This table reports goodness-of-fit of the measured variable used to estimate the latent variable 
relationship banking (BR) 
Latent Variable 
2: BR 
Measured 
Variable 
Factor 
Loading 
Standard 
Error 
Significant 
Level 
Banking MKT_SHARE 0.99 0.04 *** 
Relation TENURE 0.71 0.01 *** 
(BR) TYPE 0.32 0.67   
  BANK_AGE 0.59 0.51 * 
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5.5.7 Composite Reliability 
In determining the internal consistency reliability for the measurement models, 
composite reliability was calculated using Cronbach Coefficient Alpha. Through 
composite reliability, it can be determine if the measured variables used measure a 
single concept and the measured variables are internally consistent (Hair et al., 2017). 
Hair et al., (2017) suggest that an acceptable level of coefficient alpha to retain a 
measured variable is at least 0.7 and lower than 0.9.  As shown in Table 5.10, the 
composite reliability for corporate governance is 0.813 and relationship banking 
shows a composite reliability of 0.917, which are well within the suggested acceptance 
level and have a reasonable internal consistency. 
Table 5.10: Composite Reliability 
This table presents the composite reliability for each variable in this study 
 
5.5.8 Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) 
Hypothesized SEM 
The hypothesized structural model as shown in Table 5.11 were tested to estimate the 
overall model fit. The loading factor of one measured variable of each latent variable 
will be fixed to 1 to generate a scale for the latent variable. STATA will automatically 
choose the first variable in the model, however, this can be changed manually if 
otherwise preferred. Fit indices discussed in section 5.3.2 are utilised to assess the 
measurement model to test the hypothesized model.  
Variable
Measured 
Variable
Factor 
Loading
Composite 
Reliabity
Corporate BOD 0.97 0.813
Governance ID_PROP 0.83
(CG) FE_PROP 0.93
FI_INS 0.88
STATE 0.51
CEO_DUAL 0.98
Banking MKT_SHARE 0.99 0.917
Relations TENURE 0.71
(BR) TYPE 0.63
BANK_AGE 0.32
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The overall fit of the hypothesized model shown Table 5.11. Even though the chi-
square is significant, the p-value of 0.0001, GFI of 0.682 and RMSEA of 0.109 do not 
meet the fit indices benchmark. The preferred threshold for GFI and CFI is below 0.90 
and RMSEA should be below the cut-off value of 0.08. Hence, the hypothesized model 
is not accepted, and the structural model needs to be revised. 
Table 5.11: The Overall Fit of the Hypothesized Structural Model 
This table presents the overall fit of the hypothesized structural model 
 
Final Respecified SEM 
In obtaining the best fit model, the structural model has to be respecified following the 
assessment of the goodness-of-fit indices. SEM has eliminated two observed variables, 
state and bank age. With the modifications of the hypothesized model, a new revised 
structural model is presented in Table 5.12. Meanwhile, in Figure 5.5, the overall fit 
for the respecified and final structural model is presented. The same set of indices 
utilised to assess the hypothesized model. 
The results suggest the respecified structural model is a good fit. The ratio of chi-
square and degree of freedom is not below the acceptance level of 3. However, this 
can be ignored as was discussed previously in Section 5.3.2 the chi-square value is 
insignificant for large sample model. However, it is advised to evaluate a model based 
on more than a single index (Hair et al., 2017). Accordingly, the rest of the fitness 
indices indicates the new model fits into desirable range. GFI & CFI fit into the 
preferred threshold for GFI and CFI which is above 0.90 and RMSEA of 0.039 which 
is below the cut-off value of 0.08. 
Table 5.12: The Overall Fit of the Revised Structural Model 
This table presents the overall fit of the revised structural model 
 
 
Fit Indices P GFI CFI RMSEA
Structural 
Model
3926.486 59.492 0.0001 0.682 0.856 0.109
    /df
Fit Indices P GFI CFI RMSEA
Structural 
Model
2710.66 16.771 0.079 0.978 0.914 0.039
    /df
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Figure 5.5: Respecified Structural Equation Modelling
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5.6 Result and Discussion 
The two-way relationship between capital structure and firm risk as mediated by 
corporate governance and relationship banking were simultaneously examined as 
illustrated in Figure 5.6. The figure reports the findings on the finalised structural 
model by integrating the observed and latent variables for year 2008 to 2014 for all 
firms, i.e. business group affiliated firms and non-group firms are reported. The figure 
reports the outcome of the conceptual framework equation modelling of hypotheses 
discussed in Section 5.2. The overall final structure model and model fit are reported 
in Table 5.12. The results show that all the paths are significant at a minimum of 10% 
significance. The results for all firms indicate that corporate governance, relationship 
banking and capital structure jointly describe 56% variance of firm risk and capital 
structure’s variance of 68% is jointly explained by corporate governance and firm risk. 
Both corporate governance and relationship banking are found to be mediating the 
firm’s capital structure and firm risk at a significant level. 
Figure 5.7 reports the SEM model for group affiliated firms. The results are quite 
identical to all firms except that now latent variable corporate governance have 
negative correlation for firm risk, even though this is not statistically significant. The 
results for all firms indicate that corporate governance, relationship banking and 
capital structure jointly describe 61% variance of firm risk and capital structure’s 
variance of 81% is jointly explained by corporate governance and capital structure. 
Figure 5.8 reports the SEM model for non-group firms. The results for all firms 
indicate that corporate governance, relationship banking and capital structure jointly 
describe 81% variance of firm risk and capital structure’s variance of 65% is jointly 
explained by corporate governance and capital structure. All the correlations are 
significant at a minimum of 10%. 
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Figure 5.6: Final Structural Equation Modelling for Overall Sample 
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Figure 5.7: Final Structural Equation Modelling for Group Affiliated Firms 
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Figure 5.8: Final Structural Equation Modelling for Non-Group Firms
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5.7 Conclusion 
The objective of this study is to develop a structural equation model to understand an 
important yet unexplored two-way relationship between firm capital structure and 
unsystematic risk. The study also explored the difference in the two-way relationship 
between group and non-group firms. Prior to analysing the two-way relationship, the 
study also investigated the mediating role of corporate governance mechanisms and 
relationship banking in determining the capital structure choices. 
First, based on the evidence obtained, it appears that on average, both group and non-
group firms have similar of capital structure ratio. One type of firm does not appear to 
prefer debt over equity more than the other despite business group having the 
advantage of internal capital market. Second, the structural equation modelling shows 
that the two-way relationship between firms’ unsystematic risk and capital structure 
choices for both types of firms. This is particularly intriguing when group firms have 
exclusive access to internal capital markets and theoretically would prefer internal 
funding. Likewise, group affiliate with pyramidal ownership structures have often 
been suspected of tunnelling and diversifying resources. 
In the previous study, it was shown that corporate governance at firm level in the 
emerging economy is effective in influencing firm risk. The different elements of 
corporate governance were demonstrated to have influenced firm-risk differently 
depending on the motives of the board representative. Similarly, in this study it is 
hypothesised that corporate governance mechanism is an effective tool to discipline 
controlling shareholders from expropriating minority shareholders by undertaking 
optimal capital structure choices. To incorporate this, the latent variable corporate 
governance is included as a mediator on both capital structure and firm risk. 
Addressing the notion that high information asymmetry problems within firms with 
high ownership concentration motivated the inclusion of relationship banking as 
another mediating latent variable that can further improve firm transparency and 
consequently influences capital structure and firm risk. The findings show that long 
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term relationship between banks and customers, the banks’ stability and bank type 
influence both capital structure and firm risk of group and non—group equally. 
It is concluded that the capital structure and firm risk of both group affiliates and non-
group firms are interlinked to one another. In the context of agency theory, both type 
of firms are highly incentivised to manage risk at firm level to avoid bankruptcy and 
also attain optimal capital structure to be able particular investment strategy, Hence, 
the findings suggest that both firms are likely pursuing corporate strategy that seeks to 
reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy either by adjusting its capital structure or by 
adjusting the risk it bears (Castanias, 1983) simultaneously. This approach towards 
risk management by firms shed lights on the understanding of decisions making and 
explore the risk-taking pattern at firm level. 
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CONCLUSION 
The overall aim of this thesis is to investigate risk-taking behaviour of business group 
affiliated firms in emerging economies in comparison to non-group firms. The effects 
of ownership structure, corporate governance and capital structure on group affiliated 
firms’ risk were examined in individual study respectively. The following section 
summarises the conclusion of each study:- 
6.1 On Internal Capital Markets 
The aim of the first empirical chapter of this thesis is to examine the impact of a firm’s 
organizational form on its risk level and improve our understanding of how internal 
capital markets of business group affiliated firms affects this risk level. On the basis 
of a detailed survey of the literature, it was evident that (1) both business group 
affiliated firms and non-group firms suffer from similar type of agency problems with 
high level ownership concentration (2)business groups consists of widely diversified 
firms and the group affiliated firm benefits from internal markets that enable resources 
reallocation to assist other financially distressed affiliated firms. Taking into account 
these findings, this study examines the difference in firm risk of group and non-groups 
firms to identify if group affiliated firms can manage risk using co-insurance effect 
and facilitates risk sharing across the group.  
The findings of this study highlights that despite having similar ownership structure, 
group affiliated firms and non-group firms have distinguishable firm risk-taking 
behaviour. In particular, the study examined whether the exhibition of lower firm risk 
of business group affiliated firms is due to co-insurance effect of group firms. It is 
argued that certain firms within the group have the necessity to provide co-insurance 
to the group as a whole. The results suggest that individual group affiliated firms’ risk-
taking behaviour is dependent to the firms’ contribution towards groups’ overall size, 
revenue and cash flow. The argument on co-insurance effect of group affiliated firm 
is further confirmed by modelling it into behavioural finance framework and analyse 
firm risk of firms facing financial distress. The results show that firms that are 
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financially safe assumes lower risk than the firms that are financially distressed. Firms 
that are financially safe and deliberately assumed lesser risk are in the position to act 
as a safety net for other affiliates. In summary, group affiliate firms’ lower 
unsystematic risk is attributed to the co-insurance effect that not only allows resource 
reallocation but also to ensure survival of group affiliates in the group. 
The findings of this study significantly extend the literature on emerging market firms, 
by first, providing understanding on risk by extending the line of inquiry about the 
impact of organizational form on firm risk-taking. Specifically, the study provides 
better understanding of the attribute of business groups - internal capital market affects 
firm risk. Second, the findings contribute to the growing literature on business groups 
by focusing on the less discussed issue of the impact of the incentives associated with 
the business group structure on corporate strategy, which until recently largely focused 
on the performance impact of business group affiliation and specific forms of 
expropriation such as tunnelling  
6.2 On Corporate Governance 
The second part of this thesis aims to distinguish how the risk-taking behaviour of 
group affiliated and non-group firms are defined by corporate governance 
mechanisms. The findings will improve the understanding the effectiveness of 
corporate governance in monitoring group affiliated firms and non-group firms when 
it comes to risk-taking behaviour. From the literature, the importance of corporate 
governance is recognised due to 1) the constant reforms of corporate governance and 
2) the impact of corporate governance on many corporate outcomes such as firm 
performance, dividend policy, capital structure and executive compensation. Hence, it 
is compelling to distinguish the risk-taking behaviour of group affiliated firms and 
non-group firms in emerging economies where ownership concentration co-exists 
with weak corporate governance. 
The findings of this study are particularly interesting because in EMEs it is difficult to 
discipline entrenched owner-managers who generally cannot be removed through 
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internal or external (or market-based) mechanisms. It is established that each corporate 
governance attribute defines the risk-taking behaviour of both group affiliated firms 
and non-group firms uniquely. The size of board of directors indicates that the bigger 
the board size the less risk the firm undertake for both group affiliated and non-group 
firms. As for independent directors, proportion of female directors on board, financial 
institute and state representatives on board, they encourage risk-taking for both group 
affiliated and non-group firms. We relate this finding to the role of these categories of 
directors who are anticipated to protect the interests of minority shareholders by 
increasing investment and reducing free cash flow. This study does not find any 
statistically significant outcome when examining the role of corporate governance 
mechanisms in defining firm risk of business groups relative to their size, revenue and 
cash flow.  
Regression analysis on the effect of corporate governance on firms with and without 
default risk shows that firms that are financially safe assumes lower risk than the firms 
that are financially distressed. This finding further confirms the role of financially safe 
firms acting as safety net for other affiliates that are too big to fail. Ian summary, 
corporate governance is an effective mechanism in defining the risk-taking behaviour 
of firms in EMEs regardless of their organizational form.   
The contributions of this study in the literature of corporate governance in emerging 
economies are apparent from the findings. The findings show the efficacy of corporate 
governance codes and mechanisms that are based in developed country contexts with 
dispersed ownership structure to mitigate agency problems in emerging economy and 
subsequently determine their risk-taking incentives. With twenty years having elapsed 
since the broad features on Indian corporate governance transplanted from developed 
countries and stipulated as law, evidence from this study shows that these corporate 
governance norms have been somehow successful in mitigating agency problem of a 
different nature. Therefore, the corporate governance codes adopted from other 
jurisdiction may still need improvement to address the risk management issues. The 
study also contributes to the literature of business groups as the findings demonstrate 
the risk-taking behaviour of group affiliated firms in comparison to non-group firms. 
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6.3 On Capital Structure 
The final part of this thesis aims to develop a Structural Equation Modelling to 
understand the two-way relationship of firm risk and capital structure of group 
affiliated firms and non-group firms. Taking into consideration the research gaps 
identified in the literature, two explanatory latent variables are incorporated 1) 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm risk and capital structure and 2) 
relationship banking on capital structure.   
The findings show that both types of firms have similar capital structure even though 
it can be argued that business group affiliated firms will have lower debt to equity ratio 
because of their preference for internal funding facilitated by the internal capital 
markets enjoyed exclusively by the affiliated firms. Meanwhile, having a long-term 
relationship with their respective bankers does not contribute to any significant 
difference between group affiliated and non-affiliated firms. 
This study provides new knowledge which contributes to the understanding the two-
way relationship between firm risk and capital structure. This study is probably the 
first study that employs structural equations model to jointly model firm’s risk-taking 
and capital structure within the same empirical framework. The application of SEM 
enables us to i)treat corporate governance as a latent variable that is measured by 
observable board characteristics, ii)include other observable variable that may 
influence firms capital structure as another latent variable, iii)produce more 
comprehensive robust results because SEM takes into account the modelling of 
interactions, non-linearities, measurement error to name a few, and finally, iv)using 
model fit measurement of SEM, we are able to identify of direct and indirect paths of 
the corporate governance, relationship banking, firm risk and capital structure.    
6.4 Implications for Policymakers 
This study reports the inner workings of business groups especially the association 
between organisation form, corporate governance mechanisms, capital structure 
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decisions and firm risk in emerging economies. The evidence from the empirical 
exercise show that the magnitude of internal capital market attribute of business 
groups is quite high in firm’s strategic decisions. Group affiliated firms, on average, 
take lesser risk than non-group firm, which may have implications on entrepreneurial 
orientation of business groups and subsequently affecting the growth for emerging 
economies. Therefore, the findings open up room for deliberation by the government 
to facilitate creation of external functioning markets that facilitate risk management. 
The efficacy of corporate governance codes adopted from the developed economies is 
also proven from the study. As it has been discussed before, the corporate governance 
codes borrowed from different settings to mitigate type 1 agency problems are 
somehow efficient in mitigating the problems with the entrenched management in 
firms with high ownership concentration. Therefore, firms in other emerging 
economies with high ownership concentration, minority shareholders, stock markets, 
and regulating bodies would gain new insights from this study in terms of the extent 
to which regulations, codes of corporate governance, decree, laws and resolutions can 
be implemented both internally and externally.  
6.5 Implications for Management 
The findings of this study may serve to improve the understanding of the inner 
workings of group affiliated firms in comparison to non-group firms, enhance the 
practices of corporate governance by the management and shareholders. The findings 
will also help management understand and demand for the more effective corporate 
governance mechanisms to be implemented. The significance of having the right 
corporate governance mechanisms to balance the acceptable and excessive risk-taking 
by firms in emerging economies is important to be recognised.  
The result of this study would also benefit minority shareholders in the way they assess 
their investments in firms with high ownership concentration. For instance, even 
though board independence is ensured by regulations, this study shows that the 
  145 
composition of board members plays an important role in protecting the interests of 
minority shareholders. Also, from the findings, minority shareholders will have 
increased understanding on the importance of having the right set of board 
composition to sit on the board of directors that will act in their best interests when it 
comes to making strategic decisions. Therefore, we argue that this study  
6.6 Limitations of the Study 
Like any other research, there would always be limitation to the studies carried out. 
The main limitation of the study is that the random basis is not applied in selecting the 
sample companies. The selection was based on the availability of data on annual 
financial statements, corporate governance data. Therefore, the quality of results 
depends on the quality of the sample data. In this regard, some companies may have 
been excluded from this study, which may have different characteristics than those 
that have been included in this study. In this case, the results are only valid to the 
extent that the sample is representative of the population. Second, although the study 
has focused on India, one of the largest emerging economy, the nature of organisations 
in this country may not be applicable or comparable to other studies done in different 
settings such as developed countries. However, this is not entirely a limitation as the 
results from the different settings could serve as contribution to the body of knowledge 
in corporate governance in emerging economies.  
6.7 Future Study 
This study only focused on an emerging economy, which have a good representative 
of the organisational form in question. There is a possibility of extending this study in 
the future to other countries settings that have comparable features and organisational 
forms to those of the present study in order to determine the validity of the findings in 
different environments and time periods. In addition, a comparative may shed light on 
further insight to the theory proposed in this study. As this study only included listed 
firm, a replication of the study using non-listed or small size companies to provide 
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broader understanding if the conclusion drawn in this study is conclusive. In addition, 
inclusion of other corporate governance mechanisms such as audit committee and 
executive compensation may further improve our understanding on the effects on firm 
risk. 
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Appendix 2 : Summary of 2-Digit Industry Code of Group Affiliates and Non-
Group Firms for Chapter 3 
 
  
2 Digit 
Industry 
Code
Industry
Group   
(N)
%
Non-
Group     
(N)
%
Cumulative 
Percentage
10 Food products 372 49.34 382 50.66 7.60
11 Beverages 86 56.58 66 43.42 1.49
12 Tobacco products 14 50.00 14 50.00 0.30
13 Textiles 496 38.96 777 61.04 12.78
14 Wearing apparel 21 15.44 115 84.56 1.26
15 Leather and related products 21 18.42 93 81.58 1.21
16
Wood and products of wood 
and cork, except furniture
14 20.90 53 79.10 0.68
17 Paper and paper products 99 31.53 215 68.47 3.10
18 Books and Cards 0 0.00 7 100.00 0.08
19
Coke and refined petroleum 
products
28 31.46 61 68.54 0.83
20
Chemicals and chemical 
products
690 47.36 767 52.64 14.66
21
Pharmaceuticals, medicinal 
chemical and botanical 
products
240 28.81 593 71.19 8.71
22
Rubber and plastics products
238 29.35 573 70.65 8.25
23
Other non-metallic mineral 
products
259 61.52 162 38.48 4.29
24 Basic metals 494 47.59 544 52.41 10.30
25
Fabricated metal products, 
except machinery and 
equipment
79 23.65 255 76.35 3.18
26
Computer, electronic and 
optical products
104 36.75 179 63.25 3.04
27 Electrical equipment 185 40.66 270 59.34 4.54
28
Machinery and equipment 
n.e.c.
241 45.99 283 54.01 5.43
29
Motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers
21 100.00 0 0.00 0.23
30 Other transport equipment 402 68.14 188 31.86 5.93
31 Furniture 0 0.00 3 100.00 0.04
32 Other 49 22.69 167 77.31 2.10
Total 4,153      41.86 5,767      58.14 100.00
This table presents the distributions of sample of manufacturing firm across industries between 
2008 and 2014. The selected manufacturing firm are firm owned by group and stand-alone non-
group firm listed in Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE Ltd.) and National Exchange of India Ltd. 
(NSE). The sample includes a total of 9,927 firm-year observations consisting 4,156 group firm 
and 5,771 non-group firm drawn from Prowess database provided by Centre for Monitoring 
Indian Economy Pvt Ltd. 
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Appendix 3 : Summary of 2-Digit Industry Code of Group Affiliates and Non-
Group Firms for Chapter 4 
 
  
2 Digit 
Industry 
Code
Industry
Group   
(N)
Percentage
Non-
Group     
(N)
Percentage
Cumulative 
Percentage
10 Food products 369 49.20 381 50.80 7.60
11 Beverages 86 56.58 66 43.42 1.49
12 Tobacco products 14 50.00 14 50.00 0.30
13 Textiles 488 38.88 767 61.12 12.78
14 Wearing apparel 21 15.44 115 84.56 1.26
15 Leather and related products 21 18.42 93 81.58 1.21
16
Wood and products of wood and 
cork, except furniture
14 20.90 53 79.10 0.68
17 Paper and paper products 95 31.15 210 68.85 3.10
18 Books and Cards 0 0.00 7 100.00 0.08
19
Coke and refined petroleum 
products
28 32.56 58 67.44 0.83
20
Chemicals and chemical 
products
682 47.16 764 52.84 14.66
21
Pharmaceuticals, medicinal 
chemical and botanical products 240 28.88 591 71.12 8.71
22 Rubber and plastics products 238 29.57 567 70.43 8.25
23
Other non-metallic mineral 
products
259 61.52 162 38.48 4.29
24 Basic metals 493 47.68 541 52.32 10.30
25
Fabricated metal products, 
except machinery and 
equipment
79 23.72 254 76.28 3.18
26
Computer, electronic and optical 
products
104 36.75 179 63.25 3.04
27 Electrical equipment 185 40.66 270 59.34 4.54
28 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 240 46.33 278 53.67 5.43
29
Motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers
21 100.00 0 0.00 0.23
30 Other transport equipment 402 68.14 188 31.86 5.93
32 Other 49 22.69 167 77.31 2.10
Total 4,128    41.90 5,725     58.10 100.00
This table presents the distributions of sample of manufacturing firm across industries between 2008 
and 2014. The selected manufacturing firm are firm owned by group and stand-alone non-group firm 
listed in Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE Ltd.) and National Exchange of India Ltd. (NSE). The sample 
includes a total of 9,032 firm-year observations consisting 3,898 group firm and 5,134 non-group firm 
drawn from Prowess database provided by Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy Pvt Ltd. 
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Appendix 4 : Summary of 2-Digit Industry Code of Group Affiliates and Non-
Group Firms for Chapter 5 
 
2 Digit 
Industry 
Code
Industry
Group   
(N)
Percentage
Non-
Group     
(N)
Percentage
Cumulative 
Percentage
10 Food products 1464 70.93 600 29.07 8.10              
11 Beverages 139 65.57 73 34.43 0.83              
12 Tobacco products 71 75.53 23 24.47 0.37              
13 Textiles 1946 55.89 1536 44.11 13.67            
14 Wearing apparel 67 31.75 144 68.25 0.83              
15 Leather and related products 7 4.61 145 95.39 0.60              
16
Wood and products of wood and 
cork, except furniture
11 7.97 127 92.03 0.54              
17 Paper and paper products 259 40.28 384 59.72 2.52              
19
Coke and refined petroleum 
products
282 71.57 112 28.43 1.55              
20 Chemicals and chemical products 2396 73.93 845 26.07 12.73            
21
Pharmaceuticals, medicinal 
chemical and botanical products
779 47.27 869 52.73 6.47              
22 Rubber and plastics products 987 62.04 604 37.96 6.25              
23
Other non-metallic mineral 
products
1136 75.53 368 24.47 5.91              
24 Basic metals 2106 61.52 1317 38.48 13.44            
25
Fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment
436 55.05 356 44.95 3.11              
26
Computer, electronic and optical 
products
219 47.00 247 53.00 1.83              
27 Electrical equipment 622 54.23 525 45.77 4.50              
28 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 913 71.72 360 28.28 5.00              
29
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers
170 100.00 0 0.00 0.67              
30 Other transport equipment 1607 78.89 430 21.11 8.00              
32 Other 331 42.22 453 57.78 3.08              
Total 15,948    62.62 9,518       37.38 100.00         
This table presents the distributions of sample of manufacturing firm across industries between 2008 and 
2014. The selected manufacturing firm are firm owned by group and stand-alone non-group firm listed in 
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE Ltd.) and National Exchange of India Ltd. (NSE). The sample includes a total of  
25,466 firm-year observations consisting 15,948 group firm and 9,518 non-group firm drawn from Prowess 
database provided by Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy Pvt Ltd. 
